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Abstract 
This thesis presents a comprehensive study of Kyrgyz foreign policy from the early 
1990s to 2011. It seeks to answer the following research question: how and to 
what extent does regime security affect Kyrgyz foreign policymaking? In so doing, 
this work aims to contribute to the understanding of Central Asian politics and the 
foreign policy sources of weak states across the post-Soviet space. 
  
The underlying theme of this dissertation is centred on the question whether 
neorealist or constructivist traditions provide a more in-depth account of the erratic 
Kyrgyz foreign policymaking. Notwithstanding a myriad of studies on weak states, 
the analysis of their foreign policies is limited and mostly characterised by 
idiosyncratic, reductionist and great power approaches. In this respect, an 
interpretive and inductive framework integrative of both internal and external 
variables and with properly contextualised causal mechanisms may explain the 
international behaviour of weak states in broader and more genuine terms. Thus, 
the puzzle to be resolved is whether the concepts of rent-seeking and virtual 
politics can either substitute for or complement the New Great Game narratives in 
the context of weak states in general and Kyrgyzstan in particular. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Born out of the collapse of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan emerged as a weak state 
vulnerable to internal and external insecurities. Despite the proclamations by the 
Kyrgyz presidents to build a prosperous, democratic and multivector-oriented 
republic, Kyrgyzstan became one of the poorest countries in the region, whilst its 
multivector foreign policy resembled international beggary in seeking support from 
different and often contradictory actors. The prevailing political and academic 
discourses attributed this erratic foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan to geopolitical 
constraints and the systemic weaknesses of the country. Nonetheless, these 
developments were not only related to the systemic weaknesses of Kyrgyzstan, but 
were also deeply rooted in the autocratic and rent-seeking regime that flourished in 
the country.  
 
Accordingly, by presenting a comprehensive study of Kyrgyz foreign policy from 
the early 1990s to 2011, this thesis seeks to answer the following research 
question: how and to what extent does regime security affect Kyrgyz foreign 
policymaking? In so doing, this work aims to contribute to the understanding of 
Central Asian politics and explain the foreign policy sources of weak states across 
the post-Soviet space. The underlying theme of this dissertation is centred on the 
question whether neorealist or constructivist traditions provide a broader and more 
genuine account of the erratic Kyrgyz foreign policymaking. In particular, the puzzle 
to be resolved is whether the concepts of rent-seeking and virtual politics can 
substitute or complement the New Great Game narratives. 
 
Notwithstanding the myriad studies on weak states, the analysis of their foreign 
policies is limited and mostly characterised by idiosyncratic, reductionist or great 
power approaches. The first strand conceives foreign policy of weak states as an 
outcome of the idiosyncrasies, impulses and desires of a single leader. The 
reductionist or model-builders approach assumes that foreign policies of 
developing states are driven by the same decisional calculi of developed states, 
whilst the key difference is the scale of actions. The great power framework rests 
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on the principles of structural realism and thus explains international behaviour of 
small and weak states mostly from the perspective of systemic constraints. In a 
similar vein, Central Asia has been subjected to such trends of foreign policy 
analysis. In particular, most of the academic literature has conceived the 
international relations of Central Asia through the geopolitical interplay between 
greater players and has neglected the capacity of local states to influence foreign 
policy outcomes. 
 
Orthodox approaches to the study of the foreign policies of weak states tend to 
overlook key variables that are quintessential for the understanding of genuine 
inter- and intra-state relations. Weak states pose a formidable challenge to the 
Westphalian view of security and international order. Security in the context of 
weak states does not simply refer to external orientations or military capacities, but 
implies a wide range of preconditions vital for the existence of the state and which 
have already been realised in developed countries. Weak states lack a strong 
physical base, effective public institutions, a monopoly on the instruments of 
violence and a consensus on the idea of the state and thus are distinguished by 
the nature of their insecurities. The pivotal questions become: who is in power and 
what are their interests? Often characterised by corrupt, autocratic and family- and 
clan-based governance, the ruling elites struggle to escape the insecurity dilemma 
posed by internal and external weaknesses of the state and employ a variety of 
strategies to ensure security of their regime at the expense of the long-term state 
development. As a result, regime security often preoccupies the security agenda of 
the state and serves as the key rationale behind state policymaking. The perennial 
challenge of the ruling regimes in weak states becomes a dilemma between 
achieving short-term regime security or long-term state-building objectives.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis proposes to include the concept of regime security into the 
analysis of foreign policy decision-making in weak states in general and in 
Kyrgyzstan in particular. The ruling elites in weak states tend to prioritize their own 
security and thus shape the foreign policies of the state in accordance with the 
interests of their regimes. Thus, an interpretive and inductive framework integrative 
11 
 
of both internal and external variables and with properly contextualised causal 
mechanisms may explain the international behaviour of weak states in broader and 
more genuine terms. Specifically, such an approach provides an opportunity to 
answer the posed research question by examining neorealist explanations of 
foreign policies of weak states vis-à-vis virtual politics and rent-seeking. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
Causal Design 
The research design adopted for this study utilizes the techniques of high-quality 
investigative journalism with an academic approach to hypothesis-testing and 
theory-building.  It adopts three principles to ensure the validity and reliability of its 
generalizations: case study, process-tracing and triangulation. Since the aim of this 
work is to assess how and to what extent regime security affects Kyrgyz foreign 
policymaking, a causal design with multiple themes is the optimal research solution 
to determine causal relations between the variables. Causal design is a type of 
research, which attempts to measure the impact of one specific variable on another 
in the form of a conditional statement, such as “If X, then Y” (USC, 2012). Partial 
accommodation of a multiple-theme study within a causal design contributes to 
general theory-building and sharpens inductive tools. Unlike cross-sectional 
design, which seeks to identify patterns of association, causal design with multiple 
case studies is oriented towards establishing causal findings. As a result, the 
internal validity of such an approach is strong. Ecological validity is also strong, 
since the research methods do not intervene with the natural setting of foreign 
policy decision-making (Bryman, 2004). The issues of external validity, reliability 
and replicability are more challenging. External validity is concerned with the 
generalization of research findings beyond current research settings, whereas 
reliability and replicability are concerned with the consistency of research methods. 
Since the latter criteria are more dependent on the use of research methods than 
on the research design, lack of transparency regarding how the analysis of data 
was conducted leads to questioning of the reliability of the findings, whilst the 
unstructured and subjective nature of qualitative research significantly decreases 
the chances of true replication (Bryman, 2004: 284-285). Nonetheless, difficulty of 
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replication, lack of transparency and weak generalization (external validity) are not 
problems inherent in a particular design. Rather, they are challenges of qualitative 
research in general, as these replication, transparency and generalization are 
attributed more to quantitative research (Bryman, 2004). In this respect, alternative 
criteria may be introduced to substitute “reliability” and “external validity” such as 
“dependability” and “transferability” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Dependability, which 
parallels reliability, contributes to “trustworthiness” by necessitating an auditing 
approach to the merits of research, i.e. keeping all records for a peer audit (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). Transferability, which parallels external validity, justifies an 
intensive study of small groups by emphasizing the sophisticated and detailed 
context of findings required for possible transferability to other cases (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). 
 
Case Study and Causal Mechanisms 
This dissertation is a case study of Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz foreign policy informed 
by intensive and detailed investigation of several foreign policy themes, including 
Kyrgyzstan’s military and security relations and an analysis of the supply of jet fuel 
to the American Air Base Manas. Despite the differences and discrepancies in 
case study conceptualisations, theorising and practices, a case study can be 
recognized in general as a research strategy, which evaluates and develops 
theoretical explanations by conducting a comprehensive empirical examination of a 
particular phenomenon as a manifestation of broader phenomena (Rogowski, 
1995; Ragin, 2000, George and Bennett, 2005; Vennesson, 2008; Bennett and 
Checkel, 2014). The inductive nature of case study methods contributes 
significantly to hypothesis-testing and provides an opportunity for researchers to 
identify and study complex notions through the use of causal mechanisms. 
Although causal mechanisms are an unobservable, ontological process through 
which the causal agents affect and change the characteristics of other entities, 
hypotheses about these mechanisms can produce observable implications for 
testing and evaluation (George and Bennett, 2005: 137; Bennett and Checkel, 
2014: 14). Conceptualised as connections between independent and dependent 
variables casual mechanisms operate in distinct environments and serve to unpack 
13 
 
correlative probability propositions (Falleti and Lynch, 2009: 1145-1159). When 
causal mechanisms are well adapted to the operational context, the outcome is a 
plausible social scientific explanation without flawed causal inferences (Falleti and 
Lynch, 2009: 1144). 
 
Process-tracing 
With regards empirical research, scholars often resort to various within-case 
methods of analysis. Process-tracing is one of such methods, which is 
indispensable to the case study strategy (Vennesson, 2008: 224). Initially attributed 
to the use of data from within a case study to make assumptions about historical 
reasoning by Alexander George (1979), process-tracing can be identified as the 
use of “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to 
see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in 
fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 6). Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey Checkel (2014) 
redefine this notion by dropping the term “the intervening variable” to mitigate 
potential confusions and limit theory-building choices. Accordingly, Bennett and 
Checkel (2014: 7) define process-tracing as “the analysis of evidence on 
processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes 
of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might 
causally explain the case”. This definition underscores the inductive and deductive 
aspects of process-tracing and highlights the centrality of causal inference in the 
research method. 
 
The method of process-tracing is suited to the context of case studies and is adept 
at capturing causal mechanisms in action (George and Bennett, 2005: 224; 
Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 10). However, generalising the findings of such 
research can be challenging, because case studies investigate a particular 
phenomenon, whereas process-tracing is a within-case method of analysis. 
Nonetheless, case study methodologists argue that the research hypothesis can 
be tested not against different cases, but against different evidence derived from 
the original case (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 15-16). Thus, process-tracing can 
14 
 
help refine the proposed hypothesis and clarify the workings of causal 
mechanisms, which, in turn, may lead to the inductive evolution of theory itself 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 16). In addition, George and Bennett (2005: 216) 
assert that process-tracing is useful for the development of contingent 
generalizations that unpack the conditions, which may produce alternative results. 
This aspect is especially useful for the cases with equifinality, where a combination 
of different variables can lead to the same outcome (George and Bennett, 2005; 
Bennett and Checkel, 2014). The research of Central Asian politics fits well within 
this framework, since the analysis of this subject requires engagement with a 
multitude of diverse variables. In sum, process-tracing can clarify under which 
conditions a hypothesis may be generalised and whether causal mechanisms are 
either very generalisable or exclusive to a single case, although the level of a 
hypothesis’s generalisability for inductively-derived reasoning is nearly impossible 
to determine prior to the actual investigation (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 16-17).  
 
Also, process-tracing is based meta-theoretically on scientific realism with its focus 
on objectivity and reasoning, which in turn is closer to positivism than to 
interpretism (George and Bennett, 2005: 17; Wight, 2002: 35-36). This points to a 
foundational challenge of reconciling process-tracing with interpretism or 
constructivism and gives rise to the question whether there is room for interpretive 
process-tracing. Indeed, it may appear difficult to combine process-tracing and a 
constructivist tradition, partially because constructivism on its own is a broad 
church encompassing diverse variants. Nevertheless, process-tracing can still 
strengthen both positivist and interpretivist research designs by allowing scholars 
to investigate the causal “what” and “how” (Lin, 1998: 166–169; Vennesson, 2008: 
224; Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 17-19). For example, conventional constructivists 
like Alexander Wendt promoted scientific realism and causal mechanisms and 
accepted assessment standards for the interpretations of social phenomena 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 17). In these instances (as perceived by interpretive 
constructivists), where agency and structure are too intermingled to distinguish 
independent and dependent variables, it is still possible to dissect events and 
steps, which reveal contestation between the agent and the structure (Bennett and 
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Checkel, 2014: 17). Even radical constructivists have established standards of 
evidence and “how to” guides in order to conduct systematic and textual analysis 
(Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 17). Furthermore, George and Bennett (2005: 17) 
identified a case as “an instance of a class of events”. Bennett and Checkel (2014: 
8) argue that such a definition acknowledges that a case is the social construction 
of both political players responsible for that class of events and political scholars 
who categorise those events. In other words, a class of events is not a given 
substance, but a product of scholarly interpretations. Not surprisingly, process-
tracing features significantly in the works of many conventional, interpretive and 
radical constructivists (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 17-18). 
 
Triangulation 
I use the technique of triangulation due to the nature of the region, lack of 
academic literature and the possibility of biases. Triangulation in social sciences 
applies a mixing of methodologies and data types in order to validate the diverse 
claims related to a research question (Olsen, 2004).  This technique entails the use 
of more than one source of data, and it can operate within and across research 
strategies (Bryman, 2004: 275). The main justification of the use of triangulation is 
that by this means the results of one research strategy are cross-checked with the 
outcomes of other research strategies (Bryman, 2004: 454). 
 
There were three stages of research, beginning with a literature review to establish 
specific and testable propositions, followed by two phases of data collection: 
 
1. Literature review. The academic literature in political science and International 
Relations on foreign policy and regime security of weak states was examined.  
 
2. Document Analysis. The term “documents” constitutes a heterogeneous set of 
written, visual and audio sources of data such as private documents, mass media 
outputs, official state documents, etc., which have not been intentionally produced 
for social research (Bryman, 2004). These are the primary sources and include 
different genres. Although the ways of analysing these materials may vary, the key 
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evaluation criteria incorporate principles of authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (Bryman, 2004: 381). 
 
3. Semi-structured interviewing. Semi-structured interviewing prevents the 
premature closure of the research focus by inquiring into alternative avenues. On 
one side, the presence of the interview guide with structured and themed questions 
ensured that all interviewees were questioned within a specific topic (which 
improves the replicability and reliability of the research). On the other, the flexibility 
of semi-structured interviews provided the possibility to incorporate unexpected 
nuances and depart from the initial questioning at no expense to the validity of the 
research. My sampling for semi-structured interviewing was purely opportunistic, 
but driven by a purposive approach. I also used a snowballing technique to gain 
further access to individuals whose experience was pertinent to my research.  
 
Fieldwork 
My fieldwork was comprised of two stages. I have spent four months in Bishkek in 
the autumn of 2012 and three months in the summer of 2013. I also had the 
advantage of being a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, since I utilised every non-academic trip 
to Bishkek for academic purposes in order to gather additional information. In a 
similar vein, I have combined my academic and non-academic trips to New York, 
Washington, Brussels, London and Beijing to meet new people with knowledge of 
Central Asian politics. As a result, I have managed to interview a variety of 
individuals ranging from former prime-ministers, diplomats and security officers to 
current high-level officials, members of parliament and representatives of 
international organisations. 
 
Ethics 
The explanation of the goals of the research is critical for ensuring an informed 
decision by the interviewees to participate in the study. The informed nature of 
participation also reduces the risks of deception. Thus, all interviewees were 
informed about the aims of the dissertation, the purpose of the interview, and 
where the results may be published. In particular, it was stressed that no 
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organization has a vested interest in the outcomes of my research. The written 
information sheet in the language of instruction of the interviewee was presented, 
and written consent for the interview was obtained in the instances where the 
interviewees were willing to formally sign such documents. In all other cases, the 
interviewees were orally informed about the research theme and its objectives. 
Since research that may harm both the interviewer and the interviewees is 
unacceptable, all possible measures were taken to prevent physical, moral and 
reputational harm to both interviewer and interviewee. For instance, the 
interlocutors who have requested protection of their identities were granted 
absolute anonymity. In these cases, written notes were used instead of tape-
recording, whilst all obtained records of the interviews were password-protected 
and confidentially stored on an external portable drive. In general, to ensure best 
ethnics practices I was guided by the Statement of Ethical Practice for the British 
Sociological Association and by the American Sociological Association's Code of 
Ethics. 
 
Challenges and Limitations 
One of the greatest challenges of conducting research in Central Asia is the limited 
access to credible and objective data to use for academic analysis. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the subsequent decline of its educational institutions (or the lack 
of the development of thereof) and the lack of national funding to sponsor 
independent research negatively affected the quality and number of academic 
works produced within Central Asia on Central Asia.1 In a similar vein, the 
dwindling interest of the West in Central Asia (compared to that of the early 1990s) 
and thus the cut of the funding for the Central Asian research also resulted in the 
decrease of high quality academic works on the region.2 The lack of academic 
literature on Central Asia is further exacerbated by the lack of objective and 
trustworthy non-academic information. Since information has a strategic value, 
1 For instance, see the notes of the seminar ‘Knowledge Production and Knowledge Transfer in and 
on Central and Inner Asia’ available at: http://rethinking.asia/report/knowledge-production-and-
knowledge-transfer-and-central-and-inner-asia.  
2 This problem was also actively discussed at the seminar ‘Knowledge Production and Knowledge 
Transfer in and on Central and Inner Asia’. 
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parties to a conflict3 tend to promote information that aids their goals, whilst 
discrediting information of their adversaries (Schultz, 2004). As a result, 
information available for public access is often limited or skewed towards the lack 
of credibility and bias (Schultz, 2004). Thus, it becomes extremely difficult to gather 
original and trustworthy data for the rigorous analysis of intricate political 
phenomena in Central Asia. 
 
Central Asia on its own is a difficult place to conduct independent research, 
especially if the research is related to sensitive political topics. Access to officials is 
limited even for locals, mainly due to the institutional culture, bureaucratic “red 
tape” and the psychological motives of state officials to classify most of the 
information. Access to information becomes even more limited if an interviewer is 
associated with foreign institutions, partly because of the geopolitical mind-set that 
prevails in the region. Shaped predominantly by the experience of Soviet 
“nomenklatura”, most officials still remain closed to public and academic inquiries. 
Although there is a new trend of openness and receptivity to the public amongst 
current Kyrgyz policymakers, these initiatives lack constructive substance and 
resemble the efforts to improve the public image of politicians. In addition, state 
officials often resort to façade-making. As a result, the articulation of ideal state 
practices by officials may hide the genuine dynamics of official decision-making. 
Some interviewees who are in positions of power and consent to reveal their 
identity tend to emphasize positive trends and good governance practices, whilst 
omitting negative and contentious developments. 
 
Such an uneven access to the documents and data also affected the methodology 
of my research and in particular the techniques of process-tracing and 
triangulation. Indeed, process-tracing is a fundamental tool for the qualitative 
research. The causal process in our case can be identified as the causal 
mechanism between the independent and intervening variables and the outcome 
of such causal influences. Yet, it may be difficult to run a classical process-tracing 
research model in the context of Central Asia. This research method requires 
3 Such as the struggle over power or resources. For instance, see Norman Schultz’s (2004) 
classification of ‘conflict information’. 
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establishing causal-process observations or diagnostic evidence with recurring 
empirical regularities in order to assess and test causal inferences (Collier, 2011: 
824; Mahoney, 2012). However, collection of such evidence in Central Asia is 
problematic in its own right due to the aforementioned nature of conducting 
independent research in the region. In addition, process-tracing’s standard problem 
of missing variables may be exacerbated by the presence of biased or false data, 
which in turn can lead to analytical errors.  
 
As a result, my research design took the form of a high-quality investigative 
journalism approach. I have explored a variety of primary and secondary sources 
to reconstruct certain political decisions and actions in Kyrgyzstan such as the 
reorientation of the Manas air base to the Transit Centre at Manas. Then these 
series of events were linked together in order to understand causal relations 
between broader phenomena of regime security and rent-seeking and foreign 
policy of Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, as David Collier (2011: 824) advised, in some 
instances a detective work has been done in order to gather and evaluate 
diagnostic evidence.  
 
Quite often, however, the found evidence was either circumstantial or unreliable 
due to the political sensitivity of the research topic. Nonetheless, the methodology 
also has to be adapted to the realities of political research. In the cases, where 
there are no solid historical clues and facts, inferential leaps are an accepted 
element of hypothesis construction in order to trace the existence of consistent 
underlying causal mechanisms (Janis, 1982; Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Thus, I 
have attempted to evaluate my causal inferences through the prism of a “smoking-
gun” empirical test based on the factual and circumstantial evidence.  
 
Scholars who study process-tracing usually assess causal mechanisms through 
the colourfully named “straw-in-the-wind”, “hoop”, “smoking-gun”, and “doubly 
decisive” tests (Van Evera, 1997; Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2012; Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013). A “straw-in-the-wind” test metaphorically demonstrates that 
diagnostic evidence is too weak (Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2012). A “hoop” test 
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metaphorically makes the hypothesis to “jump through the hoop” in order to remain 
under consideration (Collier, 2011: 826). A “smoking-gun” test assumes 
metaphorically that a person who is caught with a smoking gun is purportedly guilty 
(Collier, 2011: 827). A “doubly decisive” test assumes that the evidence has been 
double-checked and completely verified (Collier, 2011). 
 
Thus, a “hoop” test suggests that a piece of diagnostic evidence has to be present 
for a proposed hypothesis to be valid (Van Evera, 1997; Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 
2012). If this hypothesis passes a “hoop” test, then it somewhat weakens rival 
hypotheses (Collier, 2011: 825). In a similar vein, if a proposed hypothesis passes 
a “smoking-gun” test, then it significantly weakens rival hypotheses (Collier, 2011: 
825). If a proposed hypothesis passes a “doubly decisive” test, then it completely 
eliminates all other hypothesis, although such a situation is highly improbable in 
social science (Collier, 2011: 827). However, passing a “hoop” test does not 
guarantee that a proposed hypothesis is valid, whilst failing a “smoking-gun” test 
does not mean that a proposed hypothesis is invalid (Mahoney, 2012: 571-572). 
Moreover, if there is a considerable doubt about the certitude of these tests, then 
these tests become the “straw-in-the-wind” tests, which neither confirm nor reject 
the hypothesis in question (Van Evera, 1997; Mahoney, 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, in the context of the Central Asian political landscape, a “smoking-
gun” test may provide sufficient criteria for the acceptance of underlying causal 
mechanisms, although multiple “straw-in-the-wind” evidence may also produce a 
convincing case. As James Mahoney (2012: 582) emphasised, “Chains of linked 
necessary conditions provide a good opportunity for the analyst to carry out a 
smoking gun test: She or he can show how an initial cause was essential to put the 
overall sequence in motion, culminating in the outcome.” Since this thesis attempts 
to assess the role of regime security in Kyrgyz foreign policymaking, the key 
support for this claim engages a “smoking-gun” test concerning the causal 
mechanism that connects regime security and the erratic foreign policy of 
Kyrgyzstan.  
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In order to accumulate a “smoking-gun” proof, it was important to mitigate the 
difficulties of gathering data for independent research in Central Asia. In this 
respect, elite interviews are an important means of collecting sufficient data for the 
process-tracing studies (Tansey, 2007). Apart from reconstructing a set of events, 
elite interviews also contribute to the triangulation technique by providing an 
opportunity to cross-check the accuracy of other findings (Tansey, 2007). 
Accordingly, in light of the aforementioned difficulties of getting access to 
information, I had to rely on my experience of conducting academic and non-
academic interviews and on my large pool of personal contacts in order to set up 
formal and informal interviews with current and former state officials, 
representatives of the business sector and members of the international 
community. There is a traditional humorous anecdote that if someone begins a 
conversation with the Kyrgyz, he/she may find common relatives. This anecdote 
reflects the interconnectedness of Kyrgyz society. In a nomadic-rooted society of 
five million people, hypothetically one can find ways to meet anyone in the country. 
Accordingly, I have utilised these arrangements for academic purposes in order to 
meet and interview a variety of people. I started by interviewing people whom I 
knew personally, and I also asked my personal contacts (friends, relatives, former 
colleagues, classmates, neighbours, etc.) to introduce me to people whose 
experience was pertinent to my research. Similarly, I have asked my interviewees 
to recommend me to someone else whose knowledge would be relevant to my 
studies based on the conducted interviews.  
 
My greatest concern was related to the question of the extent, to which I could 
have relied on the information provided by my interviewees. Since most of my 
interviews have been organised after favourable introductions, I hoped that the 
chances of façade-making would be minimal. Indeed, many interviewees spoke 
quite frankly to me about sensitive political topics, although some of them preferred 
to remain anonymous. Nonetheless, the veracity of some information was difficult 
to triangulate, although several of my interviewees shared quite peculiar and 
previously untold stories of Kyrgyz policymaking. As a result, even though these 
details could have enriched my work, I had to omit them in my research. Also, 
22 
 
sometimes the interviewees reconstructed or described events through the prism 
of their own thoughts and beliefs instead of narrating the story as they have 
experienced it.4 Thus, I often had to clarify whether my interviewees have directly 
participated in a particular decision-making process or have heard from someone 
else about this process. In addition, most of my interviewees presented the 
perspective of a certain stratum of officials or represented the new regime. This 
situation is related to the fact that the inner circles of ousted Akayev or Bakiyev are 
inaccessible for interviews, since most of them are either on the run or are 
otherwise unreachable for academic interviews, e.g. Aidar Akayev or Maksim 
Bakiyev. Accordingly, although I have sought to mitigate this situation through the 
use of triangulation technique, it is important to underline that this research misses 
original views expressed by important representatives of the old regime. 
 
Finally, in addition to the difficulty of collecting data, I was also concerned about 
the subjectivity of my interpretations. Certainly, there are numerous advantages of 
studying Central Asia as a Central Asian such as the knowledge of the local 
languages, easier access to information, network connections, personal 
observations, better understanding of political, economic and cultural context, and 
etc. Nonetheless, I was still worried about whether my Central Asian lenses could 
have distorted my understanding of complex political processes in Kyrgyzstan and 
thus led to an omitted-variable bias. Thus, I tried to stay as critical and open-
minded as possible, whilst relying solely on facts and circumstantial evidence 
amidst the prevalence of conspirological and speculative knowledge in the region. 
My methodology was also shaped in a manner to prevent research biases, whilst 
the entire research has been conducted under the vigilante guidance of my 
supervisor. In addition, I have presented the findings of my research at various 
workshops and conferences to get valuable advices and feedback on how to 
improve my work.5   
4 It is unknown whether they have done it intentionally or unintentionally. 
5 To name a few: the workshop “Stepping Out of the New Great Game Narrative: Re-Joining 
Central Asia and International Relations” at the King’s College, 54th Annual Convention of the 
International Studies Association, the workshop “Central Asia’s Hidden Offshore Ties: the Politics of 
Money-Laundering and Virtual State-Building”, at Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, the 3rd 
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Significance 
There are several implications of my research. First, my dissertation proposes to 
examine the international relations of weak states in general and of those in 
Central Asia in particular through an interpretive and inductive framework 
integrative of internal, external and transnational dynamics. Such a framework 
challenges orthodox and conventional approaches to the study of the foreign 
policies of weak states by presenting a new conceptual lens for the causal analysis 
of complex phenomenon in volatile and turbulent regions. Since relatively few 
studies have examined the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy choices of 
Central Asian states, this work aims to provide new conceptual insights into the 
analysis of Central Asian politics and to contribute to the growing literature on the 
challenges and opportunities of transitional states.  
 
Second, the novelty of my work is the integration of political economy and foreign 
policy. The proposed framework seeks not only to bridge the gap between 
systemic and domestic views on Kyrgyz foreign policy, but also complements the 
role of the political economy in the understanding of foreign policy. Kyrgyzstan will 
be used as the empirical ground to demonstrate how the political economy of rent-
seeking shapes foreign policy orientations of the republic. Building upon an 
empirical study of supplying jet fuel to the American air base Manas in Bishkek as 
part of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, this work will expose the 
symbiosis of illicit practices in developing countries with licit and semi-licit practices 
in developed countries in order to explore financial connections, which are integral 
to the nexus of weak states and organised criminal groups. Such corrupt practices 
are not only a predominant feature of business relations in the post-Soviet region 
but in other regions as well. Thus, one of the goals of this research is to 
demonstrate that rather than existing exclusively in the domestic politics of weak 
states, corruption in the developing world involves myriad different actors, ranging 
from corrupt state officials and local and international middlemen to offshore shell 
companies and reputable financial institutions. In turn, the commercial interests of 
these powerful economic groups may become the main driver of the foreign 
Annual Central Asian Studies workshop at the Newcastle University, and the 2nd Annual Central 
Asian Studies workshop at the University of Exeter. 
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policies of weak states. As this work demonstrates, the local and global political 
economies of supplying jet fuel to the Manas Air Base overshadowed potential 
geopolitical points of friction between Washington and Moscow, whilst financial 
vehicles and offshore mechanisms ensured that the secret arrangements between 
senior Kyrgyz officials, shell and intermediary companies, the American 
Department of Defence and Russian refineries remained intact.  
 
Third, this work contributes to the understanding of the role of regional security 
organisations in ensuring political stability in Kyrgyzstan, especially from the 
perspective of virtual politics and state performance. In general, although the 
complicated nature of the Central Asian security landscape gives rise to a variety 
of empirical puzzles to be explored, the military security of Kyrgyzstan is an 
underdeveloped area of research. The analysis of the effectiveness of regional 
security organisations has strong normative aspirations, because this work calls for 
a reassessment of both Kyrgyzstan’s participation in multilateral military 
organisations and the role of international security structures in Kyrgyzstan. The 
violence of June 2010 between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the south of 
Kyrgyzstan serves as an excellent empirical demonstration of the ineffectiveness of 
bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, since neither the Kyrgyz 
government nor international actors were willing and prepared to stop the ethnic 
bloodshed in the south of Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter I attempts to situate the argument of this thesis within broader debates of 
International Relations (IR). In particular, this chapter proposes to bridge the divide 
between IR and its subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) by introducing an 
interpretivist approach integrative of internal, external and transnational dynamics 
to the analyses of foreign policy. The need for an inductive framework with a 
causal methodology is propelled by the inability of both orthodox IR and FPA to 
adequately explain the behaviour of international actors.  
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Chapter II seeks to further justify the unpacking of IR’s “billiard balls” through the 
prism of constructivist traditions. This chapter reveals that the concept of weak 
states deviates from the orthodox thinking of IR, as the conceptualisation of weak 
states challenges the Westphalian view of security and international order. This 
section demonstrates that the existing approaches to the study of the foreign policy 
of weak states are limited and centred on idiosyncratic, great power and 
reductionist themes. Accordingly, Chapter II proposes to distance itself from 
conventional approaches to the understanding of the foreign policies of weak 
states and examine the international behaviour of those states by incorporating 
systemic constraints, internal insecurities and transnational links. In particular, 
Chapter II suggests exploring the neorealist explanations of foreign policies of the 
Central Asian states in conjunction with the concepts of virtual politics and rent-
seeking. A special focus has to be given to the role of regime security amongst 
other variables, since the established norms, rules and governing arrangements of 
the ruling elites become decisive in shaping the foreign policy orientations of weak 
states.  
 
Chapter III presents the case of Kyrgyzstan as a weak state distinguished by the 
complex nature of internal insecurities and external vulnerabilities. By examining 
the development of Kyrgyz foreign policy from the early 1990s to 2011, this chapter 
provides a retrospective analysis of Kyrgyz foreign policymaking through the prism 
of institutional formation, regime security and systemic pressures. In particular, this 
chapter seeks to explain the erratic foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan from the 
perspective of systemic constraints and the rent-seeking interests of the Kyrgyz 
ruling regimes. In addition, this section demonstrates how official and unofficial 
foreign policy discourses were used by the Kyrgyz leadership to justify 
opportunistic and mercantile deviations of Kyrgyz foreign policy, whilst the concept 
of multivector foreign policy appeared to be a mere act of state performance aimed 
at reproducing the predominant order.  
 
Chapter IV further explores the schism between the domestic and international 
dimensions of state and regime security in Kyrgyzstan. This section studies the 
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military cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Russia, China and the USA within the 
frameworks of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation), the SCO 
(Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation), and examines the roles of Kyrgyzstan’s security structures and its 
military partners during the ethnic violence of June 2010 in the south of 
Kyrgyzstan. The participation of Kyrgyzstan in regional security initiatives is 
scrutinised as a showcase orchestrated by the Kyrgyz ruling regimes to display 
their bandwagoning attitudes towards more powerful players in order to 
accommodate the ambitions of regional hegemons and reinforce domestic regime 
security. 
 
Lastly, Chapter V presents the experience of the American air base Manas as an 
empirical instance in order to examine the sources of Kyrgyz foreign policy and test 
the validity of the great power narratives vis-à-vis the rent-seeking variable. This 
chapter provides a detailed analysis of a complex struggle over the fuel supplies to 
the American air base at the Manas International Airport. In particular, this section 
reveals how Kyrgyz foreign policy decisions related to the Manas Air Base have 
rarely gone beyond the commercial preferences of the ruling elites. Whilst unveiling 
complex fuel arrangements between the American vendors and local 
subcontractors, this chapter demonstrates that the geopolitical New Great Game is 
a misleading concept, as the multifarious fuel cobweb had involved senior Kyrgyz 
officials, Russian Gazprom-owned refineries, American agency DLA-Energy and 
Gibraltar-registered companies.  
 
In the conclusion, I discuss the findings of the research, its contributions and 
implications and propose avenues for further research. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
One Foreign Policy, Many Theories6 
 
The end of the Cold War, the events of 9/11 and the globalization of world politics 
posed a formidable challenge to the mainstream theories of International Relations 
(IR) reinvigorating the need for the re-thinking within the field. One of the 
implications of this “soul-searching in the academic discipline” of IR (Sorensen, 
1998: 83) was the renewal of interest in foreign policy and its contribution to the 
understanding of world politics in general, and the behaviour of international actors 
in particular (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2008). Traditionally, Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) has been one of the most conventional approaches to the study of 
foreign policy decision-making. Yet, FPA was often dismissed by mainstream IR 
theorists due to its internal incongruities and its lack of grand theory. In turn, 
orthodox IR itself was subject to serious pitfalls and erroneous applications, 
especially when applied to the context of weak and failed states. Thus, the growing 
relevance of foreign policy in world politics encouraged scholars to develop the 
existing literature on FPA within the wider theoretical frameworks of IR (Smith, 
Hadfield and Dunne, 2008: 8).  
 
Accordingly, since this work seeks to assess how regime security affects Kyrgyz 
foreign policymaking, this chapter will attempt to situate the argument of the thesis 
within broader debates of IR and the literature on FPA. The first section of this 
chapter will examine foreign policy decision-making through the prism of FPA 
scholarship. The second section will scrutinise whether mainstream IR theories 
offer a broader and more politically situated account for the analysis of foreign 
policy. I identify social constructivism as a tradition capable of reinvigorating the 
study of foreign policy: the third section will bridge the divide between FPA and IR 
by introducing Colin Hay’s critical approach to political analysis. Hay’s approach 
examines causal processes through process-tracing. Such an approach is well-
6 This title is a paraphrase of Jack Snyder’s and Stephen Walt’s similarly-named articles. 
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equipped to systematise constructivist research, foster interdisciplinary dialogue 
and provide intriguing opportunities for the generalization of findings. In sum, whilst 
examining the notion of “foreign policy” and its links with FPA and IR, this chapter 
seeks to propose an inductive approach to foreign policy. This will include internal, 
external and transnational variables. Such a multi-causal framework will sharpen 
the epistemological foundations of FPA and the meta-theoretical tools of IR to 
adequately and genuinely explain the foreign policy behaviour of weak states such 
as those in Central Asia.  
 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
Traditionally, FPA has been one of the most comprehensive and fashionable 
approaches to the study of foreign policy. Valerie Hudson (2008: 12) defined FPA 
as “the subfield of IR that seeks to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign 
policy behaviour, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision 
makers, acting singly and in groups”. FPA scholarship was developed in the 1950s 
with three paradigmatic works laying the foundation for this subfield: James 
Rosenau (1966) on comparative foreign policy; Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) 
on the psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision-making; Richard 
Snyder, Henry Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954) on the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, despite its aspirations to examine and explain inter-state decision-
making processes, FPA failed to develop into an authoritative subfield of IR.  The 
main criticisms of FPA stemmed from its apparent internal incongruities and the 
absence of any form of grand theory. 
 
The term “foreign policy” is usually referred to the area of governmental activity that 
deals with the relationships between the actors (usually states) within the 
international community (White, 1981: 3). One of the classical definitions of “foreign 
policy” is given by Christopher Hill who defined it as “the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations” (Hill, 2003: 3).7 For Walter Carlsnaes (2002: 335) foreign policy is: 
7 The term “an independent actor” adds a breadth to the nature of foreign policy actors. The usage 
of “official” enables the inclusion of all outputs of the governmental mechanisms whilst maintaining 
certain parsimony amongst the plethora of international transactions (Hill, 2003: 3). The policy is 
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 Those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, 
commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental 
representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are 
directed towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental 
and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond 
their territorial legitimacy.  
 
In a similar vein, Hudson (2008: 12) characterised foreign policy as “the strategy or 
approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations 
with external entities.” This is akin to Lena Jonson’s understanding of foreign policy 
as the patterns of official state behaviour towards one another. These actions are 
derived from both the deeds and the words of the official actors (2001: 96).  
 
The classic FPA scholarship considered the particularities of human decision 
makers to be vital to the understanding of international relations. The pioneering 
work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) inspired the first wave of FPA scholars to 
unpack “the black boxes” of IR and search for explanations at inside states 
themselves. As Snyder et al (1954: 53) emphasised, 
 
We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we 
have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing 
decision-making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing 
the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political 
society.  
 
Dissatisfied with realism’s ability to explain foreign policy choices, Snyder et al 
urged the scholars to move away from the systemic explanations of foreign policy 
outcomes and examine the role of domestic players in foreign policy formation. 
 
In a similar vein, Harold and Margaret Sprout (1965) believed that foreign policy 
processes should be studied using the human psycho-milieu or the environed units 
“sum” and “foreign” to exclude the possibility of considering every particular action as a separate 
foreign policy and to emphasize that the world is not yet a “homogenizing” entity, but rather a place 
full of “foreigners and strangers” (Hill, 2003: 3). 
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who are in power and have the authority to make decisions on behalf of nation-
states. In particular, the Sprouts distinguished the milieu or the environment from 
the psycho-milieu (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 28). The latter was identified as the 
psychological, political, social and situational environment as it is perceived by the 
decision makers (Sprout and Sprout, 1965; Hudson, 2008: 14-15). This perspective 
assumed that environmental factors can affect human values, choices and 
decisions only if they are perceived and reacted to by human individuals (Sprout 
and Sprout, 1965: 7). In other words, the application of the psycho-ecological terms 
to such concepts as “state”, “regime” or “system” is rather insensible, since the 
human individuals are the cornerstone of all theories on man-milieu relationships 
(Sprout and Sprout, 1965). As Brian White (1981: 9) summarised, “[T]here is no 
need to account for the objective ‘realities’ of the state’s environmental situation if 
the subjective perceptions of decision makers are what counts.”  
 
In turn, Rosenau (1966) attempted to push for a middle-range theory, which would 
integrate information at several levels of analysis: the individual, role, 
governmental, societal and systemic levels (Hudson, 2008). Rosenau challenged 
the Sprouts reductionism, whilst accepting the relevance of the variable the 
Sprouts added. The key focus of the Rosenau’s pre-theorising was towards the 
formulation of an actor-specific theory, which would estimate “the relative potency” 
of different variables for a state and then assess and even predict the foreign policy 
behaviour of that state (Rosenau, 2006: 200). The Rosenau’s pre-theorising 
gradually evolved into the theory of Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) with strong 
direction towards scientism and behaviouralism (Hudson, 2008). The adherents of 
CFP suggest that foreign policy behaviour can be studied in aggregate and, thus, 
the dependent variable can be conceptualised via foreign policy events (Hudson, 
2008: 19). 
 
In general, these seminal pieces encouraged a generation of foreign policy 
analysts to develop middle-range theories and open “the black box of domestic 
politics and policy making in an effort to understand actors' choices in global 
politics” (Garrison et al, 2003: 155). The initial period of FPA scholarship was 
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marked by a burst of intellectual activity, ranging from methodological innovations 
to the development of actor-specific theories. In sum, however, classical FPA was 
an intellectual product of behaviourism conceived in terms of basic rational actor 
individualism. It was developed as a response to realism, which it sought to 
challenge. This challenge was relatively successful and FPA became orthodoxy for 
scholars analyzing inter-state interactions. As a result, FPA retained the use of the 
prism of realist state-centric assumptions (White, 1981: 6; Allison, 1971). These 
views regarded the state or usually the government as a centrally coordinated and 
purposive individual, whose actions are rational, value-maximizing and calculated 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999; White, 1981: 6). Foreign policy was treated as the 
matter of rational choice with particular goals, objectives, options, consequences 
and final choices (Allison, 1971).  
 
For instance, in his seminal work, Graham Allison (1971) labelled such an 
approach as the rational actor model. Since different conceptualizations of foreign 
policy lead to distinct answers and interpretations, Allison (1971) also introduced 
models of organizational behaviour and governmental politics frameworks as 
powerful alternatives to the rational actor model (Smith, 1981; Allison and Zelikow, 
1999). The organizational behaviour model examined state actions as the output of 
large organizations, which constitute the government and which work according to 
the regular patterns of institutional behaviour (Allison, 1971). This model focused 
on the role of organizational components and its standard operating procedures in 
defining the problem, outlining the options and implementing the solution (Allison, 
1971). In turn, by dismissing the characterization of foreign policy as the unitary 
choice or the organizational output, the governmental politics model suggested that 
foreign policy is the outcome of bargaining games between different players in the 
national governments with diverse goals and objectives (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 
6).  
 
The focus on bureaucratic politics, organisational behaviour and group decision-
making was a common feature of classic FPA scholarship. The adherents of 
Snyder, Rosenau and Sprouts believed that the system-level analysis of foreign 
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policy was simply insufficient. As Michael Clarke (1981: 15) emphasised, foreign 
policy decision-making needs to be examined in a broader context; a range of 
political, institutional, organisational, environmental and personal forces may be 
responsible for foreign policy actions. For example, Allison (1971) combined his 
three approaches to determine causal factors that shaped foreign policy actions of 
both the USA and the USSR during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The rational 
actor model illuminated the larger foreign policy patterns, the organisational 
behaviour model revealed an organizational routine to the decision-making 
process, and the governmental politics model underscored the bargaining games 
between the political players (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 392). Other authors 
examined the influence of groupthink, organisational structure and bureaucratic 
politics on decision-making (Hudson, 2008). Some scholars believed that foreign 
policy in wider terms is a series of decisions made by a conglomerate of different 
political actors (White, 1981). Others argued that the central explanation of state 
behaviour lies in the decision-making processes within the organisational context, 
with the basic determinants of state action being communication and information 
flows, the spheres of competence of the involved players and actors’ motivations 
(Hudson, 2008: 13; Snyder et al, 2002). In essence, all these determinants 
presumed that foreign policy choices are made on the basis of the decision 
makers’ perceptions, motives and competencies (Snyder et al, 2002: 144).  
 
Nevertheless, although FPA experienced a flourishing start, its progress began to 
contract by the late 1980s with the theory of CFP being most affected (Hudson, 
2007). The criticisms of FPA were related to its value in general, its reductionist 
position, US foreign policy orientation and the absence of a grand explanatory 
theory (Garrison et al, 2003: 156). The approach of CFP to foreign policy led to 
major internal incongruities, since CFP required immense data on the variety of 
possible independent variables with empirical testing across time and nations 
(Hudson, 2008: 19; Alden and Aron, 2012). As Hudson (2008: 25) asserted, “CFP 
methods demanded parsimony in theory; CFP theory demanded nuance and detail 
in method.” As a result, the growing number of explanantia called into question the 
reliability of the methodology and the lack of parsimony within the theory (Hudson, 
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2008). This incongruity was further escalated by CFP’s struggle to choose between 
the quantifiable and non-quantifiable explanatory variables. Indeed, CFP’s drive to 
impact both academia and the practical foreign policy sphere with the same 
research led to the outcomes that were “unsatisfactory in a scholarly as well as a 
policy sense” (Hudson, 2008: 25). In addition, to certain extent FPA continued to 
reinforce traditional realist assumptions (White, 1981: 7). For Snyder et al (2002: 
78), decision-making was “a process which results in the selection from a socially 
defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects of one project 
intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the 
decision makers”. Such a conceptualisation is similar to the “state-as-billiard-ball” 
analogy of rational decision-making, but with the decision makers being the units of 
analysis. Even the Sprouts (1965), who attempted to revise ecological concepts in 
the context of international politics via the psycho-milieu, operated within the 
vocabulary of the realist statecraft, e.g. the concepts of power, influence, political 
potential, action, reaction, etc.  
 
Yet, notwithstanding the periods of decline and critical self-reflection, contemporary 
FPA retains its commitment to build an actor-specific and agent-oriented theory 
and consider both the process and the outcomes of foreign policy decision-making 
(Hudson, 2007: 31). Conceptually, foreign policy engages with the literature on 
public policy, social psychology and comparative politics and necessitates an 
engagement with wider social science and a number of subfields (Smith, Hadfield 
and Dunne, 2008: 4). Current FPA scholarship attempts to expand those linkages 
and seeks new methodologies and greater cross-level integration of explanatory 
variables (Hudson, 2008: 12). In addition, it was FPA – with its focus on decisions, 
decision makers and decision-making systems – which challenged the orthodox 
“state-as-billiard-ball” analysis of foreign policy (White, 1981; Snyder et al, 2002). 
FPA provides a different, rather behavioural insight to the study of foreign policy, 
since the human agents and not the states become the object of study (White, 
1981: 8). As a result, FPA is still prone to multifactorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary 
and integrative analysis of foreign policy decision-making (Hudson, 2007). 
Rosenau (2006) himself appears to be more inclined towards a more holistic 
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approach to the understanding of world events, although the formulation of a 
comparative foreign policy theory remains viable for him. Consequently, as Steve 
Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (2008: 7) note, it is critical to bridge the 
divide between FPA and IR bestowing “IR with a greater appreciation for the multi-
level and multi-causal dynamics, whilst granting FPA a clearer idea of ‘grand 
principles”. Within the interdisciplinary context FPA and IR enjoy a special 
relationship; they both attempt to understand, explain or even predict the inputs 
and outputs of state behaviour. 
 
Foreign Policy and IR 
Indeed, foreign policy may be examined via different theoretical lenses, and FPA 
by itself does not provide a broad picture of foreign policy dynamics. As Hill (2003: 
283) argues, “[F]oreign policy is an activity rather than an outlook: it may be 
harnessed to all kinds of political positions, from crusading parochialism to abstract 
cosmopolitanism.” Nonetheless, an activity may presuppose an outlook, and in the 
case of international relations this outlook can be considered state-centric. In fact, 
this vision is central to the discipline of IR, which regards foreign policy as “the 
external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal 
identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity” (Campbell, 1998: 37). Such 
conventional perception of foreign policy may be related to the effects of historical 
representation, since it was the Peace of Westphalia that directed IR scholarship 
towards its statist orientation (Campbell, 1998). This may explain to some degree 
why the subject of foreign policy has been extensively scrutinised by historians 
(Hill, 2003: 5). Apart from the historians, there were also many advocates of the 
country-studies approach who favoured the development of foreign policy expertise 
of an individual state, even though the theoretical and practical relevance of those 
findings is dubious (Hill, 2003: 6).8 Nonetheless, the main contributions to the IR 
scholarship on inter-state relations stems from the works of realists, liberalists and 
constructivists, since mainstream IR theories provide a broader and more politically 
situated account for the analysis of foreign policy. 
 
8 Other theoretical developments such as public choice theory may also offer some insights into the 
making of foreign policy, i.e. the economic policy and alliance politics (Hill, 2003: 9).  
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Strengthened by the failure of the inter-war idealism to foresee the outbreak of the 
World War II, realism became one of the most dominant theories of IR. Realism 
itself is a broad theoretical church “firmly grounded in real foreign policy practice 
while also most committed to creating highly general theories” (Wohlforth, 2008: 
38). The main emphasis of the realist school of thought is placed on power 
relations and the competitive nature of states. As Hans Morgenthau (1948: 5) 
outlined, “The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in 
terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and 
thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.” With its intellectual 
origins in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, classical realism 
assumes that human nature drives the power seeking nature of states (Dunne and 
Schmidt, 2001). Conversely, neorealists or structural realists refute the role of the 
human nature in determining realpolitik and offer a more cohesive explanation of 
the behaviour of states. Kenneth Waltz (1979) claimed that power struggles occur 
because of the anarchic international system, which constrains the actions of the 
states. Survival becomes reason d’état, and states seek to achieve it in the world 
of unequal distribution of power capabilities and self-help system by balancing, 
bandwagoning or buckpassing.  
 
There is also a further deviation within the structural realist camp – between 
defensive and offensive realists. Defensive realists believe that the effects of 
anarchy can be mitigated, when defence is more feasible than offense and when 
the states can expand its security without threatening other states, since the state 
incentives to expand will be reduced (Walt, 1998: 31). Thus, the states would seek 
to preserve the status quo balance of power. On the contrary, offensive realists 
propose that the states are power maximizers, and seek to expand their relative 
power to increase the odds of survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). Thus, hegemony 
becomes the ultimate goal of any state in the anarchic system (Mearsheimer, 
2001: 22). In contrast to defensive and offensive realism, there is also a group of 
scholars who believe that international structure does affect the competitive 
behaviour of international politics, but the main force behind this competitiveness 
lies in the greedy motives of the states (Glaser, 2007). This party is often termed 
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as motivational or neoclassical realists who believe that unit level variables such as 
leaders, state-society relationships or motivation of states have an impact on the 
state behaviour (Dunne and Schmidt, 2001).  
 
One of the general assumptions about structural realism is that it is not a theory of 
foreign policy. Waltz (1996) himself disclaimed the attribution of neorealism to the 
foreign policy domain. Many scholars suggest that an authentic theory of foreign 
policy makes “determinate predictions for dependent variable (s) that measure the 
behaviour of individual states” (Elman, 1996: 12). In turn, the validity of neorealist 
predictions for dependent variable is questionable, since neorealism occasionally 
fails to defend its sustainability in the face of empirical challenges. Bound by 
specific historical conditions, realism was incapable of predicting the future of 
international relations. For instance, neorealism was incapable of predicting the 
peaceful demise of the Soviet Union and could not adequately explain the 
democratic peace phenomenon. However, notwithstanding such criticisms, 
structural realism is still well equipped for the analysis of foreign policy processes 
and outcomes. Different neorealist theories make different predictions, which may 
not be isomorphic, but they still can be employed as foreign policy theories (Elman, 
1996: 32). Even if the unit-level influence obstructs the capacity of a systemic 
model theory to make accurate predictions, this situation does not justify the 
dismissal of neorealism from predicting foreign policy outcomes (Elman, 1996: 41). 
A similar logic is applicable to the criticisms of neorealist conceptualization and 
operationalization (Elman, 1996). In this respect, when the balance of applying 
realism to FPA is right, the upshot is a powerful tool of FPA that is committed to the 
real foreign policy practices and highly general theories (Wohlforth, 2008: 38). For 
example, realist FPA may provide an incisive and wide-ranging analysis of the US 
foreign policy, since the pattern of the US foreign policy behaviour fits well within 
the general realist framework. The American grand strategy of containment 
inspired by Nicholas Spykman and articulated by George Kennan is in line with the 
realist views of the world. The idea of counterbalancing the spread of communism 
rests on the enduring realist principles of balance of power, national self-interest, 
state survival and great power relations. The détente in the Russo-American 
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relations during the Cold War (especially the US foreign policy reorientation under 
Henry Kissinger) can be comprehensively explained by the realist emphasis on 
relative gains, power distribution and material state capabilities. The American 
post-cold war interest in the Eastern hemisphere and Central Asia can be linked to 
the ideas of Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen and examined 
via the geopolitical lenses of neorealism. The more recent Bush doctrine can be 
perceived as an attempt to establish the world hegemony and deter any threats to 
the national security of the USA.  
 
Nonetheless, the realist perspective often fails to provide a clear and veracious 
analysis of foreign policy (Wohlforth, 2008). Although the major objections to the 
use of neorealism as a theory of foreign policy fail to withstand scrutiny, it remains 
unclear as to whether realism successfully provides a universal tool for predicting 
and analyzing foreign policy. For instance, realism failed to predict the absence of 
the major war between the USA and the USSR and relatively peaceful end of the 
Cold War. Instead realism has mistakenly suggested that after the end of the Cold 
War the major powers would counterbalance against American hegemony and 
establish “a new multipolar balance-of-power order” (Wohlforth, 2008: 43). 
Wohlforth (2008) argues that such pitfalls often arise from the erroneous 
application of realist principles to foreign policy practices; critics assume that all 
realist theories are universal, whereas different realist strands are applicable in 
different situations. Nonetheless, even if these nuances are taken into 
consideration, realism cannot fully unpack the foreign policy behaviour of all nation-
states. As the subsequent case study of the Manas Air Base will reveal, realism 
often fails to provide an accurate analysis of foreign policy events in the context of 
weak and autocratic states. Nevertheless, realism is exceptionally authoritative in 
explaining the behaviour of greater players on the international arena. For realists, 
the centrality of power is instrumental to the formation of successful foreign policy 
within an environment of anarchy and international enmity. Many realists base their 
notion of power on raw military capacity and presuppose rationality and therefore 
the predictability in foreign policymaking. Yet, the empirical evidence demonstrates 
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that not all international behaviour conforms to the basic realist determinants, as 
the next chapter on weak states will reveal. 
 
Accordingly, liberalism may provide an alternative framework for the understanding 
of foreign policy. Unlike realism, liberal approaches to foreign policy are concerned 
more about strengthening the liberal zone of peace than promoting power politics 
(Doyle, 2008). The origins of the liberal tradition are usually associated with the 
period of Enlightenment and with the works of John Locke, Immanuel Kant and 
Adam Smith in particular. Adherents of liberal theory believe in cooperation, peace 
and interdependence and are generally more optimistic about world politics 
(Burchill, 2009). They strongly support democracy, juridical equality, and free 
market and cherish the values of order, liberty, justice and toleration (Morgan, 
2007). Liberalists argue that economic interdependence, democracy and 
international institutions are instrumental to achieving world peace, since they 
decrease the chances of conflict and war (Walt, 1998: 32). Neoliberalists rather 
focus on the issues of political economy, environment, globalization and human 
rights. They have many parallels with structural realists (Lamy, 2001). Even though 
liberalists emphasize how individuals and their ideas, social forces and political 
institutions shape foreign policy outcomes, liberalism remains a complex theory 
(Doyle, 2008: 50). Liberalism was initially developed as a “domestic theory”; it was 
more concerned with the principles of representative governments, individual 
rights, rule of law and private property (Doyle, 2008: 59). Accordingly, in the arena 
of international relations liberals tend to apply the same norms that they 
promulgate domestically (Doyle, 2008). Liberal foreign policy seeks to protect and 
expand the liberal community without violating its values and core ideals (Doyle, 
2008). Liberalism promotes the ideas of “democratic peace”, international 
cooperation and economic interdependence. As such, liberals disparage the role of 
military power and oppose the neorealist assumptions of state homogeneity and 
the determinative nature of the international system (Doyle, 2008). For instance, 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights exemplifies how liberal values are 
strengthened and promoted via the institutional mechanisms and international 
organizations. Ratified in 1948 as a non-binding UN General Assembly resolution, 
39 
 
nowadays the declaration deems to be an obligation for all members of the 
international community (White, 1996: 225).  
 
In many respects, liberalism is an “optimistic” theoretical movement. However, its 
“positive duty” of safeguarding democratic principles can prove to be “a dangerous 
guide to foreign policy, often exacerbating tensions with nonliberal states” (Doyle, 
2008: 69). For example, the liberals may perceive the neoconservative turn of the 
US foreign policy under George W. Bush from 2000 to be the manifestation of the 
American understanding of its mission to spread democracy, liberty and freedom. 
In a similar vein, the American “God-given” mission to fight tyranny and seed 
democracy may be regarded as an imperial effort by Washington to stretch its 
power and establish world hegemony. Both interpretations, however, reveal that 
liberal foreign policy towards the nonliberal communities may differ drastically from 
policy towards its fellow liberal states. Indeed, the democratic peace thesis 
reinforces liberal traditions, but fails to acknowledge the often antagonistic 
relationship between the liberal and non-liberal states. The empirical verification of 
“liberal imprudence” suggests that liberal states may conduct unnecessarily 
aggressive and exceptionally distrustful foreign policies towards the nonliberal 
states (Chan, 1984; Doyle, 2008: 54). The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the 
military intervention in Libya in 2011 demonstrates that liberal states tend to apply 
realist practices to their liberal strategies. The statistical findings reveal that liberal 
states seem to be more war-prone; although the defensive nature of many wars 
has to be taken into the account (Doyle, 2008). For example, between 1816 and 
1980 liberal states fought on the initiator’s side in 24 out of 56 interstate wars, 
whilst non-liberal states fought on the initiator’s side in 91 out of 188 interstate wars 
(Chan, 1984: 637).  
 
More importantly, however, liberalism may not be a wise foreign policy guide to the 
world of Central Asian politics. In some instances this approach may provide useful 
tools for the understanding of political and economic transformations in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union. As Snyder (2004: 57) argues, “[L]iberalism’s 
claim to be a wise policy guide has plenty of hard data behind it.” For example, the 
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willingness of the Central Asian states to liberalise their economies according to 
the Western models after the collapse of the Soviet Union fits well within the 
neoliberal framework. Similarly, the initial course of the Central Asian leaders 
towards democracy and human rights can also be explained via the postulates of 
liberalism. Nevertheless, although some tenets of liberalism are applicable to the 
political landscape of Central Asia, liberalism in general is incapable of dissecting 
the genuine dynamics of decision-making in volatile, autocratic Central Asia. 
Liberalism is an academic tradition well-equipped to study the dynamics of liberal 
states, whereas its value in the context of non-liberal states is less imperative. For 
example, the weaknesses of neoliberal institutionalism are evidenced by the 
failures of regional integration in Central Asia. In a similar vein, the mimicking of 
democratic reforms and pseudo liberalisations by the corrupt Central Asian elites 
pose a formidable challenge to the liberalist theory. Accordingly, with its particular 
focus on liberal states and liberal traditions, liberalism’s toolbox lacks the 
necessary instruments to understand the decision-making in non-liberal states.  
 
Since both realism and liberalism appear to be incapable of sufficiently explaining 
the decision-making rationale in weak non-liberal states, constructivism may 
become a useful prism through which the claims regarding the volatile and erratic 
foreign policies of Central Asia can be tested. In fact, constructivist theory has the 
potential of both improving on realism and liberalism and bridging the divide 
between FPA and greater IR. Constructivism on its own is a broad church, which 
draws selectively from social theory, idealism, interpretative sociology, variants of 
Marxism, institutionalism, post-structuralism, hermeneutics and many others 
(Palan, 2000: 576). Whilst realists focus on the balance of power and liberalists on 
the power of free market, constructivists believe in the power of ideas as the 
driving force of international processes (Snyder, 2004: 56; Doyle, 2008: 40). 
Accordingly, many scholars divide the variants of constructivism into the sub-
groups in order to exemplify their key differences and similarities. For instance, 
Ronen Palan (2000: 576) distinguishes between “hard” and “soft” versions of 
constructivism. Hard constructivists, such as Nicholas Onuf, Rey Koslowski and 
Friedrich Kratochwil, categorically believe that social structures and institutions are 
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solely the constructs of “man-made institutions” (Palan, 2000: 576). Soft 
constructivists are less radical and consist of those who are interested in the role of 
identity, norms and culture and believe in the power of social context (Palan, 2000: 
576). Jeffrey Checkel (2008) provides slightly different categorisations – the North 
American and the European variants of constructivism. The North American 
version of constructivism, represented by Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie and 
Peter Katzenstein, to name a few, explores the impact of social norms and identity 
on foreign policy outcomes, whilst the European version of constructivism, as 
promulgated by Ted Hopf and Thomas Banchoff,  examines the role of language in 
constructing social reality (Checkel, 2008: 73-74). Both variants of constructivism, 
however, perceive the world as socially constructed with grand politics being “what 
states make of it” (Checkel, 2008; Wendt, 1992).  
 
The main source of scepticism about constructivism derives from its ambivalence 
over the use of mainstream social science methods which comes at the expense of 
its own theoretical distinctiveness, its lack of an alternative research programme 
and its anti-positivist epistemic approach (Hopf, 1998: 171). Further, constructivism 
fails to explain what structural factors spearhead changes in values and what 
material circumstances are needed to sustain the harmony between new values 
and new ideas (Snyder, 2004). Constructivists also tend to belittle or even neglect 
the role of power, which is deeply interconnected to the study of foreign policy 
(Checkel, 2008: 80). 
 
Indeed, constructivism offers a vigorous framework for the analysis of foreign 
policy decision-making. It rejects the realist assumption of fact-value and 
“endogenizes” interests by exploring how they are constructed through a process 
of interaction between agents and their broader environment (Hill, 2003: 9; 
Checkel, 2008: 74). Checkel (2008) underscores three ways, in which 
constructivism may contribute to the study of foreign policy: the impact of 
bureaucracies, decision-making and international institutions. If Allison’s 
governmental politics model outlines how different political players with different 
interests seek to shape the national interests according to their own preferences, 
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constructivist analysis of foreign policy attempts to examine the process of interest 
formation itself, instead of accepting the state interests as a given (Checkel, 2008). 
For instance, the presence of the American Air Forces in Germany, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan may have different implications for Russian foreign policy if we 
examine them through a constructivist prism. Germany has long been perceived as 
an American ally, whereas Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan was regarded as a zone of 
Russian influence. In this respect, an increase of the American contingent at the 
Ramstein Air Base, for example, may trigger no interest from the Kremlin, whilst 
the strengthening of American military potential in Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan will 
certainly generate anxiety in Moscow with subsequent reactivation of Russian soft 
or hard power politics in the near abroad. Unlike realism, constructivism is less 
concerned about the amount or quality of military equipment, which can be 
stationed either in Germany or Ukraine. It is the social context that gives meaning 
to the material facts, for example whether it is a social context of friendship or 
enmity (Checkel, 2008: 75).  
 
Furthermore, constructivists advance a communicative approach to the 
understanding of decision-making rationality. Unlike the rational and cognitive 
decision-making models of FPA that assume that actors are asocial and driven by 
instrumental or bounded rationality, the communicative approach suggests that the 
decision makers are social units who define their interests by means of 
communication and argument rather than by bargaining and pre-defined interest 
(Checkel, 2008: 76). Thus, language becomes a medium through which the world 
is interpreted and through which decision makers persuade and convince each 
other to choose certain foreign policy actions (Checkel, 2008: 77). For instance, 
constructivism effectively explains nation-building and identity formation in Central 
Asia at the expense of the neighbouring countries or the process of merging 
regime security and national security in the region. In addition, Checkel (2008) 
emphasises that constructivism explores the international-domestic nexus and 
conceptually overcomes the level-of-analysis problem. For example, constructivism 
illuminates the interplay of actors at different levels of analysis and may provide a 
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comprehensive analysis as to how domestic politics can shape international politics 
and vice versa. This is useful for the analysis of weak states in Central Asia.   
 
Evidently, an intellectual tradition of constructivism and FPA, a field of study with 
an implied approach, has significant points of intersection. Both cognitive FPA and 
constructivism, especially its American school, examine how decision makers 
construct their realities (Checkel, 2008). In addition, some constructivists share 
with FPA its focus on “willful agents” or agency (Checkel, 2008: 74). However, the 
linkages between FPA and constructivism should not be exaggerated, since 
scholars of FPA have different purposes and different epistemological approaches 
than most of the constructivist theorists (Houghton, 2007). The works of Snyder 
and his colleagues were developed within the realist paradigm and as such they 
treated ideas as causal rather than as constitutive (Houghton, 2007: 33). FPA 
focuses on the construction of individual realities, whilst constructivism explores 
the role of social learning within a wider social structural context (Houghton, 2007: 
33; Checkel, 2008: 74). In addition, as David Houghton (2007: 33) denotes, an 
approach cannot be automatically classified as constructivist simply because it 
underscores the role of ideas. Nonetheless, in general, the greatest promise of 
constructivism lies in its potential to collaborate constructively with other 
approaches in order to restore predictability of world politics and appreciate the 
difference (Hopf, 1998). Moreover, constructivist approaches can be extremely 
useful in the understanding of the foreign policy of weak states, since 
constructivism takes into account the social context and agent-structure interplay. 
As a result, constructivism offers a rich and diverse tool kit, which may provide “a 
robust entrée into the social dynamics of foreign policy analysis” (Checkel, 2008: 
81). 
 
FPA and IR 
Each theory attempts to provide its own explanation of foreign policy behaviour, 
exposing the weaknesses of other approaches and, thus, creating strong checks 
on each other (Snyder, 2004: 55). Since this intersection is unavoidable, the 
conjunction of greater IR narratives with specific findings of FPA may contribute 
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greatly to the analysis of foreign policy dynamics (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 
2008). Waever (1996) once expressed what it deems to be a shared belief 
amongst the IR scholars: 
 
It is a not overly well guarded secret that the discipline of International 
Relations is disappointed with its sub-discipline Foreign Policy Analysis. 
And the grand theorists have not been very good at integrating domestic 
and international explanations. While domestic factors are usually 
involved in empirical studies as part of the explanation, most IR-
theorists have found it very difficult to see how the two sides can be linked 
in a coherent way. 
 
For many years FPA was either dismissed by mainstream IR or placed within the 
realist and, more rarely, within pluralist theories (Houghton, 2007). For instance, 
when designing a plausible foreign policy model, Roy Jones (1979) emphasised 
that sovereign nation-states are the constituent units of the foreign policy world that 
seek to increase their power in order to secure their foreign policy goals. As a 
result of such a conceptualisation of foreign policy, FPA was either located within 
the realist domain or totally dismissed. Nonetheless, in general, it is rather odd that 
FPA has been associated with both realism and liberalism (Houghton, 2007). 
Houghton (2007: 26) contends that FPA resembled a body of micro-theories that 
failed to transform into a recognized theory and subsequently disengaged with the 
rest of IR. Yet, prospects remain for the integration of FPA within IR. Vendulka 
Kubalkova (2001) believes that IR has been split into FPA and the study of 
International Politics, and constructivism provides all the necessary tools for putting 
the field back together. In other words, constructivism may become FPA’s entry 
point to the integration with IR. As Checkel (2008: 74) rephrased Martha 
Finnemore’s statement, “Much of foreign policy is about defining rather than 
defending national interests.”  
 
Indeed, greater engagement with the discipline is important in order for FPA 
remain an innovative subfield of IR.  FPA has always been engaged with the 
broader IR discussions, whether by challenging the central tenets of realism or by 
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introducing the methodology for a middle-range theory (Alden and Aron, 2012). 
There is a natural connection between the role of ideas, beliefs and identity and 
psychological research of FPA (Garrison et al, 2003). Moreover, current FPA 
scholarship has taken an ideational turn and is particularly interested in state 
identity and its effects on foreign policy, and whilst FPA brings individual 
construction, social constructivism brings collective construction (Garrison et al, 
2003: 159; Houghton, 2007: 42). In addition, FPA is often criticised for lacking a 
theory of structure, whilst constructivism is criticised for lacking a theory of agency 
(Houghton, 2007: 41). Although there is no one social constructivism and there are 
significant ontological and epistemological divisions within constructivist domain, 
the absence of a unified approach does not undermine FPA’s capacity to fit within 
this framework. On the contrary, this occurrence suggests that there may be a 
version of constructivism that corresponds with FPA’s vision and offers the 
necessary intellectual underpinnings for the analysis of foreign policy (Smith, 2001: 
53).Thus, social constructivism may reinvigorate the study of foreign policy placing 
FPA within the substantive critical debates of IR (Houghton, 2007).  
 
In this respect, Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2008) propose a critical approach to 
foreign policy, where decision makers are in power and have the authority to make 
decisions, although they are constrained by strong internal and external structures. 
This approach applies the features of critical political analysis introduced by Colin 
Hay (2002) to the foreign policy sphere. Hay (2002: 251) suggested that critical 
political analysis should be 
 
1. Empirical but without being empiricist 
2. Balanced in its conception of the relationship between structure and 
agency 
3. Inclusive in its conception of the political, inclusive in its incorporation 
of extra-political factors and attentive to the interaction of the domestic 
and the international 
4. Sensitive to the potential causal and constitutive role of ideas in social, 
political and economic dynamics and, above all 
5. Attentive to the contingency, open-endedness and inherent 
unpredictability of social, political and economic systems. 
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 The application of these principles to foreign policy offers a significant advantage 
over the limited perspectives of both FPA and wider IR (Smith, Hadfield and 
Dunne, 2008: 6). In a similar vein, Paul Williams (2005: 5) argues that Hay’s 
approach provides a useful starting point for the analysis of state foreign policy.  
Hay’s first principle implies that critical analysis should examine the actual foreign 
policy evidence, whilst retaining normative assumptions and commitments. The 
empirical evidence is an important starting point to build those assumptions and 
commitments, even though social scientists may be tempted to dismiss empirical 
political analysis (Hay, 2002). The empiricism in this case is regarded as neutral 
analysis without any normative interpretations (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2008: 
5). Williams (2005), for instance, provides ethical judgements about the Blair’s 
foreign policies whilst analysing the UK foreign policies under the Labour party. 
 
The second principle examines the relationship between agency and structure; this 
concept has the greatest added value for an understanding of the foreign policy 
behaviour of both strong and weak states. The agency-structure issue itself is one 
of the most central debates within the field of social science, since it questions 
whether the agents shape the structures or the structures shape the agents. As Hill 
(2003: 26) argues, this contention returns “the perennial issues of causation, 
freedom and determinism to the agenda of IR” and leads to “a sharper examination 
of the rather unsophisticated conceptual basis of some foreign policy studies”. 
Agency or agent is an entity, which is capable of making a decision or action in any 
given context (Hill, 2003: 27). Structure is a set of factors and larger arrangements 
that constitute the multiple environments, within which agents operate, and that 
determine the agency’s choices by exerting a constraining effect (Hill, 2003: 26). 
Currently, mainstream IR is being most criticised for the lack of insight into 
structure (Hudson, 2007: 8). In particular, FPA criticises both neorealism and 
constructivism for their inadequate conceptualization of agency (Hudson, 2007: 
11). FPA, in turn, is being criticised for being too agent-focused. Nonetheless, 
more scholars tend to support the mutually complementary approach across the 
field of social science. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu (1984) argued that the 
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concepts of agency and structure should be reconciled, whilst Anthony Giddens 
(1984) even introduced a structuration theory, which focuses on the understanding 
of human agency and social institutions. Social science needs to interrogate, 
explore and reflect on the vibrant relationship between both agency and structure 
(Hay, 2002: 254). One level of analysis is insufficient to explain political 
phenomena; a deeper examination of processes, structures and interactions 
between different units is needed (Hill, 2003: 27).  
 
Accordingly, an approach which integrates both agency and structure will be 
relevant to foreign policy analysis, since foreign policy cannot be abstracted from 
the domestic context and international structures (Hill, 2003). Foreign policy is a 
complex, evolving and dynamic process of interaction between a great many 
agents within a numerous structures (Hill, 2003). Even the actual conceptualization 
of the term “foreign” is still contentious. In the ideal theoretical model, foreign policy 
is created within the internal milieu of the nation-state and implemented within its 
external environment (White, 1981: 4). In reality, however, the differentiation 
between the “domestic” and “foreign” politics becomes rather arbitrary, especially 
in the light of the rapid processes of globalization and the emergence of new 
security challenges (White, 1981: 4). As a result, the internal governmental 
activities are externalised, whilst the external governmental activities become 
subjected to the internalization. Thus, the concept of “foreign” should not be 
confined to the characteristics, which are found outside the state (Campbell, 1998: 
37). The term “foreign” itself began to signify the “outside” parameter of the nation-
states only after the term “international” was coined by Jeremy Bentham in the late 
eighteenth century (Campbell, 1998: 37). Consequently, it is difficult to sustain a 
rigid differentiation between the domestic and foreign politics, since the growing 
number of governmental activities typically has both dimensions (White, 1981: 4).  
 
In this respect, Carlsnaes (2008) suggests the use of a meta-theoretical 
framework, which incorporates both agency and structure. Such an analytical 
framework may resolve the agency-structure conundrum, whilst providing a meta-
theoretical foundation for a methodological reorientation towards an institutional 
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perspective in the foreign policy studies (Carlsnaes, 2008). Thus, Hay’s approach 
may serve as a useful starting point for such an analysis of foreign policy. The 
explanatory or dependent variable of this approach may be twofold though, since 
for some scholars foreign policy is the product of the decision-making processes, 
whilst for others foreign policy is the decision-making process itself (Carlsnaes, 
2008). The independent variables will be linked to various levels of analysis, which 
Hay’s actor-structure framework proposes. In addition, the process-tracing method 
of analysis outlined in the introductory section of the dissertation is well-equipped 
to track causal relations between the variables within the complementary 
framework of agency-structure. Many conventional constructivists, including 
Wendt, agree that agency and structure are mutually constitutive, espouse the role 
of causal mechanisms and endorse the use of process-tracing strategies to 
interpret social phenomena (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 17). 
 
In turn, for interpretive constructivists, agency and structure are too entangled at all 
levels of analysis to differentiate whether the agency or the structure is the 
dependent or independent variable (Bennett and Checkel, 2014). In such 
instances, an interpretivist view can be still reconciled with process-tracing, 
because constructivist inquiries have to develop both experience-distant and 
experience-near approaches (Pouliot, 2007). Even radical constructivists have 
frameworks for conducting discourse analysis, whilst their genealogical methods 
resemble historical forms of the process-tracing technique (Bennett and Checkel, 
2014: 17). Also, a bracketing strategy that dissects events at which an agent 
challenges social structure or a structure thwarts agent’s actions can be applied to 
the analysis (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 18). Causal mechanisms are abstract 
notions whose causal force is shaped by their operational environment (Falleti and 
Lynch, 2009: 1159). However, the contours of this environment transform over time 
(Falleti and Lynch, 2009: 1159). Thus, from an explanatory viewpoint, dividing time 
into relevant periods is important for the observation of causal mechanisms at work 
and for the understanding of processes and outcomes of interest (Falleti and 
Lynch, 2009: 1159). This method allows the scholars to reveal the contestation 
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between the agent and the structure and underline whether the former or the latter 
drives social processes. 
 
In a similar vein, the remaining three principles of Hay’s approach outline 
necessary prerequisites for the effective causal analysis of political processes. The 
third principle rejects a narrow view of politics as only inclusive of governmental 
variables (Hay, 2002: 251; Williams, 2005: 6). Critical foreign policy takes into 
account not just the interplay between the governmental bodies, but also the wider 
political realm: the role of individuals, activities of NGOs and influence of norms, 
ideas and values (Williams, 2005: 6; Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2008: 5). Such an 
approach is particularly useful for the assessment of the impact of one variable on 
another, since it allows scholars to examine what actors, groups or individuals 
benefit from particular foreign policy decisions. Likewise, the fourth feature of Hay’s 
analysis underscores the causal and constitutive role of ideas. The critical study of 
foreign policy requires scholars to confront important theoretical issues related to 
knowledge and reality and search for gaps between the leaders’ words and deeds 
(Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2008: 5). Williams (2005: 6) denotes that such a 
phenomenon leads to difficult epistemological and methodological conundrums 
about the extent to which motivations and ideas guide foreign policy decision 
makers. However, when applied properly this principle contributes to the 
understanding of causal influences between the agent and the structure. Moreover, 
such an approach allows the scholars to track observable implications in order to 
build or test hypothesis. For instance, Williams (2005: 6-7) made an assessment of 
the Labour foreign policy based on the discrepancies between the statements of 
intent and the actual foreign policy actions.  
 
The fifth feature of Hay’s critical analysis is particularly pertinent to the 
understanding of foreign policies of weak states, since this principle assumes 
construction of foreign policies through causal mechanisms. Hay (2002: 259-260) 
believes that even the most inevitable and inexorable processes tend to be 
contingent, open-ended and contested. For instance, Stefano Guzzini (2011) 
argues that security should be understood through its performance – securitisation. 
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Securitisation is “the discursive process through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an 
existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and 
exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491). By 
conceiving security through its performance Guzzini (2011: 335) underscores that 
there is no universal context for the discursive processes; security is “simply part of 
an ongoing social construction of (social) reality”. Thus, in a similar vein, both 
foreign policy agents and foreign policy can be perceived as the products of social 
construction. In other words, foreign policy decisions are prompted not by the 
“objective” and given geopolitical realities, but by the “subjective” conceptions 
placed within a constructivist environment such as securitisation processes and 
security discourses (Guzzini, 2011: 331). As Williams (2005: 7) argues, there is 
nothing unchangeable, inevitable or natural about foreign policy directions, and 
accordingly “things” in foreign policy of the UK or any other country could have 
always been different.  
 
In sum, an approach introduced by Hay, and then revised, by Smith, Hadfield and 
Dunne to foreign policy, advocates for an approach which looks at causal 
processes as some form of process-tracing. As Vincent Pouliot (2007) asserts, 
constructivist methodology should be interpretive, inductive and historical by 
implication due to constructivism’s postfoundationalist way of reasoning. Indeed, 
since constructivist strands draw more on post-positivism, whilst FPA’ methodology 
is mostly positivist, interpretive process-tracing becomes a useful tool to build and 
test theories. Causal mechanisms not only systematise constructivist research and 
foster an interdisciplinary dialogue, but also provide intriguing opportunities for the 
comparison of processes and dynamics of different security analyses (Pouliot, 
2007; Guzzini, 2011: 338; Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 19). 
 
In general, narrowing the gap between FPA and IR will be beneficial for both 
parties, since such a merger opens the possibility for a critical account of foreign 
policy “which draws on a wider notion of politics explicitly guided by progressive 
norms, and where decision makers are seen as having choices” (Smith, Hadfield 
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and Dunne, 2008: 8). Waltz’s structural realism regards states as black boxes, 
whose preferences are determined by anarchic international system, whereas 
Wendt’s constructivism contends that preferences are determined by ideas 
(Hudson, 2007: 10). Thus, the agency-structure debate between Waltz and Wendt 
concerns whether the state-actors shape the structures or whether the structures 
shape the system behaviour (Hudson, 2007: 10). However, the proponents of FPA 
claim that the state is the decision-maker in the first instance, since “[s]tate action 
is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state” (Snyder et al, 2002: 
59). They further claim that only human beings can generate ideas and create 
identities, and only human beings are the agents within the international system 
(Hudson, 2007: 10). Accordingly, one of the most important contributions of FPA to 
wider IR may be its focus on decision makers who serve as the link between the 
material and ideational determinants of state behaviour (Hudson, 2007: 7). There is 
also a practical implication that emerges from this theoretical amalgamation. 
Generally, the practitioners of foreign policy struggle to make use of academic IR 
and prefer to use FPA (Hudson, 2007: 191), partly because mainstream IR 
underestimated the capacity of states to conduct independent foreign policies and 
make an impact regardless of its size and weaknesses (Hill, 2003: 285). In turn, 
FPA (perhaps, more than any other sub-discipline of IR) attempts to maintain 
relevance for the practical foreign policy side and help decision makers with foreign 
policy processes and choices (Snyder et al, 2002: 175). Thus, the greater 
integration of FPA with wider theoretical insights of IR will be valuable not only to 
the academy, but also to the policymaking institutions, since they will be exposed 
to more rigorous theoretical frameworks.  
 
Nonetheless, most importantly, the foreign policy approach’s need to integrate both 
internal and external dynamics is propelled by the lack of a conceptual framework 
that adequately explains foreign policy behaviour of weak states. As previously 
outlined, conventional approaches to FPA are well equipped to analyse foreign 
policies of bigger international players such as the USA, Russia or China. Yet, 
when applied to smaller states and weaker players, these approaches are often 
rendered redundant, as their “universality” lacks sufficient explanatory punch. In 
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other words, if to rephrase Ali Dessouki and Bahgat Korany (1984: 9), the 
underdeveloped study of underdeveloped countries is most clearly demonstrated in 
the analysis of their foreign policies, which is either psycho-centric, reductionist or 
great power inclined. Such arguments may provide easy explanations of the 
international behaviour of weak states. However, they may not be genuine just like 
the shadows in the Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Thus, an interpretive and inductive 
framework with properly contextualised causal mechanisms may offer greater 
value for testing FPA claims regarding the relationships of weak states. 
 
Conclusion 
Foreign policy is a broad, complex and constantly evolving phenomenon. A 
framework that can encompass all aspects of foreign policy also needs to be 
multifaceted and comprehensive. Traditionally, the most conventional approach to 
the study of foreign policy was embraced by FPA. However, FPA has been often 
dismissed or belittled by mainstream IR. This is mainly due to its focus on domestic 
politics and human decision-making. Nonetheless, the empirical challenges and 
recent developments within the field forced even the dominant IR theories to revise 
their assumptions and epistemologically and methodologically re-establish 
themselves. This re-thinking provided an exceptional opportunity for FPA to test its 
claims and seek greater integration with other IR theories. It became apparent that 
mainstream approaches fail to explain certain foreign policy processes and 
outcomes, whilst alternative approaches lack parsimony and adequate explanatory 
power to spearhead foreign policy debates. As such, an approach to foreign policy 
– integrative of internal, external and transnational dynamics – offers the greatest 
promise. The greater focus on multi-level and multi-causal dynamics will sharpen 
the epistemology of FPA as well as the meta-theoretical tools of IR. As a result, 
such a conceptual approach will significantly contribute to the understanding of the 
foreign policy phenomenon and, as Snyder (2004: 62) puts it, will set the 
framework “to ask hard questions of those who think that changing the world is 
easy”. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Foreign Policy and Regime Security of Weak States 
 
The concept of weak states presents a serious challenge to the Westphalian 
understanding of the international system and orthodox IR respectively. Weak 
states lack effective institutions, a domestic consensus on the idea of the state and 
a monopoly on the instruments of violence and thus become vulnerable to internal, 
external and transnational threats. The nature of threats becomes instrumental to 
the analysis of the inter- and intra-state dynamics in weak states. However, the 
existing approaches to the study of foreign policy of weak states are rather limited 
and centred on the idiosyncratic, great power and reductionist themes. Although 
these frameworks provide an easy explanation of foreign policy decision-making, 
one level analysis is insufficient for the genuine understanding of complex political 
phenomena in the turbulent and vibrant developing regions, as the case of Central 
Asia will demonstrate. Certain concepts such as “domestic/foreign policy” or 
“national/regime security” are extremely perplexed in weak states and demand a 
greater scrutiny. Accordingly, a quest for unpacking the international behaviour of 
weak states should commence not on the domestic or systemic levels, but in 
between, incorporating external environment, internal insecurities and transnational 
links.  
 
Thus, this chapter seeks to further relate the argument of this thesis to broader 
literature on regime security and foreign policy of weak states. In particular, this 
chapter introduces the notion of “regime security” and proposes to examine foreign 
policy of weak states in general and Central Asia in particular vis-à-vis state 
performance and rent-seeking. Respectively, the first section of the chapter will 
explore the notion of weak states and will demonstrate that IR’s classical “billiard 
ball” analogy is misleading in the context of weak states. The second part will 
examine regime security as the variable, often neglected by grand IR theorists, but 
which is quintessential for the understanding of foreign policy trajectories of weak 
states. The third section will assess the importance of regime security with respect 
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to other factors that may affect foreign policies of weak states. The fourth part will 
introduce international relations of Central Asia and the notion of the Great Game, 
whilst the subsequent sections will examine the neorealist explanations of foreign 
policies of the Central Asian states in conjunction with the concepts of state 
performance and rent-seeking. 
 
Weak States 
The concept of “weak states” is ambiguous and wide-ranging, since the concept of 
“state” itself is to some extent quite elusive and syncretic. As identified in Chapter I, 
states are the central units of the international system and are important for the 
mainstream theories of IR. Yet, for orthodox IR, states are analogous to “billiard 
balls” in a political and territorial sense. This paradigmatic concept is presented as 
given in IR and exempt from extensive theoretical and empirical analysis (Halliday, 
1987: 217; Buzan, 1991: 60). As Fred Halliday (1987: 217) puts it, “[In IR] the 
‘state’ comprises in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map – viz, the 
country as a whole and all that is within it: territory, government, people, society.” 
Such a conceptualisation discourages any further inquiry into the domestic 
structure of the state, since in theory the state already possesses political 
legitimacy, allegiance and authority at the domestic level (Buzan, 1991: 58-61). 
There is also a sociological concept of the state, which perceives it as “a human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory” (Weber, 1948: 78). Similarly, Theda Skocpol (1979: 
29) defines the state as “a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations 
headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority”. Such a 
Weberian conceptualisation of the term separates the state and the society and 
examines the state purely in the political and institutional context, i.e. equates the 
state with the central government (Buzan, 1991: 59).  
 
Nonetheless, the nexus between the domestic and external structure is more 
valuable and promising for the effective analysis of security and foreign policy. 
Accordingly, Barry Buzan (1991: 59) suggests conceptualising the state broadly 
enough to integrate both domestic and international dynamics. This 
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conceptualisation approaches the state from the perspectives of physical base, 
institutional expression and the idea of the state (Buzan, 1991). The physical base 
has a concrete character and includes territory, population and all natural and man-
made resources within the state’s borders (Buzan, 1991: 90-91). The institutions of 
the state are the governmental machinery with its executive, judicial, legislative and 
administrative bodies along with the operating norms (Buzan, 1991: 82-83). The 
idea of the state is the most abstract component of the state, but which is at the 
core of “the state’s political identity” (Buzan, 1991: 70). If we examine the states 
through the prism of these components, it may become apparent that 
metaphorically “the billiard balls” are different in size, weight and colour. There are 
some stronger states, and there are some weaker states. In fact, the latter 
represents the majority in the international system and requires specific attention. 
As Robert Keohane (1969: 310) puts it, “If Lilliputians can tie up Gulliver, or make 
him do their fighting for them, they must be studied as carefully as the giant.” 
Accordingly, different scholars label those states differently. Mohammed Ayoob 
(1995) favours the term “Third World”, which was initially associated with the 
Nonaligned Group of Asian and Africa states in the Cold War era. Annual state 
index by Foreign Policy (2005) introduces the notion of “insecure states”. Eghosa 
Osaghae (2007) refers to the concept of “fragile states”. Robert Rothstein (1976) 
uses the term “less developed countries”, whilst Mary Kaldor (2010) and Dietrich 
Jung (2009) refer to “the post-colonial states”.  
 
Notwithstanding the variety of categorisations, there is a general consensus 
amongst the scholars regarding the essence of these entities. Weak states are 
those states that lack a strong physical base, an effective institutional expression, a 
monopoly on the instruments of violence and a consensus on the idea of the state 
(Buzan, 1991; Jackson, 2010: 187). The first two notions are associated with the 
strengths and weaknesses of the state’s institutional capacity (Thomas, 1987; 
Jackson, 2010). Michael Mann (1984) delineates two types of institutional power: 
despotic and infrastructural power. Despotic power is the ability of a state to 
coercively impose its rule on its citizenry, even with the exercise of force (Mann, 
1984; Thomas, 1987). Infrastructural power is the ability of a state to rule by 
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consensus, with effective and legitimate institutions (Mann, 1984; Thomas, 1987; 
Jackson, 2010). Whilst the latter is more associated with the characteristic of a 
strong state, the former is rather the fate of a weak state (Jackson, 2010). The 
monopoly on the instruments of violence is another important characteristic, which 
distinguishes strong and weak states. In many weak states, the governments (even 
with strong despotic power) lack the absolute loyalty of their armed forces and are 
constantly under the threat of being overthrown (Jackson, 2010: 189). In some 
other cases, their armed forces are too fractured, poorly equipped and unfit for 
combat – quite often such a situation is artificially conditioned by the ruling regimes 
to deter possible military coup d’états (Jackson, 2010). The side effect of such a 
divide-and-rule policy is the emergence or the strengthening of other domestic 
actors such as the opposition leaders, organized crime groups, and ethnic or 
religious extremists who could rival the authority of the government and challenge 
the status quo (Jackson, 2010). As a result, the government may fail to guarantee 
the rule of law, maintain order and retain legitimacy without the monopoly on the 
instruments of violence (Jackson, 2010: 189). The idea of the state is a less 
tangible, but most central component of the state (Buzan, 1991). It distinguishes 
from the physical base of the state and its institutions by the notion of purpose and 
seeks to answer the existential questions of the state and define its totality (Buzan, 
1991: 70). The sources of the idea of the state lie in the concept of the nation and 
its organising ideology (Buzan, 1991: 70-77). Unless the idea of the state is not 
“firmly planted in the minds" of its citizenry and in “the minds” of other states, the 
state has neither secure domestic foundation nor has secure international 
environment (Buzan, 1991: 78).  
 
In this respect, different states may experience different types of security and 
insecurity in relations to those concepts. The narrowness of the state’s national 
security may correlate positively with the weakness of the state. If the idea of the 
state is strong, any potential institutional failures will not pose serious menace to 
the state’s totality (Buzan, 1991). If the idea of the state is weak, then any 
malfunctions of the institutional capacity may lead to serious repercussions that 
may threaten integrity of the state as a political unit, e.g. revolutions or civil wars 
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(Buzan, 1991: 82). Accordingly, in weak states national or state security is often 
equated to the security of the governments and ruling regimes, which creates the 
grounds conducive to endemic domestic violence (Buzan, 1991: 99-102). These 
weak states will be still viewed as states, but mostly due to their diplomatic 
attributes such as the boundaries on the maps or the seats in the United Nations 
(Buzan, 1991: 101). However, from within, these states will remain anarchic and in 
condition of latent or effective civil unrest (Buzan, 1991: 101).  
 
Thus, the concept of “weak and strong states” refers to the degree of socio-political 
cohesion, whilst the concept of “weak and strong powers” refers rather to the 
traditional military-economic distinctions of states (Buzan, 1991: 97).  For instance, 
weak powers like Austria or Singapore are strong states, because the strength of 
the state does not depend on traditional power (Buzan, 1991: 98). Weak states 
represent a broad continuum of states across the world and are characterized by 
political volatility, external vulnerability, institutional weakness, power 
centralization, delusion of national identity, structural economic problems, social 
divisions, lack of legitimacy, and crisis of democracy (Jackson, 2010: 188). They 
harbour religious, intercommunal, ethnic or other internal antagonisms along with 
the features of despotism, leadership greed and external attacks (Rotberg, 2003: 
4). Representing international majority, these states are poor, vulnerable and 
insecure latecomers to the global system of states and are at their infancy of 
becoming modern states (Ayoob, 1995: 15). Moreover, a weak state is not a static 
and binary condition, but rather a continuum, since weak states can become strong 
and strong states can become weak (Jackson, 2010: 189). Thus, weak states may 
be perceived not just as a category, but also as a concept with flexible frontiers 
(Ayoob, 1995: 13; Muni, 1979: 121).  
 
In fact, weak states can be further distinguished, as the degree of their weakness 
may vary significantly. Whilst some states remain weak without any positive 
progress, other weak states may slide towards failure or collapse (Rotberg, 2003). 
To some extent the concept of “a failed state” runs in parallel with the 
abovementioned conceptualisation of weak states. Yet, in the case of failed states, 
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the nature of threats and the level of internal incongruities are more severe. As 
Robert Rotberg (2003: 5) emphasises, failed states are often characterized by the 
protracted character of violence, which stems from the religious, ethnic or 
intercommunal differences and antagonism. Nonetheless, it may be erroneous to 
classify those enmities as the root cause of state failure, because the number of 
factors that may contribute to the state failure is immense. For instance, Rotberg 
(2003) asserts that the indicators of state failure may include loss of governmental 
control and authority over parts of the territory, increase of criminal violence, 
growth of flawed institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, lack of essential political 
goods, political role of warlords or other non-state actors, etc. In other words, failed 
states constitute “a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the 
fundamental jobs of a nation-state in the modern world” (Rotberg, 2003: 6). 
Moreover, there is also the related notion of “a collapsed state”, which is a more 
extreme version of a failed state (Rotberg, 2003: 9). William Zartman (1995: 1) 
refers the phenomenon of state collapse to “a situation where the structure, 
authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be 
reconstituted in some form, old or new”. In this context, centralized political 
authority is absent or absolutely minimal, whereas the territory of the country is 
divided into the illegitimate warlord fiefdoms (Rotberg, 2003: 10). As a result, 
during this period the state as a functioning and legitimate order vanishes 
(Zartman, 1995: 1). Furthermore, the condition of a collapsed state is also not a 
static condition. For instance, whilst some states like Somalia fail and then 
collapse, other states like Tajikistan or Lebanon are slowly recovering from the 
collapsed to the failed state of being (Rotberg, 2003: 9-10).  
 
In general, the presence of such a versatile classification of weak states 
demonstrates that the classical “billiard balls” analogy is misleading, if not 
erroneous, in many parts of the world and particularly in Central Asia. Even though 
the classifications of weak states often overlap with each other and to a certain 
extent resemble a conceptual verbiage, the concepts of weak states pose a 
formidable challenge to the Westphalian understanding of the international system 
and order. The nature of threats is one of those key features that require further 
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unpacking. Lacking effective institutions, domestic consensus on the idea of the 
state and a monopoly on the instruments of violence, weak states become 
vulnerable from outside and from within. Home-grown threats overshadow external 
threats and preoccupy security agenda of the state. As abovementioned, the 
border lines between regime security and national security become diluted, 
substantially affecting strategic decisions of the governments and daily lives of 
common people. Indeed, such an emphasis on power of internal dynamics in weak 
states directly contradicts the traditional postulates of mainstream IR. However, 
states are not equal, and true international system of states lies under “the façade 
of internationally recognized statehood” (Buzan, 1991: 103). Accordingly, the quest 
for the answers to the foreign policy behaviour of weak states should start perhaps 
not on the systemic, but on the domestic level of analysis or in between, since it is 
internal insecurities that may be the driving engine of the small and the weak.    
 
Regime Security in Weak States  
As aforesaid, there are numerous factors that shape the outlook of weak states. 
Regime security is one of those key variables, often neglected by the grand 
theorists, which requires a specific attention of scholars. Weak states are 
distinguished by the nature of their insecurities and its correlation to the ruling 
regimes. Thus, the role of regime security may be quintessential for the 
understanding of foreign policy trajectories of weak states. In fact, since this work 
seeks a multi-level approach integrative of both internal and external dynamics, the 
notion of regime security may become a point of contact for FPA and grand IR, the 
need for which was previously discussed in Chapter I.   
 
The concepts of “regime” and “security” need to be unpacked for more rigorous 
understanding of weak states. In general, Security Studies is the broad sub-
discipline of IR, mainly because the concept of security is broad and multi-faceted. 
The Oxford (2012) and the Merriam-Webster (2012) dictionaries provide a clear, 
yet narrow definition of security, which is the state of being free from danger, fear 
or anxiety. In IR, however, “security” is more endowed with a specific context 
(Ayoob, 1995). Traditionally, IR literature regarded the concept of security from the 
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perspective of external threats and military responses (Ayoob, 1995: 5). As Walter 
Lippmann (1943: 51) emphasises, “A nation is secure to the extent to which it is 
not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is 
able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.” Similarly, Giacomo 
Luciani (1988: 151) defines national security as “the ability to withstand aggression 
from abroad”. Ian Bellamy (1981: 102) believes that “security itself is a relative 
freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be 
a consequence of any war that should occur”. In other words, for most of the 
system-centred scholars security is outwardly directed, with the state being a 
referent object to be secured from external threats through military might (Ayoob, 
1995; Collins, 2010: 2). Such an approach to security roots back to the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648, when the notion of the state was formally institutionalised, 
and, as Ayoob (1995: 6) argues, this notion became inherent to the Western 
strategic thinking. 
 
Nevertheless, the application of these principles to the analysis of weak states 
leads to several major conceptual problems (Ayoob, 1995; Thomas, 1987). 
Security in the context of weak states does not simply refer to external orientations, 
systemic relations, military capacities or major powers alliances (Ayoob, 1995; 
Thomas, 1987). Security in weak states encompasses a wide range of dimensions 
vital for the existence of the state and which are already dealt with in the West 
(Thomas, 1987). For instance, external orientation, one of the fundamental 
attributes of the Western security, is not as relevant for weak states as for strong 
ones, because most insecurities emanate from within the borders of weak states 
(Ayoob, 1995: 7). The outcomes of systemic security are also less promising for 
weak states. The proxy wars during the Cold War had an inverse effect on security 
of developing states by turning the Third World into a battlefield arena and 
substantially contributing to the growing insecurities (Ayoob, 1995: 7). Even the 
reliance on military power and alliance security does not bring security guarantees, 
as the cases of Somalia, Vietnam and Pakistan demonstrate (Ayoob, 1995: 7). 
Accordingly, in view of these contentions a great many scholars propose a different 
approach to the study of security in weak states. Thomas (1987: 1) asserts that 
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several key areas need to be examined to find “the Third World security” such as 
the search for security through nation-building or nuclear weapons, or the search 
for secure systems of trade, health, money and food. Acknowledging the 
comprehensiveness of these criteria, Ayoob (1995: 9-11) proposes to define the 
Third World security primarily in political terms and in relation to the substantial 
challenges the states and regimes face. Indeed, the limitation of Thomas’ wide-
ranging criteria strictly to those with political outcomes adds parsimony to the 
analysis of the concept of weak states’ security without diminishing its explanatory 
power.  
 
Respectively, Ayoob (1995: 9) proposes the following definition of the notion, 
“[S]ecurity-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities – both internal and 
external – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state 
structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.” The inclusion 
of the internal vulnerabilities is one the most important adjustments to the definition 
of security that are widely contested by traditional IR. Nonetheless, internal 
dynamics can explain political behaviour of weak states. Numerous external and 
internal threats are conducive to the environment, where each societal unit, 
including the ruling regime, compete for survival (Jackson, 2010: 191). In turn, this 
fierce competition leads to a further escalation of the situation, creating a vicious 
and everlasting circle of “an insecurity dilemma” (Jackson, 2010: 191). The state 
becomes trapped in a semi-permanent condition of “emergent anarchy”, where all 
components of the society are engaged in self-help survival strategies, whilst the 
government is unable to accumulate a monopoly on the instruments of violence or 
establish effective institutional and physical base (Jackson, 2010: 191). In addition, 
the peculiar forms of threats inherent to weak states further twist the insecurity 
spiral. For instance, there are a number of threats, unique for weak states, which 
pose serious challenge to the integrity of the country. These states are under the 
constant threat of armed and violent intervention into the political life of the state, 
e.g. coup d’états, revolutions, revolts (Jackson, 2010). For example, Centre for 
Systemic Peace (2011) names 750 alleged, plotted, attempted and successful 
coup d’états in the world from 1946 to 2010, and this list excludes popular 
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uprisings, victories by rebel forces, social revolutions, ouster of the leaders due to 
their health incapacity or death, or ouster by foreign forces. The threat from 
warlords, religious leaders, opposition politicians, strongmen, or other individuals 
who may challenge the dictatorial and infrastructural power of the state contributes 
greatly to the insecurity dilemma of weak states. In addition, the flaws of state 
institutions in weak states lead to the steady erosion of the rule of law and to the 
eventual governmental crisis, when the ruling elites struggle to fill the formed 
political vacuum and claim illusory legitimacy under the mantle of statehood 
(Jackson, 2010: 190). 
 
Even though most of the pressing threats to security in weak states are 
domestically generated, it will be imprudent to jettison in toto the role of the 
external or transnational threats. Since these states are internally weak, fragile and 
impotent to exercise coercive capacity, they become vulnerable to any external 
incursions, interventions or conflict spillovers (Jackson, 2010: 190). This 
involvement into the domestic affairs of the state may not necessarily be direct, as 
other interested players may support the regime change or contribute to the 
effective condition of anarchy and political vacuum covertly or indirectly. The 
examples of such cases are numerous, from the conspiracies of the medieval 
Europe up to the recent interventions by the USA and the UK in Libya. In addition, 
weak states fail to prevent smuggling of goods, human and arms trafficking, influx 
of misplaced people or the actual fighting, because their borders are too loose and 
the infrastructural power is too weak (Jackson, 2010: 190). 
 
In a similar vein, “regime” can be endowed with a specific context. In public 
discourse and journalistic accounts regime is usually referred to a form of 
government.9 Quite often this term is commonly applied to the non-democratic 
governments, which suppress political freedoms and exercise arbitrary rules 
(Shama, 2014: 14). The Oxford dictionary (2014) relates the term “regime” to the 
Latin word “regere” or “to rule” and thus defines the word as “a government, 
especially an authoritarian one”. The Merriam-Webster dictionary (2014) also 
9 For instance, see www.reuters.com, www.rt.com, www.cnn.com, www.aljazeera.com, and etc. 
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classifies the term as “a form of government” or “a particular government” and as 
“a system of management”.  
 
In the academia, regime is examined in broader terms.10 For instance, Sally 
Cummings et al (2013: 446) assert that “[t]he state refers to the locus and structure 
of power; the regime to the rules and limitations governing power’s access and 
use; and government to the particular group of political actors who are exercising 
power at any given time”. However, Cummings et al (2013) argue that these three 
concepts are often conflated in the political analysis of the post-communist 
countries. Thus, in their work, Cummings et al (2013: 447) understand “the state” 
through the Weberian definition with its focus on the structure and sources of 
power in terms of both actors and institutions, whilst the government is analysed as 
the people who occupy the highest political offices in the country and administer 
the state. In turn, the scholars relate the concept of the regime to the rules and 
norms, which govern power arrangements in the country (Cummings et al, 2013).  
 
Cummings et al (2013) even highlight “vertical regimes” and “horizontal regimes”. 
“Vertical regimes” are referred to the rules and norms, which define the nature and 
methods of power allocation amongst political actors, whilst “horizontal regimes” 
are referred to the acceptance of these rules by all players and thus are essentially 
about elites’ legitimacy (Cummings et al, 2013: 446). Accordingly, Cummings 
(2002: 3) denotes that “[r]egimes are typically less permanent than states but more 
permanent than governments”. In a similar vein, Gerardo Munck (1996: 8) argued 
10 In IR literature “regime” is usually examined in much more complex terms (Rittberger, 1993). For 
instance, speaking about international regimes, Stephen Krasner (1982: 186) emphasizes that 
“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in 
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.” 
Similarly, John Ruggie (1975: 569) asserts that international regime is an ensemble of “mutual 
expectations, generally agreed-to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance with which 
organizational energies and financial commitments are allocated”. Keohane and Nye (1977: 19; 
1987: 732) further build upon the Ruggie’s concept and affirm that this international law concept 
represents the “governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence” and “networks 
of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects”. Nonetheless, the 
definition of international regimes in IR is yet less than straightforward, whilst the agreement 
amongst IR scholars on one universal definition of “international regime” is still highly unlikely 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997). 
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that political regime is defined by the formal and informal procedural rules and the 
acceptance of those rules by all relevant actors. These rules determine who gains 
access to the main governmental positions, how this access is gained and how this 
all interplays with the publicly binding decision-making (Munck, 1996: 8). Likewise, 
Oisín Tansey (2009: 5) distinguished the term “regime” as a core set of rules, 
procedures and norms that determine elites’ access to power.11  
 
Nonetheless, in this work, the definition of the term “regime” will exclude the rules 
and norms that determine power allocations and will be only limited to a certain 
group of people in power – the ruling elites who have a monopoly on the 
instruments of violence within the country.12 In weak states, these people are 
usually the leaders of the state and their entourages such as their relatives, clan 
member and cronies. Nael Shama (2014: 14) provides a somewhat similar 
definition of the regime, which is “governments of authoritarian states, the ruling 
elites of these states, and the clientage and patronage networks that are cultivated 
by and associated with these elites”. Such a conceptualisation goes beyond a 
narrow view of the regime as a particular government by incorporating other key 
political players who can influence state decision-making without holding official 
positions in the government.  
 
Furthermore, this conceptualisation also distinguishes from the general concept of 
“the elites”. George Field and John Higley (quoted in Sharan, 2001: 111) define 
elites as “[p]eople [who are] able, through their positions in powerful organizations, 
to affect national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously” and who 
are “capable, if they wish, of making substantial political trouble for high officials 
(i.e. other elite persons who happen to be incumbents of authoritative positions) 
11 Tansey (2009), however, excludes administrative structure and legal source of authority from the 
characterisation of the regime. 
12 Although this research does not engage with the broader understanding of regime, it welcomes 
further studies of the rules, norms and procedures that determine power distribution in the context 
of Central Asia. For instance, a recent research of this topic has been conducted by Cummings et al 
(2013). By dissecting the concepts of government, regime and state in the case of Kyrgyzstan, 
Cummings et al (2013) argue that the entire period from 1991 to 2010 in Kyrgyzstan can be 
classified as one regime of semi-authoritarianism, whilst the events of 2005 and 2010 can be 
defined as government changes. 
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without being promptly repressed”. However, in this work, the concept of regime is 
not inclusive of all political actors who are capable of projecting certain degree of 
power within the state. Instead, this work focuses on a dominant group – a 
controlling minority of individuals whose power and influence prevails over those of 
other actors within the country and who can significantly affect state policymaking. 
Accordingly, in this work, regime will be examined through the prism of the 
interests of the ruling elites.  
 
In this respect, regime security will be classified as “the idiosyncratic set of 
dispositions, orientations, and strategies of a particular regime as it seeks to 
maintain its physical presence, establish and perpetuate legitimacy, and further its 
permanent and ad hoc interests” (Mohamedou, 1996: 111). The realisation of 
these strategies is mainly directed to achieve regime security in four areas: power 
consolidation, economic viability, internal and external threat diffusion and 
legitimacy renewal (Mohamedou, 1996; Mohamedou, 1998).  
 
Power consolidation typically occurs when the regime takes over the state 
machinery, but this process may be repetitious, depending on the volatility of the 
threats (Mohamedou, 1996; Shama, 2014). For the regime to last, however, power 
consolidation needs to be perpetuated with the socio-economic demands of the 
people (Mohamedou, 1996: 115; Shama, 2014). Although the regimes may exist 
without economic viability, the ruling elites tend to associate the economic 
successes with their regimes to guarantee further security (Mohamedou, 1996: 
116). In fact, gaining and maintaining legitimacy becomes an ultimate goal for 
regime security (Mohamedou, 1996; Mohamedou, 1998). In general, in weak 
states, the regime – id est the ruling elites – employ a range of internal and 
external strategies to ensure their own security at the expense of the long-term 
state developments (Migdal, 1988; Mohamedou, 1996: 112; Mohamedou, 1998; 
Jackson, 2010). Accordingly, the next sections will examine in more detail some of 
the strategies that the Central Asian regimes resort to in order to maintain their 
presence and protect their interests. 
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In sum, the perennial challenges of the ruling regimes in weak states lie in the 
dilemma between achieving short-term regime security and long-term state-
building objectives (Jackson, 2010: 194). The ruling elites struggle to escape the 
insecurity dilemma posed by the internal and external weakness of the state, and, 
as a result, they twist the insecurity spiral further. It is a matter of debate whether 
insecurity dilemma of weak states is the standard process of state-building. Yet, 
the understanding of the regime and regime security in weak states is essential for 
the analysis and evaluation of the international behaviour of these states. As 
Ayoob (1995: 191) emphasizes, both domestic and international behaviour of the 
Third World states cannot be adequately explained without including security in the 
centrepiece of the analysis. The ruling elites in weak states are “obsessed” with the 
regime security and, respectively, most of the domestic and foreign policies they 
implement are conditioned by this preoccupation (Ayoob, 1995: 191). Thus, regime 
security may become one of the key explanations that determine international 
behaviour of weak states, although the number of independent variables affecting 
this process is numerous. 
  
Foreign Policy of Weak States 
Since weak states are a separate concept, their foreign policies also need a 
separate focus. Accordingly, the importance of regime security needs to be 
assessed with respect to other factors that affect foreign policies of weak states. 
One may presume that there is a great scholastic diversity in the analysis of foreign 
policies of weak states, especially since a myriad of foreign policy behaviours 
inherent to weak states was identified by various scholars and policymakers. 
However, these approaches are still rather limited and could be situated within 
three main themes – the idiosyncratic, great power and reductionist frameworks, 
although the newer works on weak states tend to expand this analysis by 
examining domestic, systemic and transnational variables.  
 
The available academic literature distinguished the horizontal and vertical 
methodological approaches to the study of foreign policies of weak states (Handel, 
1990: 4). The horizontal approach seeks to devise a general foreign policy theory 
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of weak states, whilst the vertical approach seeks to examine foreign policy of a 
particular state during a specific period (Handel, 1990: 4). In this respect, Jeanne 
Hey (2003) provides a comprehensive summary of the most commonly cited 
strategies of small states on the international arena. According to Hey (2003: 5), 
these states: 
 
• Exhibit a low level of participation in world affairs 
• Address a narrow scope of foreign policy issues 
• Limit their behaviour to their immediate geographic arena 
• Employ diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as 
opposed to military instruments 
• Emphasize internationalist principles, international law, and other 
“morally minded” ideals 
• Secure multinational agreements and join multinational institutions 
whenever possible 
• Choose neutral positions 
• Rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships, and resources 
• Aim to cooperate and to avoid conflicts with others 
• Spend a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources on 
ensuring physical and political security and survival  
 
Although Hey attributes this pattern to small states, her classification is still 
applicable to weak states, as their foreign policy behaviour is very similar. 
Nonetheless, small and weak states are different concepts. Small states are 
characterised by their differences in a geographical size, population number and 
degree of influence on international arena (Hey, 2003). The concept of weak states 
is related more to the socio-political cohesion, as identified by Buzan (1991). For 
instance, Syria can be classified as a small and weak state, whereas Israel can be 
identified as a small, but strong state.  
 
Yet, notwithstanding the comprehensiveness of such summarising classifications, 
the contention regarding the diversity in the analysis of foreign policy of weak 
states still lacks strong theoretical and empirical base. Traditional approaches to 
the study of foreign policies of weak states are limited and mostly characterised by 
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psychologistic/idiosyncratic, great power and reductionist positions (Dessouki and 
Korany, 1984). The first strand conceives foreign policy of weak states as an 
outcome of the idiosyncrasies, impulses and desires of a single leader (Dessouki 
and Korany, 1984: 4). This view runs in line with the behavioural and actor-specific 
commitments of traditional FPA that investigates foreign policies via the 
particularities of individuals responsible for it. Consequently, the presidents, kings 
or sheikhs are examined as the sole sources of foreign policy with war and peace 
being the outcome of their personal tastes and choices (Dessouki and Korany, 
1984: 4). For instance, Zeev Maoz and Allison Astorino (1992) suggested that 
during the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970s most of the foreign policy 
decisions in the engaged states were resulting from the perceptions of the key 
decision makers and how they assessed the nature of the events. Similarly, Yong-
Pyo Hong (2000) explained security and foreign policies of South Korea of 1953-
1960 via the role of its autocratic president Syngman Rhee. Hong (2000) denoted 
that when the degree of support and legitimacy of the Rhee regime declined, 
Rhee’s own interests substituted national security concerns, and as a result the 
foreign policy priorities of South Korea of that period such as “the march north” or 
the orientation towards the USA served Rhee’s interest (Hong, 2000). 
 
Indeed, in general, it may be difficult to rule out the idiosyncratic variables from the 
explanation of foreign policies of weak states, since the regimes in weak states are 
often centred on charismatic or dictatorial leaders. In fact, in certain cases, such an 
approach appears to be enticing. For example, Thomas Leonard (1999) attributed 
the pursuit of independent foreign policy by Cuba to Fidel Castro, whilst Peter 
Mansfield (1982) identified Saddam Hussein as the principal policy-maker of the 
Ba’athist regime and the key source of the Iraqi foreign policy. Similarly, David 
Chandler (1999) investigated the decision-making rationale of the Khmer Rouge 
regime in Cambodia by exploring the ideas, desires and behaviour of Pol Pot. 
Nonetheless, as outlined in Chapter I, decision makers-oriented FPA is often 
dismissed by mainstream IR due to its major internal incongruities and incapacities 
to deal with the systemic variables. The sole focus on one leader as the 
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determinant of foreign policy requires a solid and rigorous justification for omitting 
other variables.  
 
On the contrary, the second framework examines the role of systemic factors in 
shaping foreign policies of weak states at the expense of domestic variables. The 
great power theme derivates from mainstream IR and rests upon the principles of 
structural realism, thus, explaining international behaviour of weak states mostly 
from the position of balance of power and systemic constraints. Within this 
framework, not only foreign policy of weaker states depends directly on the actions 
of greater players, but even domestic policy of those states is perceived as the 
reaction to the external influences. In other words, rephrasing Paul Noble (1984: 
41), the idiosyncratic approach examines what the governments “would like to do”, 
whereas the great power approach examines “what they are able to do”. The 
widest application of the great power analysis may be depicted in the literature on 
interstate relationships between the post-Soviet countries. Many scholars present 
Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia as a battleground between Russia 
and the USA after the demise of the USSR. The so-called New Great Game 
philosophy prevails not only within the academic circles, but also in the official 
discourses. As a result, the relations between post-Soviet states are often based 
on the capstones of the traditional security studies that are power relations and 
military might. For instance, the Russian-Georgian relations are quite often 
examined through the prism of the Russian consolidation of power and reassertion 
on its periphery (Allison, 2008a). The inability of the Ukrainian leadership to 
consolidate its foreign policy is explained by the swings of the Ukraine regime from 
one geopolitical pole to another, which may be evident in the Ukraine’s balancing 
between a “Slavic choice” and a “European choice” (Light, White and Löwenhardt, 
2000: 82-83). Similarly, the cobweb of the Central Asian relations is more 
commonly scrutinised through the interplay between Washington, Moscow and 
Beijing. 
 
The application of the great power narratives is not constrained uniquely to the 
post-Soviet periphery. For example, Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou (1996: 
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44) denoted that foreign policy of the Arab states was often perceived as the 
function of the Cold War bipolarity. In a similar vein, Nadav Safran (in Mohamedou, 
1996: 44-45) placed the great powers matrix in the core of the Arab states relations 
by arguing that the involvement of the great powers in the region exacerbated the 
local rivalries and prolonged the Arab-Israeli conflict. John Heilbrunn (1999) 
emphasised that Benin’s foreign policy was formed in Paris before 1996, whilst 
after 1996 Benin’s foreign policy became the product of the regional politics. 
Likewise, Nigeria was often examined through the prism of the Soviet and 
American engagement (Wright and Okolo, 1999: 127). Nonetheless, similar to the 
idiosyncratic model, one level analysis is insufficient to explain complex political 
phenomena, particularly in the turbulent developing regions. As aforesaid, certain 
concepts such as “domestic/foreign policy” or “national/regime security” are 
extremely perplexed in weak states and require multidimensional scrutiny. 
 
If the great power framework perceives foreign policies of weak states through the 
prism of greater players, the reductionist or model-builders approach equates the 
foreign policy dynamics of weak states with those of strong states. As Dessouki 
and Korany (1984: 6) assert, the reductionist approach assumes that foreign policy 
of developing states is driven by the same decisional calculi as foreign policy of 
developed states. The main difference is measured only in the quantitative terms. 
Stronger states have more resources, and thus they can conduct their foreign 
policies on larger scale. For instance, one of the reductionist models, the 
Rosenau’s linkage politics (1969), stressed the interdependence of national and 
international environments. From Rosenau’s perspective (1969) foreign policy 
decisions are conducted in accordance to their domestic outcomes, and likewise 
domestic policy decisions are spearheaded with regards to their international 
consequences. For example, Houman Sadri (2004) relied on the postulates of 
Rosenau’s linkage model to examine Iranian foreign relations in the 21st century. 
The presence of the sub-national actors and external forces was identified by Sadri 
(2004: 103) as sufficiently compelling to scrutinize the decision-making processes 
in Iran from the stands of the linkage politics. In a similar vein, Patrick McGowan 
and Klaus-Peter Gottwald (1975) believed that the linkage politics is paramount in 
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determining external behaviour of small post-colonial African states. McGowan and 
Gottwald (1975) argued that foreign policy of both strong and weak states can be 
perceived as an adaptive form of behaviour or, in other words, as a result of the 
interconnectedness between the domestic structures of a state and external 
events. To test their hypotheses, McGowan and Gottwald (1975: 476) implied 
under the ceteris paribus assumption that “the bigger the state, the greater its 
influence capability; and the more modern the state, the greater its stress 
sensitivity”. 
 
Yet, many scholars question the applicability of reductionist approach to weak 
states (Dessouki and Korany, 1984; Ayoob, 1995; Mohamedou, 1996). Such a 
model-builders approach predicates that both strong and weak states follow the 
rational decision-making model and thus fails to account for specific characteristics 
of weak states (Dessouki and Korany, 1984: 6). For instance, the linkage model 
rests on the premises of the dichotomy between internal and external 
environments. However, the border line between those two environments is razor-
thin, if not absent, in the developing regions like the Middle East (Mohamedou, 
1996: 47). As a result, model-builders approaches such as the linkage politics are 
rendered redundant or at least explanatory weak, when for instance applied to the 
Syrian-Lebanese, Saudi-Yemeni, Algerian-Mauritanian, Jordanian-Palestinian or 
Egyptian-Libyan affairs (Mohamedou, 1996: 47). Respectively, the reductionist 
approach is questioned on the same grounds as the idiosyncratic and great power 
frameworks for being too simplistic or even incomplete when applied to the context 
of weak states.  
 
Newer literature on foreign policies of weak states tends to go beyond the 
abovementioned traditional approaches by expanding the analysis to domestic, 
systemic and transnational variables. For instance, Peter Schraeder and Nefertiti 
Gaye (1997: 491) argue that the interplay between domestic and international 
factors held a prominent role in the formation of the Senegalese foreign policy. 
Thus, it may be inadequate to analyse the Senegalese foreign policy solely through 
the prism of the superpowers relations or the personal rule of Leopold Sedar 
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Senghor or Abdou Diouf even during the period of Cold War (Schraeder and Gaye, 
1997: 486). In this respect, Schraeder and Gaye (1997: 507) indicated that the 
following variables could have influenced the Senegalese specific foreign choices: 
the role of Islam and Wolof culture, democratic traditions, absence of the military 
rule, French colonial past, economic conditions, and acceptance of the socialist 
ideology by the Senegalese elite. Moreover, Schraeder and Gaye (1997: 485) 
pointed out that there are more salient variables such as traditional culture, religion 
or regional interests that can account for a broader and more nuanced 
understanding of the foreign policy dynamics of weak states. 
 
Indeed, more scholars accept that idiosyncratic, reductionist and great power 
frameworks often fail to reveal the genuine picture of decision-making and at worst 
draw “mere caricatures” of more intertwined and complex phenomena (Schraeder 
and Gaye, 1997: 507; Muni, 1979; Mohamedou, 1996). Accordingly, contemporary 
scholarships of foreign policy decision-making in weak states attempt to move 
towards a multi-level and multi-causal framework of analysis. For example, Frank 
Mora (2003) emphasises that foreign policy choices of Paraguay from 1954 to 
1998 were bound to two explanatory variables – idiosyncratic and systemic. Under 
Alfredo Stroessner Paraguay’s state decision-making was shaped by the autocratic 
governing rules, norms and procedures, whilst Paraguay’s foreign policy was 
devised to strengthen Stroessner’s corrupt neosultanistic regime (Mora, 2003). 
Under transformist Andres Rodriguez Paraguay’s foreign policies were directed to 
attract international support to the democratising regime of Rodriguez. Paraguay 
terminated its international isolationism and joined regional economic systems to 
boost Rodriguez’ legitimacy (Mora, 2003). The attraction of the investment capital 
and the demonstration of commitments to democratic reforms were critical for the 
strengthening of Rodriguez regime (Mora, 2003: 23). Nonetheless, lacking strong 
political and economic base and landlocked by two regional powers, Paraguayan 
foreign policy was constrained by the nature of the international system and was 
dependent on the regional balance of power, whether it was the Argentine-Brazil 
rivalry, the Uruguayan support in Mercosur or the engagement of the USA (Mora, 
2003: 14).  
73 
 
 Lena Jonson (2006) applied a similar framework to examine Tajikistan's quest for 
foreign policy during the first four years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Jonson (2006: 11) articulated three possible explanations that drove 
Tajikistan’s external relations: 1) the regional system approach, which focuses on 
the international system in the region, the constraints it represents and the 
opportunities it offers to the Tajik state 2) domestic consolidation approach, which 
gives attention to efforts by the government to consolidate the state and secure its 
own hold on power 3) societal approach, which looks at the dynamics from within 
society and which may press the government to shift its foreign policy in one 
direction or another.  
 
Through the analysis of war-torn Tajikistan Jonson provided constructivist insights 
on how a small state formulates its foreign policy priorities and seeks to develop its 
national interests under the vigilante focus of greater powers. In particular, Jonson 
(2006: 182) believes that the distinctions between the internal and external factors 
behind the foreign policy of a state cannot be clear-cut, as the domestic scene of a 
state is subjected to the influences from the outside and is vulnerable to the impact 
of international environment. Thus, Johnson (2006: 182) analysed Tajikistan’s post 
9/11 “open door” concept through the prism of great power engagement and 
Afghanistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan triangle. The introduction of domestic 
consolidation and societal approaches provided alternative views into the analysis 
of factors that shaped international behaviour of Tajikistan. Jonson (2006: 13) 
asserts that Tajik policymakers define and interpret national interests in terms of 
the interests of the ruling regime and thus “formulate foreign policy largely 
autonomously in relation to society in the sense that they try to reduce the other 
interests’ possibilities to influence the choice of foreign policy”. The discontent 
groups of people within the society and competing clan rivalries may also directly 
or indirectly influence the directions of foreign policy of the country and feed the 
insecurity of the ruling regime, which in turn may force the ruling elites to rethink its 
foreign policy to ensure a continued hold of power (Jonson, 2006: 13, 129). Thus, 
since relatively few studies examined the determinants of foreign policies of weak 
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Central Asian states, such a multi-causal approach sets an example for further 
academic inquiry into this topic. 
 
One of the main rationales behind this approach lies in the possibility of expanding 
traditional Western notions of security to include into the agenda internal and non-
military security matters inherent solely to weak states (Ryan, 2009). The ruling 
regimes in weak states “reside” in between the international system and domestic 
society, and their foreign policy decisions are linked to both of these notions (Ryan, 
2009: 12). Thus, the foreign policy theory should be capable of scrutinising the 
challenges and opportunities posed by both domestic and international 
environments, since “neither domestic nor foreign policy can be understood without 
recourse to the constraints presented in the other, overlapping, sphere” (Ryan, 
2009: 12). Respectively, amongst internal variables more scholars tend to 
emphasize the role of regime security in determining foreign policy behaviour of 
weak states. Particularly, this trend is depicted in the new works on the Arab 
states. For example, Mohamedou (1996) suggests treating regime security and 
state-building as key variables that affect foreign policy-making processes of Iraq. 
The scholar argues that it is the duality of these concepts, which accounted for 
major foreign policy decisions of Iraq such as the annexation of Kuwait in the early 
1990s or the launch of the missiles on Saudi Arabia and Israel (Mohamedou, 1996: 
324). Likewise, Curtis Ryan (2009: 7-8) asserts that the Western notions of “state” 
and “security” have a more complex meaning in the Middle East, which 
complicates the applicability of mainstream IR theories to the local context. 
External factors may severely limit foreign policy choices of weak states, but 
systemic constraints are not decisive (Ryan, 2009). The pivotal question rather 
becomes who is in power and what their interests are (Ryan, 2009: 8). As a result, 
in regards to the degree of influence on the foreign policy outcomes and alliance 
formations, the variable of regime security retains more explanatory power over the 
perspective of external threats in the Middle East (Ryan, 2009).  
 
In sum, the traditional foreign policy studies of weak states are mostly 
characterised by idiosyncratic, great power and reductionist frameworks of 
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analysis. However, weak states lack strong physical and institutional base, 
effective monopoly on the instruments of violence and a consensus on the idea of 
the state, and as a result they are trapped in the vicious circle of insecurity 
dilemma. Since the ruling regimes in weak states are preoccupied by their own 
security and short-term goals, the frontiers between the domestic and international 
politics blur. This phenomenon becomes the perennial impediment to the analysis, 
whereas the explanatory capacity of the orthodox approaches is rendered to be 
insufficient or even misleading in explaining the genuine dynamics of international 
behaviour of weak states. New literature on foreign policies of weak states seeks to 
mitigate this epistemological challenge and go beyond the abovementioned 
traditional approaches. In turn, the amalgamation of domestic and external 
variables may explain international behaviour of weak states in broader and more 
genuine terms. In particular, the inclusion of security into the analysis may 
contribute greatly to the understanding of foreign policies of weak states (Ayoob, 
1995). The ruling regimes in weak states tend to prioritize their own security and 
shape their foreign policies in accordance to the home-generated threats. Thus, it 
becomes essential for the understanding of foreign policy dynamics of weak states 
to include the interests of the ruling elites who are undermined by traditional and 
internal security dilemmas and obsessed with domestic and regional legitimacy 
(Ryan, 2009).  
 
The Great Game of Central Asia 
Respectively, then the ensuing question is how to examine international relations 
of Central Asia. Despite the shortcomings of structural realism, it will be imprudent 
to jettison in toto the role of the systemic factors in shaping foreign policies of five 
Central Asian republics. However, in a similar vein, it will be also inconsiderate to 
relate all foreign policies of the Central Asian states to the notions of 
bandwagoning and power relations. As aforementioned, one level analysis is 
insufficient to explain complex political phenomena in the turbulent developing 
regions. In turn, a diversified system-level analysis may provide a broader 
explanation of international politics in the region. Such an analysis may explain 
how the Central Asian regimes manage to play the greater actors off one another 
76 
 
to secure external funding and lucrative contractual terms, to curtail inconvenient 
external expectations and to manipulate foreign standards and norms for their own 
benefits (Cooley, 2012: 9). Accordingly, this work proposes to examine foreign 
policies of the Central Asian states via the merger of internal, external and 
transnational variables. In particular, the foreign policy of regime security in 
Kyrgyzstan will be assessed in relation to the concepts of bandwagoning, state 
performance and rent-seeking. 
 
Similar to the previously mentioned studies, Central Asia has been subjected to the 
traditional trends of foreign policy analysis of weak states. Although recent studies 
tend to stress the role of the domestic variables in determining foreign policies of 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, most of the 
literature conceives foreign policy decision-making in Central Asia through the 
neorealist prism of the great powers engagement. It may not be surprising that 
many scholars examine foreign policy orientations of these states through the 
neorealist perspective, since Central Asia has been an indispensable part of the 
Soviet monolith for 75 years, and purportedly Moscow drew the border lines of its 
own “backyard” or the current “near abroad”. Thus, both scholars and policymakers 
tend to examine the Central Asian politics through the Russian decline and 
reassertion in the region, linking it to the New Great Game over the spheres of 
influence.13  
 
Much cited concept of the Great Game has been coined by a British intelligence 
officer Arthur Conolly who was casted in a well with vermin and reptiles for two 
13 It was in the early 1900s, when Sir Halford Mackinder (1904) advanced his Heartland theory that 
stressed the importance of controlling Eastern Europe, including Central Asia, for the world 
dominance. However, his Heartland thesis has long dominated the academic and political 
discourses in the region. Nicholas Spykman (1944) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) were amongst 
those who introduced the concepts of geopolitics into the American foreign policy practices, as they 
emphasized that the balance of power in Central Asia directly affects the interests and security of 
the USA. As Matthew Edwards (2003: 83) denotes, such a world-wide use of the term “the New 
Great Game” along with an increasing focus on Central Asia has been potentially caused by the 
revived interest in geopolitics as the framework for the politico-security analysis. Yet, compared to 
the classical Great Game, the concept of the New Great Game was not limited to geopolitical 
dominance in a zero-sum form (Edwards, 2003). It included the competition in military, economic, 
cultural and religious spheres with actors at the local, state, regional, transnational and multinational 
levels (Edwards, 2003). 
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months and then beheaded by the Emir of Bukhara on charges of spying in Central 
Asia for the British Crown (Fromkin, 1980: 936). Although the Great Game dates 
back to the early 19th century, the term itself, however, has been popularized by 
Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim in 1901. The novel unfolds the life story of an orphan 
Kimball "Kim" O'Hara who is sucked into the political confrontation between the 
Russian and British Empires, known as “The Great Game”, whilst travelling with a 
Tibetan Lama to “the River of the Arrow” (Kipling, 1901). The original Great Game 
was a secret war played by Tsarist Russia and Victorian Britain at the steps of 
Central Asia, with 2,000 miles separating two empires in the beginning of the 
confrontation and less than 20 miles in the Pamir region by the end of it (Hopkirk, 
1990: 5). Imperial Britain perceived the active expansion of Tsarist Russia in 
Central Asia and Caucasus as the direct threat to its integrity, as there was a 
possibility of further expansion of the Russian forces to India through Afghanistan. 
Accordingly, the British Empire attempted to contain the growing influence of 
Tsarist Russia in the Central Asian region, which led to a latent confrontation 
between two great powers and a catastrophic defeat of Imperial Britain in 
Afghanistan. This classic stage of the Great Game has officially ended in 1907 with 
the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention (Hopkirk, 2002: 61).14 Hundred years 
later the concept of the Great Game has been revived with new players entering 
the political scene of Central Asia. This revisited notion imagined a covert rivalry 
between Russia, China, and the USA in Central Asia and also acknowledged the 
emerging roles of Iran and Turkey. Such theorising was conducted from the 
perspective of greater powers, since the newly independent states were assumed 
to be too weak and fractured to make independent decisions, whilst the presence 
14 The second phase of the Great Game began at the onset of the World War I, when Kaiser of 
Germany Wilhelm II decided to create a new Teutonic empire (Hopkirk, 2002: 61). In conjunction 
with Mehmed V Reshad of the Ottoman Empire, Wilhelm II declared a jihad against the Entente 
Powers to harness the militant Islamists against Russia and Britain in Central Asia and India 
(Hopkirk, 2002: 61). Particularly, Wilhelmine Germany relied on the Afghans and the Persians to 
invade India, as the Germans and Ottomans were spreading the rumours that Wilhelm II has been 
converted to Islam (Hopkirk, 2002: 61). The second phase of the Great Game, however, was ended 
by the defeat of the Central Powers in the World War I. The third and final phase of the Great Game 
is often attributed to the period after the Bolsheviks Revolution in 1917, when Vladimir Lenin 
proclaimed to liberate Asia from imperialist oppression (Hopkirk, 2002: 61). Lenin believed that the 
British Empire would have collapsed if Britain lost its jewel India (Hopkirk, 2002: 62). Thus, as 
Hopkirk (2002: 62) puts it, the Russians and the Britons found themselves once again playing a 
hide-and-seek game across the steps and mountains of Central Asia.  
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of strong and ambitious neighbours further constrained their choices. As Frederick 
Starr (1996: 80) argued, the fate of Central Asia was in question after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, because the region has been “politically organized from 
without” since the 15th century.  
 
The hypothesis of bandwagoning posits that weaker states will align with the 
sources of threat, because these states are too weak to change the power 
distribution patterns or affect the systemic outcomes (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). 
Respectively, the New Great Game model envisages that weak Central Asian 
states with low aggregate capabilities will have no options but to bandwagon much 
stronger neighbours or the actors with stronger offensive potential. Indeed, the 
interplay between Russia, China, and the USA is currently one the most 
fashionable frameworks in the analysis of the Central Asian foreign policy. The 
engagement of Russia in the region seems to be a natural process, taking into 
account the historical and cultural legacies, long transparent borders and Russia’s 
image as security guarantor and manager (Jonson, 2001: 120). If in the early 
1990s the Russian policy in Central Asia was low-profile, yet with a zero-sum 
perspective, in the mid 2000s with the rising prices on oil and gas the Russia’s 
confidence of its great power status increased, which led to its reassertion in the 
Central Asian region (Jonson, 1998; Jonson, 2001; Allison, 2009a). As a result, 
many scholars and policymakers assumed that all matters related to Central Asia 
have to be discussed and agreed beforehand in Kremlin. As for the USA, 
Washington’s interest in the region was progressively growing since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. In the beginning, the engagement of the USA in Central Asia was 
purportedly associated with the proliferation of democratic principles and with the 
counteraction of the Russia’s efforts to perpetuate colonial relations (Blank, 2001: 
145). It was also assumed that the USA was interested in securing cheap energy 
supplies from Central Asia, though it remained unclear whether the Caspian oil and 
gas are of genuine strategic importance to Washington (Blank, 2001: 145). 
However, in 2001, with the global war on terror, the USA has drastically increased 
its military presence in Central Asia, promoting basing politics and overshadowing 
the democratic nurturing (Cooley, 2008: 248). China has been historically a 
79 
 
traditional enemy of the Central Asian peoples. Yet, in the 21 century the politics of 
China in the region were rather associated with the economic cooperation and 
trade. For China, Central Asia is important in the context of Eurasia and its 
possible alliance with regional powers and its cross-border relations and links with 
Xinjiang (Xing, 2001: 153). Nonetheless, it is still difficult to clearly outline the 
Chinese strategy towards Central Asia, since Beijing has specific goals and macro-
conceptions but lacks a formal policy (Rumer, Trenin, and Zhao, 2007: 137).  
 
The engagement of Iran and Turkey in Central Asia was also perceived through 
the geopolitical interplay. The Iranian interests in the region are primarily related to 
Afghanistan and Iranian security issues (Herzig, 2001: 171). Iran seeks to compete 
for the Central Asian influence mainly to deter its further isolation if the USA, 
Turkey or Israel fills the Central Asian power vacuum (Herzig, 2001: 174). Thus, 
Iran is interested in reviving Persian heritage and embracing Islamic governments 
in the region (Herzig, 2001: 174). The Turkey’s probe to enter “mysterious and 
closed world” of new Central Asia was largely supported by the USA to contain the 
hegemonic ambitions of Iran and the proliferation of Shi’a Islam in the region 
(Snyder, 1995: xxiii). Washington assumed that secular Muslim Turkey with strong 
Western ties would become a model of development for its “Turkic brothers” 
(Snyder, 1995: xxiii). However, although the involvement of Turkey in Central Asia 
was steadily growing, Ankara was more interested in the developments of the 
Caspian region than in Central Asia itself (Winrow, 2001: 217). The Turkish officials 
perceived the Central Asian republics (excluding Farsi-speaking Tajikistan) as a 
new market for its goods and as an alternative source of hydrocarbons and raw 
materials (Winrow, 2001: 199). As a result, to achieve these goals Ankara was 
keen to promote common linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural ties (Winrow, 
2001: 199). 
 
In general, the relations of Central Asia are described as resulting from historical 
and cultural affinities, security concerns and economic and strategic interests of 
great powers in the region (Jonson and Allison, 2001: 15). Central Asia is 
perceived as an investment of the international system managed by “responsible 
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stakeholders” Russia, China and the USA (Rumer, Trenin, and Zhao, 2007: 70-
71).15 The capacity of the local states to conduct foreign policy independently of 
the external powers’ influence is either diminished or completely dismissed. As Roy 
Allison (2009b) emphasises, weak regionalism in Eurasia is mostly explained by 
the competitive nature of the great power engagement in the region, the 
preferences for bilateral partnership, the history of the Russian dominance or the 
enduring intraregional rivalries – essentially, all factors that are beyond the control 
of the local states. The cases of successful regional cooperation are also explained 
via the neorealist framework such as the hegemonic stability theory (Allison, 
2009b).  
 
Nonetheless, although the great powers analysis via the notion of the New Great 
Game is an attractive concept, this framework fails to reveal genuine dynamics of 
“the real game” in Central Asia. In fact, the framing of the region through the prism 
of imperial confrontation overlooks significant changes in the international politics 
of Central Asia (Edwards, 2003; Cooley, 2012). Comparing the period of the Great 
Game to the current state of affairs, it is evident that the political, economic, military 
and cultural situations are fundamentally different (Edwards, 2003: 90). If the Great 
Game was played by two imperial powers, the so-called New Great Game involves 
a greater number of players significantly different in typology (Edwards, 2003). For 
instance, besides the states, there are players at the supra-state level such as the 
NATO, the SCO or the OSCE and at the sub-state level such as multinational 
corporations, NGOs, extremist groups or criminal organizations (Edwards, 2003: 
89). In addition, the aims, means, methods, costs and benefits of the New Great 
Game are also far different compared to those in the early 20th century due to the 
number and diversity of the players (Edwards, 2003). For example, the control over 
Central Asia may be a matter of prestige and demonstration of Moscow’s 
increasing role in the international system. Chevron and Exxon Mobil may regard 
15 For instance, historical and cultural commonalities are spearheaded in the relations between 
Turkey and all Central Asian states, except Tajikistan, between Iran and Tajikistan, or between 
Russia and Central Asia through their Soviet legacy (Jonson and Allison, 2001: 14). The economic 
interests are reflected in the energy interests of all the regional powers, Iran’s trade with 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, China’s economic ties with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan or the 
American and Turkish investments in the Central Asian economies (Jonson and Allison, 2001: 15). 
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Central Asia as an oil and gas field with immense potential to generate double-digit 
profits, whilst Hizb ut-Tahrir may imagine Central Asia as a fertile ground for the 
establishment of Islamic caliphate.  
 
The rules of the Great Game also assume that the local sovereigns and peoples 
are compliant with the wills of the greater powers. However, the Central Asian 
practices demonstrate that the local elites are not necessarily subservient to 
Russia, China or the USA and a fortiori to Turkey and Iran. The Central Asian 
states have emerged from being the passive pawns of the Central Asian 
chessboard to become critical actors in their own right, establishing themselves the 
rules of the game (Cooley, 2012). The local rules, which outline the terms of the 
game for the external players, are predominantly directed at ensuring the survival 
of the local regimes, increasing their private gains and reserving the brokering role 
for the home elites between local clientele and international community (Cooley, 
2012). Furthermore, unlike the original Great Game, the New Great Game is not 
necessarily a zero-sum game at least at the state-centric level. As Heathershaw 
(2007) accentuates, even a scant political analysis demonstrates that the New 
Great Game theory is contained by the existence of a shared ground expressed in 
the “War on Terror” and the second- or even third-tier role of Central Asia to the 
USA, Russia and China. Heathershaw’s example of the “War on Terror” 
demonstrates that there is an intersection of interests between Russia, China and 
the USA, as none of the sides are interested in the escalation of the situation in 
Afghanistan, the subsequent spillover effect and the radicalization of the region. 
The existence of this strategic triangle between Moscow, Beijing and Washington 
has been observed not only in their competition, but also in their cooperation, 
enabling, and emulation (Cooley, 2012). The cooperation in the security sphere 
between the three poles has been especially vivid after the events of 9/11. 
Enabling was also an important feature of these trilateral relationships, as all 
parties enabled each other to pursue their own strategic aims in the region 
(Cooley, 2012). Emulation or mimicking has become a common trait as well: the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), for instance, mirrored the form of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or the Chinese and 
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Russian election monitoring institutions mirrored the OSCE’s Office of Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) (Cooley, 2012).  
 
Strikingly, the commitment of the scholars and policymakers to the use of the term 
“the New Great Game” can be attributed to the commitment of the Central Asian 
and Russian elites themselves to such a geopolitical mindset. John Heathershaw 
(2007: 248) denotes that “[i]deologies, and the political, social and cultural setting 
in which they ‘originate’, continue to have an enduring impact long after that 
‘origination’”. The elites who came to power both in Russia and Central Asia have 
been raised on the dogmatic incrustations of the communist ideology. 
Consequently, this nomenklatura who became the stronghold of democracy in one 
night was still affected to a varying level by the ideas of class struggle and 
imperialism. Moreover, it will be premature to disregard the legacy and tenets of 
the Cold War, which lasted for more than four decades and affected more than one 
generation of the Soviets. Thus, the popularity of the geopolitics amongst the elites 
in the region may be also attributed to the institutional knowledge inherited from the 
Soviet past (Heathershaw, 2007). 
 
In general, the great power analysis of the Central Asian foreign policies may not 
fully explain the decision-making dynamics in these states, although the rejection 
of systemic variables will also be imprudent and unjustified. Central Asian states 
lack effective institutions, physical base, a monopoly on the instruments of violence 
and a consensus on the idea of the state. Whilst the Central Asian elites may play 
ethnic, religious or Asian cards, they are unwilling to be bound by such “natural” 
ties and to become dependent upon any new “big brother” (Olcott, 1996: 21-37). 
The ruling regimes in Central Asia tend to prioritise their own security and shape 
foreign policies of their countries in accordance to the home-generated threats. 
The neorealist explanations of foreign policies of the Central Asian states need to 
be examined vis-à-vis other alternative or supplementary variables. In this respect, 
state performance and rent-seeking may contribute significantly to the explanation 
of the Central Asian decision-making. 
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State Performance 
The concept of state securitisation or state performance has been only recently 
framed within the context of Central Asia. The notion of state performance 
assumes the construction of virtual statehood despite the lack of real and 
existential state attributes. Andrew Wilson (2005) labels this manufacturing process 
as the virtual politics or the reinventing act of dramaturgiia.16 Virtual politics is 
about the ruling elites who invent authority and theatricalise the mythology of the 
state to control, contain and manipulate democracy and hide their own venality 
(Wilson, 2005). To protect their own interests and the interests of their entourages 
the ruling elites may securitize the state, whilst in reality they will be securitising 
their regimes. Politics becomes a set of designer projects on virtual democracy 
with avatars and graphical icons in cyberspace instead of the politicians and 
people in real life (Wilson, 2005: 39). Wilson (2005: 90) even distinguishes the 
extent of that dramaturgiia, which can shift from “information make-up” to “an entire 
virtual drama”.  
 
Derek Hutcheson (2006: 468) described the Wilsonian understanding of the post-
Soviet politics as “the world of virtual politics, where nothing is as it seems”. 
Lacking legitimacy and infrastructural power, the ruling elites in weak states resort 
to any means in order to sustain their power. In these states, regime legitimacy 
usually means legitimacy by association or by self-proclaimed righteousness 
(Mohamedou, 1996: 118-119). Thus, the ruling elites may securitize the state 
under the aegis of national interests, but de facto for the benefit of a small group of 
people.17 In fact, the leaders of weak states with post-colonial experiences often 
exploit colonial practices and the divide-and-rule policies themselves to retain the 
power (Jackson, 2010). These performances may be reflected in the increase of 
financing for the law enforcement agencies, expansion of the state secret services, 
politically motivated law cases, illegal use of the system for operative investigative 
16 “Dramaturgiia” is translated from Russian as the dramaturgy or the playwriting. 
17 For the concept of “securitization” and the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, see Buzan, 
B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner; Emmers, R. (2010) ‘Securitization’, in Collins, A. (ed.) Contemporary Security Studies, 2nd 
edition, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, pp. 136-151; or McSweeney, B. (1996) ‘Identity and 
security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, Review of International Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 
81-93. 
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activities, constraints on freedom of media or detention of the opposition leaders. 
The strengthening of the dictatorial capacity may also take a more repulsive 
manifestation such as the direct violence, high profile assassinations, mass 
murders, ethnic cleansing or other forms of state terror. 
 
In these cases, democratic institutions resemble a Potemkin-type façade, which 
disguises the total control over the political arena and the state by the ruling elites 
(Hutcheson, 2006). In contrast to the Western democracies, the political 
technologists of the former Soviet states seek not only to affect the political 
outcomes within an established and real political arena, but to control and modify 
this political arena itself (Hutcheson, 2006). Along with the identity and ethnicity 
manipulations, the ruling elites employ a range of strategies to manipulate the 
democratic processes (Jackson, 2010: 193). Being under the external pressure to 
democratise, many leaders of weak states simulate the democratic changes to 
boost their claims for legitimacy both domestically and internationally. These claims 
often lack real basis, because the indicators of the democratic transition such as 
freedom of speech or fair elections appear to be a mere façade.  
 
In fact, in the post-Soviet states, the ruling elites face the challenge of escaping the 
stigma of international pariahs, whilst nourishing their patronage networks and 
maximising control over the economy and society of the country in order to enrich 
themselves (Leonard, 2007). As a result, virtual politics emerges as a convenient 
solution for the ruling autocrats to strengthen their grip on power by exploiting the 
trappings of liberal democracy (Leonard, 2007). For instance, the creation of fake 
opposition parties, pressure groups and NGOs allows the autocratic leaders to 
establish control over the political sphere in a more subtle and effective way 
(Wilson, 2005; Hutcheson, 2006; Leonard, 2007). Achieving and sustaining power 
for the “unprincipled clientele” becomes the mail goal of the political technologists 
in weak states of former Soviet Union (Johnson, 2006: 359). 
 
Nonetheless, virtual politics shall not be mistakenly equated to the notion of 
totalitarianism (Hutcheson, 2006). As Juliet Johnson (2006: 360) colourfully 
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summarised, “Virtual politics operates in the twilight zone between democracy and 
authoritarianism, inasmuch as true autocrats would not need to employ extensive 
virtual politics to maintain their power.” Accordingly, the leaders of weak states still 
have to interact with real counterparts in order to successfully implement the 
project of virtual politics, since the stability of a virtual regime requires unified and 
powerful elites, an inert electorate, an information control culture and the lack of 
external pressures (Wilson, 2005: 41; Hutcheson, 2006: 468).  
 
In this respect, Central Asia is an excellent empirical referent to observe the 
makings of virtual democracy. In Central Asia, the leadership is usually 
characterized by an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule with clan or family 
based decision-making, which exploits various factors such as the identity issues, 
nation building or power relationships to sustain its own security and legitimacy 
(Olcott, 1996). The Central Asian presidents who are de facto the neofeudal rulers 
grew up wary of democracy and the Western “war on tyranny” in the context of the 
unstable Central Asian political environment, chronic kleptocracy and desperate 
poverty (Lewis, 2008). Whilst these leaders are keen to rip the benefits of 
international cooperation, political pluralism and the rule of law are still far from 
their agendas. As a result, the ruling regimes in Central Asia mastered themselves 
in staging politics and performing statehood via Olympic-style shows, imaginary 
reforms and feigning democratic elections (Heathershaw, 2012: 628). For instance, 
Akayev’s simulation of democratic reforms hid the daunting situation in the country 
and created “a kind of virtual Kyrgyzstan”, which attracted international assistance 
and support (Lewis, 2008: 124). In a similar vein, the discourses of national 
statehood promulgated by the local elites have concealed the imbrications of 
Tajikistan’s official institutions with the global political and economical assemblages 
(Heathershaw, 2013).  
 
Moreover, the Central Asian acts of dramaturgiia were not performed exclusively 
for the Western audience, since democratic tilts are not the only sources of 
external legitimacy for the ruling elites. Alliance with powerful external players also 
becomes an increasingly common strategy amongst the ruling regimes in weak 
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states (Jackson, 2010: 193).  Central Asian bandwagoning with Russia or China 
within multilateral structures was also an act of “virtual regionalism” (Allison, 
2008b). The successes of such cooperation were relatively modest. However, the 
tangible achievements were not the main goal of virtual politics. The primary goal 
of dramaturgiia was to reinforce domestic regime security, ensure regime 
legitimacy and reinvent the autocratic leaders for “the world of virtual democracy” 
(Allison, 2008b; Wilson, 2005: 89).  
 
Respectively, the Central Asian dramaturgiia may not only supplement the 
neorealist picture drawn by the New Great Game narrators, but virtual politics can 
also provide an alternative view on decision-making in one of the most turbulent 
and dynamic regions in the world. The existing chasm between the discourses and 
the realm of practices may reveal how the discursive elements are used to 
construct virtual statehoods in Central Asia and how local elites manipulate these 
practices for their own benefit (Heathershaw, 2013). 
 
Rent-Seeking 
Since the ruling regimes perform the acts of dramatugiia to protect their own 
interests, the capture of the state by those elites cannot be neglected. In fact, rent-
seeking may prove to be not a constitutive, but a causal element of state 
performances in Central Asia. Crystallised by the clan and family bonds, rent-
seeking in Central Asia has morphed into a symbiotic substance of parasitic nature 
with the state and of mutualistic nature with the ruling regimes. Thus, the rent-
seeking variable may be instrumental for the understanding of foreign policy of 
regime security in weak Central Asian states, since the actors engaged in the rent-
seeking practices are biotrophic in the essence and interested in safeguarding the 
established rules of the game. 
 
The conditions of weak and failed states provide unparallel economic opportunities 
for the privileged groups to make fortunes by nefarious means (Rotberg, 2003; 
Migdal, 2001). Corruption and nepotism become the founding skeleton of the 
system, wherein every actor with access to illegal or semi-illegal profiting turns out 
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to be interested in safeguarding the existing regime, whilst those excluded from the 
lucrative incomes and preferential benefits tend to challenge the ruling actors, but 
not the rules of the game. Thus, in weak states the fear of the almighty oligarchs 
replaces the fear of the leviathan state (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000). 
Conspired with the state officials, powerful economic groups tend to maximize the 
rent extraction in the captured economies (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000), 
and Central Asia with its vast natural resources is not excluded from those 
processes.  
 
Rent-seeking is the process of expending resources to capture public policy 
decisions (Mbaku, 1998: 195). Academic literature on rent-seeking is relatively new 
and dates back to the works published in the 1960s by Gordon Tullock, Richard 
Posner and Anne Krueger (Congleton, Hillman and Konrad, 2008). Such a 
literature examines the quests for income redistribution via public policy at the 
expense of social losses and how the investments into the sources of the pre-
existing income redistribute this contesting wealth instead of creating productive 
activity (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Congleton, Hillman and Konrad, 2008). 
However, the phenomenon of rent-seeking itself is probably as old as human 
civilization. For instance, Charles Delorme, Stacey Isom and David Kamerschen 
(2005) emphasize that rent-seeking contributed to the weakening of the Roman 
Empire and its further demise in the V century. The political change from a 
Republic to an emperor rule aggravated the rent-seeking behaviour of the ruling 
elites and led to the embezzlement of tax revenues (Delorme, Isom and 
Kamerschen, 2005). As a result, with its weakened military and decreasing 
population Rome was incapable of repelling the invasion of the barbarians from the 
North (Delorme, Isom and Kamerschen, 2005). 
 
The term “rent” is often benchmarked as income returns, which are higher than the 
minimum that an economic actor would have gained in a competitive market or 
under alternative conditions (Jomo and Khan, 2000: 5). Such a broadness of the 
definition demonstrates that rent-seeking behaviour can range from illegal activities 
such as illegal transfers by mafia and semi-legal activities such as monopoly rents 
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to legal activities such as short-term profits by innovators or political lobbying 
(Jomo and Khan, 2000: 5-6). In general, the rent-seeking theory rests on the 
premises that the opportunities for personal gain can have significant impact on 
public policy decision-making, whilst the quest for personal enrichment may be 
camouflaged by the populist rhetoric of social changes and developments 
(Congleton, Hillman and Konrad, 2008: 3). Accordingly, the calculation of social 
losses due to the unproductive use of resources and the presence of “the prizes” 
for the public policy decision makers becomes a central challenge to the theory of 
rent-seeking (Congleton, Hillman and Konrad, 2008: 3).  
 
The rent-seeking behaviour is not endemic exclusively to the developing and non-
democratic states, since there is an incentive for the individuals and special-
interest groups to capture the government and influence its distributional outcomes 
for the purpose of enriching themselves (Mbaku, 1998: 195). This phenomenon of 
“state capture” is often described as “a situation in which individuals, groups or 
legal firms manipulate the formulation of laws, decrees, regulations and policies, to 
gain durable self-benefits” (Garay, Salcedo-Albaran and De Leon-Beltran, 2009: 4). 
State capture is usually associated with the legal actors such as national or 
international economic groups that pursue their economic interests mainly through 
the corrupted practices (Garay, Salcedo-Albaran and De Leon-Beltran, 2009). 
However, this concept should not be limited exclusively to those actors. In the 
developed and democratic countries, rent-seeking takes the form of lobbying, 
political campaign contributions and bribery, whereas in weak states and states in 
transition these activities may extend to political violence and bureaucratic 
corruption (Mbaku, 1998: 196-197). Indeed, bureaucratic corruption is one of the 
most perennial indicators of the rent-seeking behaviour. As Mbaku (1998: 199) 
outlines,  
 
First, state control of the economy has placed under the direct control of 
civil servants a significant portion of national resources, allowing these 
individuals to manipulate public policy to enrich themselves at the 
expense of society. Second, massive state intervention in private 
exchange has produced politicised resource allocation systems in which 
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returns to factors of production are not determined by the marginal 
productivity of the resource but by the rent-seeking activities of the 
resource owner. 
 
These preconditions explain the merger of private interests and state politics in 
weak states. Civil servants may be lured by the possibilities of rapid enrichment 
despite the illegality of such actions and potential criminal persecution. This 
phenomenon has become a focal feature of the political economy of weak states.  
 
In addition, in rentier states the institutional mechanisms of resource distribution 
are limited by command and clientelism (Dillman, 2000: 11). Patron-client relations 
are those repeated set of transactions and exchanges between two agents who 
are distinguished by power or status and are identifiable as a superior patron and 
an inferior client (Jomo and Khan, 2000: 12). These arrangements take the forms 
of the “elaborate patronage systems, whereby state elites and various social 
groups are joined in complex networks of mutual exchange” (Jackson, 2010: 192). 
Any attempts to alter or threaten the rent-seeking patterns can lead to a substantial 
resistance from the engaged parties whether these are the business or political 
elites (Dillman, 2000: 11). Moreover, in many weak states, patrons and clients are 
often either the relatives or cronies of the ruling elites. For instance, John Mbaku 
(1998: 204) denotes that in Africa the bureaucrats are believed to be pressured by 
their extended families to engage in corrupt practices and share the benefits of 
state service with their kinfolk. In these instances, family-based ties further solidify 
patron-client arrangements. 
 
In fact, the logic of the politics in clan-based and transition societies suggests that 
the clans as central actors will pursue their interests and will compete over limited 
resources within the realms of the weak state (Collins, 2002: 143). Clans are the 
identity networks, which consist of horizontal and vertical blood or marriage bonds 
and which are deeply rooted into the kin-based cultures and norms (Collins, 2002: 
142). As Kathleen Collins (2002: 143) argues, clan governance should not be 
reduced to clientelist politics, because the blood bonds persist notwithstanding the 
changes in economic conditions unlike clientelist bonds (Collins, 2002: 142). The 
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upshot of the competition between the clans over the resources and public offices 
becomes the system best described as the clan hegemony (Collins, 2002: 143).  
 
Such implications of rent-seeking may not only affect the foreign policy orientations 
of the country at the expense of the long-term state-building objectives, but may 
also have a detrimental effect to the stability of the regime in general. The notion of 
clan hegemony assumes that the distribution of rents may become a cause of 
fracture between different clans and can lead to political instability and inter-clan 
confrontations. As Scott Radnitz (2010b) emphasises, one of the ironies of the 
Central Asian politics is that autocratic regimes weaken their grip on power in the 
course of designing policies directed, on the contrary, to strengthen their rule. For 
instance, when the ruling regimes implement liberal market reforms, an important 
prerequisite for economic development, they are at risk of creating potential future 
challengers in the face of formidable capitalist class (Radnitz, 2010b). Furthermore, 
if these regimes fail to protect the poorer population from market shocks and 
economic downfalls, they create an aggrieved and discontent populace, which can 
be easily mobilised in exchange for material and parochial benefits (Radnitz, 
2010b).  
 
As a result, such a situation leads to the emergence of a cross-class coalition 
between the marginalised population and the wealthy elites (Radnitz, 2010b). 
Labelled by Radnitz (2010b) as “subversive clientelism”, this phenomenon is one of 
the strategies of the wealthy elites in nondemocratic states who have incentives to 
protect their interests from power holders. Subversive clientelism assumes the 
creation of “a social support base by making material and symbolic investments in 
local communities”, which in turn can be easily mobilised in order to support their 
investors (Radnitz, 2010b: 5). 
 
Radnitz’ mass mobilisation theory rests on the principle that economic dispersion 
reduces the ruling regimes’ margin for error. Radnitz (2010a: 142-143) argues that 
“[b]eginning from a centralized concentration of resources, some republics 
purposely widened the scope of actors eligible to share some of assets of the new 
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state, while others ensured that resources would flow predominantly to a narrow 
clique that also ran the government”. As a result, for instance, the post-Soviet 
states, which underwent liberalising economic reforms and sweeping privatization, 
were more open to political contestation and power struggle (Radnitz, 2010a). 
Liberal economic reforms helped create a layer of wealthy capitalist elites who 
were willing and able to either support or challenge the ruling regimes and the 
status quo. In turn, those states, which did not undergo liberalisation reforms and 
rapid privatisation, were less vulnerable to mass protests (Radnitz, 2010a). A weak 
and underfunded opposition in these states lacked the support of an independent 
business cohort and thus was incapable of unseating autocratic rulers. To support 
his mass mobilisation theory Radnitz (2010b) brings the cases of Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan is presented as a “positive” example, whilst Uzbekistan is 
presented as a “negative” example.  
 
Nonetheless, Radnitz’s account of political instability and mass mobilisation could 
have been enriched by further analysis of resource allocation, rent distribution and 
elite cooptation. In this respect, Lawrence Markowitz (2013) provides an alternative 
explanation of why some states like Uzbekistan serve as a negative example of 
mass mobilisations and popular uprisings, whilst other states like Tajikistan 
experience formidable anti-regime movements. In his recent study of regime 
change in weak states with immobile capital Markowitz (2013) attempted to 
advance his theory on state failures by examining how distinct rent-seeking 
arrangements in Central Asia either foster the cooptation of local elites to the 
regimes or provoke the struggle over rents and further state fragmentation.  
 
Accordingly, Markowitz (2013) concluded that when rent-seeking opportunities are 
evenly distributed between provincial and local elites, these elites become 
dependent on the existing regime and open for cooptation. In turn, the ruling 
regime becomes more resilient against popular uprisings and threats of regime 
change (Markowitz, 2013). Uzbekistan is an exemplary case of such a rent-seeking 
state with cohesive territorial apparatus and coercive security institutions, which 
are willing to uphold the existing regime as long as the rent-seeking opportunities 
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are distributed evenly between various localities (Markowitz, 2013). In the 
instances, when the local elites lose access to patrons along with the opportunities 
to convert scarce resources into the rents, elites become more inclined to 
challenge established political arrangements in order to open up or restore the 
rent-seeking avenues (Markowitz, 2013). The case of Tajikistan demonstrates that 
such a struggle over rents in the resource-poor localities can lead to a state failure 
and a civil war (Markowitz, 2013). 
 
Markowitz’s conclusion runs in line with the peculiar model proposed by Petros 
Sekeris (2010), which explains the strategy of a rent-seeking autocrat how to stay 
in power, extract rent and coopt the local elites into his/her patron-client network. 
Sekeris (2010) asserts that the clients’ or local elite’s individual cooptation value is 
important to an autocrat, because all clients can join the political opposition and 
threaten the autocrat’s power. Respectively, an autocrat will choose a particular 
strategy to mitigate the threats to his rule. Accordingly, Sekeris (2010) calculated 
that a weaker autocrat shares the country’s rents with the strongest individuals 
rather than with the greater number of clientele in order to coopt the strongest 
societal actors, whilst saving a greater part of the rent for him or herself. In turn, a 
stronger autocrat will be inclined to diversify his/her beneficiaries, often on a 
random basis, to guarantee a low cooptation price of his/her clientele (Sekeris, 
2010). Although Sekeris’ model is reductionist to a certain extent and does not take 
into account other variables such as the loyalty or personal characteristics of the 
autocrats’ clientele, this model can still be conducive to the understanding of the 
regime formation in weak states such as Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Furthermore, rent-seeking in weak states should not be examined as a 
phenomenon exclusive to the domestic politics of these states. The unlawful 
enrichment of the autocratic rulers and their entourages cannot be accomplished 
without the support of local and international brokers, offshore companies and 
major financial institutions, which operate within the realm of licit and formal norms 
and practices. The fusion of the formal global economy with local informal 
economies poses a serious regulatory challenge to both scholars and policymakers 
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who seek to establish sustaining policies and greater oversight over these spheres 
in accordance with practices of good governance, transparency and accountability.  
 
Central Asia is an excellent empirical ground to expose the dynamics of 
transnational rent-seeking and showcase how a developing region gets connected 
to the global economy via hidden and informal financial vehicles and offshore 
enterprises. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan 
provide numerous illuminating cases, which demonstrate how hypothetically 
isolated Central Asia becomes connected to the global political and economic 
assemblages via contemporary financial mechanisms. The cases are extremely 
diverse and range from telecommunications and fuel procurement to gold mining 
and banking. For instance, the Swedish-Finnish telecommunications company 
TeliaSonera was targeted in probes for aggravated bribery in Uzbekistan, with 
allegedly 300 million USD being paid by TeliaSonera to an associate of Gulnara 
Karimova, the daughter of the president of Uzbekistan, through the CEO of a 
competing Russian telecommunication company MTS and a Gibraltar-registered 
shell company in order to gain access to the national telecom market (Sindelar and 
Yusupov, 2013). On March 24, 2010, German carmaker Daimler agreed to pay 185 
million USD to settle international bribery charges leveled by American prosecutors 
in at least 22 countries, including Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Eurasianet.org, 
2010). To win a 219 million USD oil contract in Karachaganak, Baker Hughes 
made payments to Kazakh officials via British tycoon Robert Kissin, using a 
Barclays bank account set up on behalf of a shell company registered in the Isle of 
Man (Leigh, 2010). In the UK, a dispute over the Tajikistan Aluminium Company 
(Talco) became one of the most expensive legal proceedings ever held at the 
London High Court, which involved the offshore companies registered in the 
Guernsey Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 
  
Such cases reveal that political power is not contained solely within the Central 
Asian states, but flows from the transnational through to the national and the local. 
These cases also demonstrate that driven by the goals of personal enrichment the 
Central Asian elites are in full authority to establish the rules of the game for the 
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external players to abide. Thus, one level analysis of the Central Asian foreign 
policy dynamics will be simply insufficient for the genuine understanding of 
complex political phenomena in such a turbulent and vibrant developing region. In 
fact, the rent-seeking nature of doing business in Central Asia complicates the 
understanding of the Central Asian political processes, as the signs of state 
capture and global economic assemblage can be mistakenly perceived as the 
signs of the New Great Game. The events portrayed as the New Great Game 
resemble the processes related to globalization of world politics and can be applied 
to most energy producing areas, since not only the conditions, but even the players 
involved in the business activities are often the same (Edwards, 2003: 92).  
 
In sum, rent-seeking emerges as an important variable, which can reveal the 
causal linkage between regime security and foreign policymaking in weak states. 
This notion may not only help to unpack IR’s “billiard ball” state and explain the 
rationale behind the construction of virtual statehood and virtual democracy, but 
may also shed the light on the nature of political instability in weak states. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter revealed that the concept of weak states deviates from the orthodox 
thinking of IR, since the proposed conceptualisation of weak states challenges the 
Westphalian view of security and international order. Traditional approaches to the 
study of their foreign policies tend to oversimplify the reality or neglect key 
variables that are crucial for the understanding of genuine inter- and intra-state 
developments in weak states. However, weak states are distinguished by the 
nature of their insecurities, since they lack strong physical base, effective 
institutional expression, a monopoly on the instruments of violence and a 
consensus on the idea of the state. Thus, the established governing arrangements 
between the local elites contribute substantially to the formation of foreign policy 
orientations of weak states. Regime security often preoccupies security agenda of 
the state and serves as the key rationale behind the state policymaking. In this 
respect, the case of Central Asia demonstrates that the fashionable idea of the 
New Great Game provides limited analysis of the political processes in the region, 
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focusing solely on the geopolitical interplay between greater players and neglecting 
the capacity of the local states to influence foreign policy outcomes. Accordingly, 
the neorealist explanations of foreign policies of weak states need to be examined 
in conjunction with other alternative or supplementary variables such as state 
performance and rent-seeking, since such an approach with specific focus on 
regime security and integrative of internal, external and transnational variables will 
enhance our understanding of complex political phenomena in weak states in 
general and in Central Asia in particular.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
The Development of Kyrgyz Foreign Policy 
 
Kyrgyzstan is a relatively new state with the record of being independent spanning 
only twenty three years. However, in that short stint Kyrgyzstan has already seen 
three different presidents, experienced two violent revolutions, survived two 
interethnic conflicts, hosted two military air bases, and implemented one erratic 
foreign policy of regime security. Notwithstanding such developments, Kyrgyzstan 
has not fallen into the abyss of civil war like Tajikistan, nor has it become a quasi-
autarchic state like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. The answer to this empirical 
puzzle may lie in the schism between domestic and international dimensions of 
state and regime security in Central Asia, since states like Kyrgyzstan are 
distinguished by the complex nature of internal insecurities and external 
vulnerabilities.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter introduces Kyrgyzstan as a weak state distinguished by 
the complex nature of internal insecurities and external vulnerabilities and thus 
proposes to examine the erratic foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan from the perspective 
of systemic constraints and the rent-seeking interests of the ruling regimes. In so 
doing, this chapter will provide a retrospective analysis of Kyrgyz foreign 
policymaking through the prism of institutional formation, regime security and 
systemic pressures. The first two parts of the chapter will study the development of 
Kyrgyz foreign policy from early 1990s to 2011. A specific focus will be given to 
Bishkek’s relations with Russia, China and the USA. The third section will examine 
official and unofficial foreign policy discourses that prevailed in Kyrgyzstan from the 
position of virtual politics or the acts of state dramaturgiia. The last part will explore 
the processes, which led to systemic weakness of Kyrgyzstan and to creation of a 
rent-seeking foreign policy regime in the country. 
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Kyrgyz Foreign Policy at a Glance 
Initially, the period of independence was by default regarded in Kyrgyzstan as the 
path towards prosperity and brighter future of the country (Wood, 2005: 145-146). 
Foreign policy was understood to be one of the tools to achieve these goals, since 
the newly emerged country needed international support and cooperation to 
transition from the Soviet past to the democratic present. Akayev was eager to 
explore ties with Western democracies, whilst in a similar vein the victory of a 
young pro-democratic leader with liberal reformist views was warmly welcomed in 
the West.18 The period of 1990s in general was often perceived by many Kyrgyz 
policymakers through the prism of romanticism and boundless optimism as the 
period of state-building and institutional formation (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of 
Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 
October 2012; Wood, 2005: 145).  
 
Kyrgyzstan was the first Central Asian state to adopt a Western style civil code to 
liberalize prices, overhaul its financial and banking systems, privatize large 
industrial facilities, sanction private ownership of land and uphold a relatively open, 
competitive political system (Gleason, 2001: 168). On May 10, 1993, the 
Parliament adopted the Kyrgyz som as the new currency of the country.19 The 
introduction of the Kyrgyz som was important for foreign policymaking, because 
this occurrence created necessary prerequisites for the republic to develop 
18 In 1990, the stalemate between First Secretary of the Communist party Absamat Masaliyev and 
Prime-Minister Apas Dzhumagulov led to a situation, when the Supreme Council of Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan had to look for an alternative compromise figure. This position was offered to famous 
Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov, but he refused to run for the highest position in the country and 
suggested the candidacy of Akayev, a young scientist, academician and President of the Kyrgyz 
Academy of Science. When Akayev’s candidacy was considered by the Supreme Council, Akayev 
himself was in Moscow and had to be persuaded to return to Bishkek and run for Kyrgyz presidency 
(Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 
December 2013). As a result, on October 27, 1990, out of twelve candidates Akayev and Nasirdin 
Isanov received the majority of votes by the Supreme Council. In the second round of elections 
between these two candidates, Akayev won with the majority of votes. Later, during the putsch 
events of 1991 Akayev supported the self-determination right of the Soviet republics and rejected 
the offer of Mikhail Gorbachev to become the Vice-President of the USSR. On October 12, 1991, 
Akayev won the direct presidential elections with 95 percent of votes in his support, although 
Akayev was the only candidate running for this position.   
19 Akayev had to speak three times in the parliament to assure the parliamentarians of his 
resignation if the new currency ruined the economy of the country. 
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independent economic policy, although the escape from the rouble zone has also 
accelerated the construction of customs barriers (Wood, 2005: 147). 
 
The early 1990s were marked by a burst of Kyrgyzstan’s diplomatic activity. The 
Declaration of Independence of the Kyrgyz Republic invited all countries to 
recognise the sovereignty of the Kyrgyz Republic, and already on December 24, 
1991, Turkey became the first state to establish diplomatic relations with Bishkek. 
Few days later Australia and the USA followed Turkey’s example to hail the newly 
independent state. On December 27, 1991, China recognized the sovereignty of 
Kyrgyzstan (Toktomushev, 2001; Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003). Prior to 
the announcement of the Kyrgyz independence, Boris Yeltsin visited Bishkek on 
July 20, 1991, and signed an Agreement on the Basis of Interstate Relations 
between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, although officially Russia and Kyrgyzstan 
established diplomatic relations on March 20, 1992 (Toktomushev, 2001; 
Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003). In December 1991, Akayev made his first 
official visit abroad to Turkey as the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, where he 
signed an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation and later in 1997 a Treaty of 
Eternal Friendship (Toktomushev, 2001; Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003; 
Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 23 December 2013). On December 21, 1991, Kyrgyzstan, along with 
seven other former Soviet republics, signed the Almaty Protocol to become a 
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 20  
 
Akayev sought to establish diplomatic relations with the variety of actors interested 
in the region, ranging from the USA and Russia to Turkey and Iran. By the end of 
1992, Kyrgyzstan established diplomatic relations with 59 countries (Dzhorobekova 
and Momosheva, 2003). Washington established diplomatic relations with 
Kyrgyzstan on December 27, 1991, after the visit of U.S. State Secretary James 
20 On December 8, 1991, Boris Yeltsin of Russia, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and Stanislav 
Shushkevich of Belarus signed the Belavezh Accords to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the creation of the CIS. In fact, by signing the Belavezh Accords Yeltsin, Kravchuk and 
Shushkevich created de facto the union of Slavic states (Toktomushev, 2001: 24). The presidents 
of the Central Asian states were tempted to create a Turkic Union of their own, but after the 
discussions in Ashgabat in December 1991 the Central Asian leaders decided to join the CIS 
instead (Toktomushev, 2001: 24). 
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Baker on December 17, and opened its embassy in Bishkek on February 1, 1992 
(Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003; Zakirov, 2008; Anonymous, Former 
Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the USA, 16 December 2013). In the same year 
Kyrgyzstan opened its embassy in Washington, DC (Zakirov, 2008; Anonymous, 
Former Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the USA, 16 December 2013). The key 
document, which initiated bilateral relations between the two countries, became the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the governments of Kyrgyzstan and the 
USA on August 26, 1992 (Toktomushev, 2001: 93). More than 20 agreements 
constituted the legal base for the Kyrgyz-American bilateral relations, amongst 
which were an Agreement concerning the promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (Zakirov, 2008: 9).  
 
China was also amongst the first countries to recognize the sovereignty of 
Kyrgyzstan. In May 1992 Akayev made an official visit to China, where he signed a 
Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the 
People's Republic of China and the Kyrgyz Republic at ambassadorial level 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1992). The two 
governments agreed that both countries would settle territorial disputes through the 
norms of international law (Carlson, 2008: 65-66). The government of Kyrgyzstan 
also recognised Taiwan as an integral part of the Chinese territory (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 1992). Officially, the diplomatic 
relations between Kyrgyzstan and China were established on January 5, 1992 
(Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003; Anonymous, Former Diplomat at the 
Kyrgyz Embassy to China, interview, 24 December 2013). China opened its 
embassy in Bishkek in May 1992, whereas Kyrgyzstan opened its embassy to 
China on August 31, 1993, and dedicated its opening to the anniversary of the 
Kyrgyz independence (Toktomushev, 2001; Anonymous, Former Diplomat at the 
Kyrgyz Embassy to China, interview, 24 December 2013).  
 
In a similar vein, Akayev began to re-establish bilateral relations with the countries 
of the former Soviet Union. On May 15, 1992, Kyrgyzstan signed the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST) that aimed at integrating military structures of the CIS 
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member-states. On June 10, 1992, Bishkek and Moscow signed the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. On March 26, 1996, Akayev made 
an official visit to strategic partner Moscow in order to meet Yeltsin and discuss the 
areas of possible mutual cooperation (Toktomushev, 2001; Anonymous, Former 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 
2013). Furthermore, in July 1996 Akayev made an official visit to Tajikistan, where 
the two presidents signed an Agreement on the Basis of Interstate Relations 
between the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Tajikistan, 2013). Akayev also visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and in January 
1997 Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed an Agreement on Eternal 
Friendship confirming their commitments to the strengthening of good neighbourly 
relations (Legislation of the CIS countries, 1997). In April 1997 Akayev also made 
visits to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia to develop bilateral relations 
(Toktomushev, 2001; Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003). In July 2000 Akayev 
made his second official visit to Moscow to meet Putin and discuss economic and 
security cooperation, whilst two months prior to this visit Akayev signed the law to 
turn Russian into the official language of Kyrgyzstan (Toktomushev, 2001; 
Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003; Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). In a similar 
vein, Akayev saluted the transformation of the CST into the CSTO and welcomed a 
Russian military air base in Kant in 2003 to support the CSTO’s mission in the 
region.  
 
In the mid-1990s Akayev began to explore foreign relations with the Asian 
countries. In March 1992 Akayev made his first official visit to India to establish 
diplomatic ties and to learn from India’s experience of restructuring economy and a 
socio-political system (Joshi, 2007: 148). In April 1993 Akayev made an official visit 
to Japan. The two governments concluded that the agreements signed between 
the USSR and Japan would continue to serve as the basis for bilateral relations 
between Kyrgyzstan and Japan, although only one out of those seven agreements 
remained effective (Toktomushev, 2001: 136). In 1995, Akayev made official visits 
to Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines, after which Akayev became seriously 
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interested in examining the Malaysian economic model and its applicability to 
Kyrgyzstan (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012). As a result, in 
1996, upon the request of the Kyrgyz government the Malaysian and Kyrgyz 
experts conducted a joint study on how to revive the Kyrgyz economy (The 
Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to Malaysia, n.d.).21 As a follow up, in January 
1998, a Special Kyrgyz-Malaysian Economic Commission was created in order to 
implement the recommendations of the Malaysian experts, which however failed to 
translate into concrete actions (Toktomushev, 2001: 164-167). In July 1996 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin visited 
Kyrgyzstan (Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003). The leaders agreed to 
enhance their cooperation in the spheres of border management, economic 
cooperation and regional security. In addition, in 1996 Kyrgyzstan began to explore 
military cooperation with China along with Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan within 
the framework of the Shanghai Five later to be renamed to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). 
 
Nonetheless, Western vector remained a top priority in the Akayev’s list of official 
visits (Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). In April 1992 Akayev visited Germany, 
and on September 12, 1992, Germany opened its embassy in Bishkek, which was 
authorised to act on behalf of the European Union (Toktomushev, 2001: 105). In 
the same year Kyrgyzstan started the dialogue with the NATO within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, whilst in 1994 Kyrgyzstan 
joined the NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In May 1993 Akayev 
made his first visit to the USA, where he met U.S. President Bill Clinton and U.S. 
Vice-President Al Gore (Zakirov, 2008). In November 1994 Akayev made an official 
visit to Switzerland, where he signed an Agreement on Technical Cooperation 
between Kyrgyzstan and Switzerland (Toktomushev, 2001). In 1994 Akayev also 
visited Belgium and France to develop bilateral relations, whilst in 1998-1999 
Akayev made official visits to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, 
21 In 2000 the Malaysian experts conducted the second stage of this study. 
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Denmark and Italy (Toktomushev, 2001; Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003; 
Zakirov, 2008). As a result, in June 1999 a Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement between Kyrgyzstan and the European Union (EU), which was signed 
on February 9, 1995, was finally ratified by all EU member-states (Toktomushev, 
2001: 100; European Union, n.d.). The aim of this partnership was to create a 
framework for political dialogue between Kyrgyzstan and the EU and to support 
Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to strengthen democracy and transition to a market-based 
economy (European Union, 2010). Furthermore, in 2001 Akayev agreed to host an 
American air base at civilian Manas International Airport as part of the Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, which would become the focal point of the 
Kyrgyz-American relations up until 2011. 
 
In addition, the path towards independence was also regarded in Kyrgyzstan as 
the novelty of becoming a member of various international organisations (Wood, 
2005: 145-146). On March 2, 1992, at the 46th session of the UN General 
Assembly, Kyrgyzstan was accepted as a full-fledged member to the United 
Nations (Toktomushev, 2001; Anonymous, Former Representative of Kyrgyzstan 
to the United Nations, interview, 29 December 2013). In 1993, after Akayev’s 
meeting with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administrator 
James Speth, UNDP opened its office in Kyrgyzstan, which served as the UN’s 
main contact point in the republic (Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 2003; 
Anonymous, Former Representative of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations, interview, 
29 December 2013). In 1998, Kyrgyzstan also became the first post-Soviet country 
to join the World Trade Organization (Gleason, 2001: 173). 
 
In that stint, Kyrgyzstan also began cooperation with specialised agencies of the 
UN such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO),  International Labour Organization 
(ILO), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 
103 
 
World Food Programme (WFP), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (HCR), etc.22 
 
In 1992 Kyrgyzstan also joined the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, which was transformed into the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.23 On July 8, 1992, Akayev signed the 
Helsinki Final Act, and on June 3, 1994, he signed the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe (Toktomushev, 2001; Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). In 1993 the Kyrgyz 
Embassy to Austria was opened in Vienna, which also co-served as the 
representative office of Kyrgyzstan to the OSCE (Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 
2003). On July 23, 1998, the OSCE Permanent Council established the OSCE 
Centre in Bishkek to work in the spheres of border security and management, good 
governance, regional cooperation, environmental protection, legislation and rule of 
law (OSCE, n.d.). 
 
In sum, as Global Security (n.d.) reported, since independence Akayev and his 
emissaries travelled tirelessly across the globe in order to establish new relations 
and seek new partners. Apart from the abovementioned states, Akayev made visits 
to Iran, Pakistan, Israel, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and etc (Golan, 
1995; Global Security, n.d.; Aras, 2002: 39; Dzhorobekova and Momosheva, 
2003). Official visits of Akayev had a bilateral character as well. Kyrgyzstan was 
visited by President of Turkey Turgut Ozal, Prime-Minister of Turkey Suleyman 
Demirel, Vice President of the USA Al Gor, Secretary-General of the NATO 
Manfred Worner, Prime-Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto, President of Iran 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Prince of Wales Charles amongst many others 
(Toktomushev, 2001; Zakirov, 2008). As a result, by 2005, Kyrgyzstan established 
diplomatic relations with more than 100 states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, n.d.). 
 
22 See http://www.un.org.kg/. 
23 See http://www.osce.org/bishkek/. 
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In addition, Akayev was eager to promote his own foreign policy initiatives 
(Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 23 December 2013). In 1996, Akayev put forward an idea of celebrating 
an international year of mountains. Soon, in 1998, at its 54th Plenary Meeting, the 
UN General Assembly proclaimed the year 2002 as the International Year of 
Mountains in order to ensure the well-being of mountain communities and to 
promote sustainable development of mountainous and lowland regions (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2000). Akayev’s Silk Road Doctrine 
was also accepted as an official document of the UN on September 17, 1998, and 
was presented in many different countries (Toktomushev, 2001: 171; Dundich, 
2010). This doctrine portrayed Kyrgyzstan as a Eurasian land-bridge, which could 
have linked the East and the West (Wood, 2005). Akayev also supported the 
creation of a Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ). Eventually, the 
creation of a CANWFZ was endorsed by all five presidents of Central Asia in 
Almaty in 1997, whilst the treaty’s final draft text was adopted on February 8, 2005, 
in Tashkent (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.). 
 
However, very quickly the period of boundless romanticism of the 1990s was 
substituted by the period of disillusionment and frustration. By the early 2000s 
Akayev was no longer perceived as a democrat and a reformer in Kyrgyzstan and 
was widely criticized for the usurpation of power, tribalism, persecution of 
opposition and corruption. On February 27, 2005, the Central Election Committee 
of Kyrgyzstan announced the outcomes of the first round of parliamentary 
elections. The pro-Akayev candidates won the majority of seats in the parliament. 
Few days later, the Central Election Committee also approved the results of the 
parliamentary runoff elections, according to which Aidar Akayev and Bermet 
Akayeva, the son and the daughter of Askar Akayev, also acquired parliamentary 
mandates. The outcomes of these controversial elections triggered a wave of 
protests across the country with the most active social movements emerging in the 
south of the republic. The number of protesters ranged from 2,000 in Naryn to 
50,000 in Jalalabad (Marat, 2006). By March 21, 2005, the central government lost 
control over most of the major cities, as the crowds led by the opposition figures 
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captured key administrative buildings. On March 24 from 15,000 to 20,000 people 
gathered at the Central Square of Bishkek (Marat, 2006). At first, the protestors 
were demanding cancelation of the elections’ fraudulent results. However, by 
afternoon the crowd began to demand Akayev’s resignation, and soon the frenzied 
masses stormed and captured the White House without any significant resistance 
from the police. Akayev fled with his family to Moscow, whilst the opposition 
established an interim government and announced the victory of the Tulip 
Revolution. 
 
Coming to power in the wake of the popular uprising against authoritarian Akayev, 
Bakiyev positioned himself initially as the champion of democratic reforms. Indeed, 
as Tyntchtykbek Tchoroev (Former Director of the RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service, 
interview, 18 August 2009) asserted, for a short term the Tulip revolution made the 
Kyrgyz Government’s policy more open, transparent and Western-bound. The 
Kyrgyz President carried out his duties as a post-revolutionary reformer and was 
under control of the democracy-minded forces of society (Tchoroev, Former 
Director of the RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service, interview, 18 August 2009; Juraev, 2010). 
The opposition was strong and the parliament and the civic organizations were 
very pro-active in liberalizing processes (Freedom House, 2005; Freedom House, 
2006). Nonetheless, despite the promised changes Bakiyev quickly returned to the 
legacy of the first president. The Kyrgyz presidency began to get stronger shortly 
after the March events, whereas the movements for liberal reforms step-by-step 
gave way to a semi-authoritarian system of power (Tchoroev, Former Director of 
the RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service, interview, 18 August 2009; Juraev, 2010; Collins, 
2012: 22-23; Kalishevskyi, 2014; Stobdan, 2014). Bakiyev tried to distance himself 
from the other post-revolutionary governments of Ukraine and Georgia and has 
developed closer relations with the countries of the SCO, including its leading 
authoritarian members Russia and China (Tchoroev, Former Director of the 
RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service, interview, 18 August 2009). Already on July 11, 2005, at 
the SCO summit in Astana, Bakiyev emphatically supported a joint SCO 
declaration, which called for the American withdrawal of its troops from the Central 
Asian soil (Cooley, 2012). Two months after, Bakiyev made his first official visit as 
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the President of Kyrgyzstan to Moscow. In February 2006, Bakiyev openly 
questioned the presence of the American air base on the Kyrgyz territory and the 
rental fees Kyrgyzstan was receiving (Pannier, 2006). Several months later 
Bakiyev began to threaten the American side with the possibility of base eviction.  
 
There were fewer prominent diplomatic milestones during the tenure of Bakiyev 
than in the era of Akayev, which can be explained by the longer term of the latter 
and his task of building a new state. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy under Bakiyev was 
even less systemic than in the first fifteen years of the country’s independence. 
Despite the reformist and democratic rhetoric Bakiyev continued to build his politics 
upon Akayev’s autocratic legacy. In the period from 2006 to 2009 Bakiyev has not 
made any official visits to the Western countries24 (Tchoroev, Former Director of 
the RFE/RL Kyrgyz Service, interview, 18 August 2009). However, such a state of 
affairs has not prevented Bakiyev from exploring the avenues of cooperation with 
the Western states. In particular, Bakiyev extended his engagement with the USA 
within the framework of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. In addition, during his 
short spell as the President of Kyrgyzstan, Bakiyev proposed several initiatives 
pertinent to the international relations of Central Asia such as the organisation of a 
special conference on Afghanistan under the auspices of the SCO and the 
strengthening of anti-terrorism mechanisms within the SCO and the CSTO (Jomart 
Ormonbekov, Former Attaché at the Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to the 
Kingdom of Belgium, Mission to the EU and NATO, interview, 5 December 2012; 
Anonymous, Consultant, interview, 3 November 2013).  
 
These initiatives were overshadowed by the daunting tasks of resurrecting the 
Kyrgyz economy and reforming the political system of the country, which Bakiyev 
failed to accomplish. The regime of Bakiyev quickly became associated with high 
level of corruption, nepotism and criminalisation of the republic. If Akayev needed 
fifteen years to turn towards autocratic path and seize power in the country, 
Bakiyev managed to usurp power within one presidential term. The popular 
discontent with Bakiyev’s rule significantly increased in December 2009, when the 
24 Bakiyev unofficially visited Germany, where he had a medical treatment. 
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leadership of Kyrgyzstan undertook several unpopular measures purportedly to cut 
the budget deficit and reform the energy sector. On January 1, 2010, the 
government under Daniyar Usenov doubled the gas and electricity tariffs despite 
the unprecedented heating and electricity cuts during one of the harshest winters in 
the country.25 In addition, one of the most profitable energy providers 
“Severelektro” was sold to an unknown private owner for less than 3 million USD, 
even though it was previously estimated to be worth more than 130 million USD 
(Lee, 2010; Novosti.kg, 2010). Prior to that, “Kyrgyztelecom”, the largest state-
owned telecommunications company, was also swiftly privatised (Lee, 2010). The 
appointment of Maksim Bakiyev, the president’s son, as the Head of the newly 
created Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation further 
ridiculed the people. Fraudulent presidential and parliamentary elections, 
assassinations of parliamentarians and journalists, alarming rates of 
unemployment, increasing exodus of the Kyrgyz work migrants to the near abroad 
and budget deficit – all these factors disillusioned the people and their expectations 
of the Tulip Revolution.  
 
In addition, several weeks before the April events of 2010, the Russian media 
outlets and federal TV channels launched a campaign, condemning Bakiyev and 
his family ruling, although similar campaigns were also run by Radio Freedom 
Europe/ Radio Liberty, BBC and several independent web portals. Particularly, the 
Russian media disparaged the “entrepreneurialism” of Maksim Bakiyev and his 
connections to the transnational criminal networks and disgraced Russian 
oligarchs. Furthermore, on April 1, 2010, Kremlin made the export of petroleum 
products from Russia to Kyrgyzstan, previously exempt from taxes, subject to 
duties in the amount of 400 USD per ton (Regnum 2011; Anonymous, Fuel 
Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, 2012). The imposed fees on petroleum immediately led to a 
shortage of fuel in the country and to an increase in prices on other products in 
general. As a result, protesters, led by the opposition, occupied the squares in 
major cities and called for reforms in the country. Bakiyev’s government attempted 
25 This move increased the rumours that Bakiyev’s family was transporting electricity to Taraz and 
selling it in Kazakhstan. 
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to suppress the discontent by limiting access to media, deploying security forces 
and detaining the leaders of opposition, which on the contrary led to a massive 
upraising against the ruling regime throughout the country. By April 6, 2010, the 
protesters controlled all major cities in the regions. On April 7 the protest in Bishkek 
against autocratic Bakiyev turned into a violent revolt leaving 87 people dead, as 
the White House guards clashed with the crowd. Bakiyev fled to his home village 
Teyit and then to Minsk on April 15, 2010. 
 
Accordingly, when Otunbayeva came to power, she inherited a more difficult 
political and economic situation in the country. Unlike Bakiyev in 2005, Otunbayeva 
had no carte blanche to run reforms in Kyrgyzstan. Prior to the April events of 
2010, only a few could have predicted that Otunbayeva would become the next 
president of Kyrgyzstan. However, the governmental change of 2010 brought 
strange bedfellows together in their fight against Bakiyev and his family ruling. 
When Bakiyev’s regime was toppled, the revolutionary leaders realised that they 
needed to appoint a compromise figure as an interim president – someone who 
had no ultimate power and ambitions to challenge them afterwards and seek the 
presidency on a permanent or longer term basis (Kim, 2010). At that time, none of 
the key political figures had enough power to capture the seat in the White House 
without political confrontation with other players. In addition, Kyrgyzstan was on the 
brink of switching from presidential to parliamentary-presidential form of 
governance. As a result, Otunbayeva was an ideal candidate for the interim 
presidency. Otunbayeva has never possessed neither the financial capital nor 
political power derived from the clan networks to seek the presidency on more 
permanent basis. In addition, Otunbayeva had the potential to attract Western 
funds to Kyrgyzstan, as she enjoyed excellent rapport with Western leaders and 
had an excellent reputation in the diplomatic circles. Since Otunbayeva’s 
presidency was the product of the inter-elite negotiations, the main objectives of 
her tenure were to stabilise the situation in the country and ensure a smooth and 
peaceful transition of power (Kim, 2010; Anonymous, Political Adviser, interview, 6 
May 2013). Respectively, the developments in the Kyrgyz foreign policy under 
Roza Otunbayeva were less apparent than those during the rules of her 
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predecessors. Despite being a career diplomat, Otunbayeva had little opportunity 
to formulate a cohesive foreign policy of the republic. Her short tenure in office 
(2010-2011) further contributed to her inability to meaningfully influence 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy. 
 
Political turmoil that followed the ousting of Bakiyev and the ethnic violence of June 
2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan predetermined the priorities of Otunbayeva’s rule. 
Otunbayeva was more pre-occupied with the domestic matters during her 
presidency, as she was constitutionally responsible for stability in Kyrgyzstan. 
Initially, coming to power in the wake of the uprising against Bakiyev, Otunbayeva 
was very vocal of the American support to the Bakiyev regime. In particular, 
Otunbayeva criticised the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Ambassador 
Tatiana Gfoeller for their unreserved support of Bakiyev.26 Otunbayeva claimed 
that Washington attempted to secure the American air base Manas on Kyrgyz soil 
at the expense of human rights and democratic principles. When Otunbayeva 
became the Interim President of Kyrgyzstan, her criticisms went beyond the mere 
rhetoric to target the U.S. fuel vendors and Kyrgyz subcontractors (Higgins and 
Kessler, 2010; Horton, 2010). As a result, although the American vendors 
remained the sole suppliers of jet fuel to the air base, the purportedly Bakiyev-
controlled local fuel subcontractors have been substituted by Gazprom-affiliated 
firms. Nonetheless, the intricate fuel arrangements of the Manas air base were not 
the main priority of Otunbayeva’s foreign policy efforts. The ethnic violence of June 
2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan posed a formidable challenge to the integrity of the 
republic. Facing international reticence and indifference Otunbayeva and her 
government had to deal with the conflict and its repercussions on their own. 
Accordingly, Otunbayeva’s government focused more on post-conflict humanitarian 
efforts, including the attraction of funds to mitigate the magnitude of the ethnic 
conflict. 
 
26 For instance, see Otunbayeva’s interview to The Washington Post on April 16, 2010, available at:  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041505110_2.html?sid=ST2010061504528. 
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In sum, the romanticism of independence has been soon substituted by 
disillusionment and frustration in Kyrgyzstan. Despite his rhetoric Akayev was 
incapable of transforming Kyrgyzstan into the Switzerland of Central Asia, and 
neither of his successors has succeeded in these efforts. Respectively, whilst the 
decay of the institute of Kyrgyz foreign policy was aggravated during the tenure of 
Bakiyev, these processes have ultimately begun when Akayev was in power. 
 
Russia, China and the USA 
When Kyrgyzstan appeared on a geographic map as a newly independent state, 
this development attracted attention of a great number of international players. The 
list of countries interested in a small mountainous republic ranged from Iran and 
Turkey to India and Australia. In turn, the Kyrgyz leadership was also searching for 
alternative models of development for Kyrgyzstan, as Akayev was seriously 
examining the Malaysian, Japanese and Swiss economic models and their 
applicability to Kyrgyzstan’s context (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012). 
Nonetheless, from the onset of independence there were three major vectors – 
Russia, China and the West – that Kyrgyzstan had to take into consideration whilst 
devising its national interests and foreign policy priorities.  
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was the most natural partner for 
Kyrgyzstan to seek support from, especially in light of rapid impoverishment of the 
country. The legacy of common Soviet past and the magnitude of Cold War 
predetermined the initial gravitation of Kyrgyzstan towards the Russian orbit, 
especially taking into account that Kyrgyzstan was under the protectorate of Russia 
from the early 1900s. The sentiments of the common population also favoured a 
closer cooperation with Moscow than with the West.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the shared historic and cultural legacy many Russian 
politicians perceived Kyrgyzstan as “the Russian underbelly” after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012). The first 
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Russian government under Yegor Gaidar regarded Central Asia as an economic 
burden in a situation, when Russia had to concentrate on reforming its own 
economy (Jonson, 2001: 96-97). These pragmatic discourses reflected the genuine 
situation in international relations. Despite its hegemonic ambitions Russia was too 
weak to project power beyond its borders, especially facing internal fragmentation 
and collapse of the economy in addition to the loss of the Cold War. Even after 
1993, when the Russian government declared its intention to recover great-power 
status and enhance its relations with the CIS countries, Russian policy towards 
Central Asia remained highly ambivalent – Kremlin was wishing for leadership 
without any obligations (Jonson, 2001: 97).  
 
However, Russia remained the foremost strategic partner for Kyrgyzstan despite 
Kremlin’s reluctance to engage in the Central Asian region nearly up until 1999. As 
Ashirov (Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012) denoted, Akayev enjoyed an 
excellent rapport with the Russian leadership and was a good friend of the first 
Russian president. Economy and trade were regarded as the basis for interaction 
between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, although in the late 1990s trade turnover 
between Russia and Kyrgyzstan has decreased by 37,4 percent (Toktomushev, 
2001: 49). Russia also could have offered more in terms of military assistance. 
Central Asia has often been perceived by the Russian elites as an unstable region 
of high security concerns, and Kyrgyzstan, as part of that region, was not isolated 
from the threats radiated from Afghanistan. When Taliban came to power in 
Afghanistan in 1996, the discourse about the threat of Muslim fundamentalism and 
drug trafficking became more prominent in the Russian political circles 
(Anonymous, Political Adviser, interview, 6 May 2013). Fearing a spillover effect 
after the invasion of Islamic extremists in Kyrgyzstan in 1999, Vladimir Putin 
reactivated Russia’s Central Asian policy (Jonson, 2004). Under the aegis of 
fighting international terrorism Moscow introduced a new basis for security and 
military cooperation (Jonson, 2004).  Kremlin was eager to maintain the role of 
Russia as a security guarantor for the region, whilst at the same time addressing 
the growing engagement of the USA in the area (Jonson, 2004).  
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 Although in the aftermath of September 11 events Moscow preferred to 
bandwagon the USA and support the American war on terrorism, by mid 2000s 
Russia grew wary of the increasing American presence in Central Asia. A series of 
popular revolutions against authoritarian leaders across the post-Soviet space 
sparked Kremlin’s fears of colour revolutions that bring anti-Russian leaders to 
power (Wilson, 2009). This phenomenon explains why Kremlin supported Bakiyev 
and his new revolutionary government despite providing a political asylum to 
Akayev and his family. Russia still lacked hard and soft power at that time to 
change the course of events in Kyrgyzstan, whereas weak Kyrgyzstan was not a 
classical clientilistic state to Russia. Putin credited Bakiyev with a soft loan of 189 
million USD to sustain his regime immediately after the March events of 2005, 
which can be regarded as an attempt to buy the new ruling elites and ensure the 
gravitation of Kyrgyzstan towards the Russian orbit (Tengri News, 2012). Indeed, 
foreign policy orientation of Bakiyev was sympathetic to Moscow during the first 
years of his presidency. Bishkek and Moscow improved their military and security 
cooperation, although economic collaboration failed to progress. In a similar vein, 
Kremlin opted to support the interim government of Otunbayeva in 2010 despite its 
animosity towards certain political leaders and open criticisms of the switch 
towards the presidential-parliamentary form of governance in Kyrgyzstan.27  
 
In sum, however, the expectations of both Russia and Kyrgyzstan have not been 
fulfilled. The economic integration failed because at that time Russia’s interests in 
Central Asia were mainly related to two-fold strategic and security concerns: to 
integrate the Central Asian states into the CIS hemisphere as close allies of 
Kremlin and to deny external powers strategic access to the Central Asia region 
(Jonson, 2001: 98). There were no significant joint projects, apart from the CSTO 
military base in Kant and the Dastan factory that produced torpedoes for export to 
Russia and India. Lacking oil, gas and natural resources, Kyrgyzstan was more 
important to Russia geopolitically than economically. In addition, the default of 
1998 and financial crisis of 2008 further stalled economic cooperation. The CIS 
27 For instance, it is believed that there is a personal enmity between the Russian leaders and 
Omurbek Tekebayev, the leader of the Ata-Meken party. 
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itself was perceived more as a platform for “a civilised divorce” by the leaders of 
the former Soviet states. As a result, despite the political rhetoric the CIS was 
deprived of necessary mechanisms for policy implementation and failed to develop 
into a genuinely collective multinational or supranational entity (Allison, 2009). In 
April 2011 Kyrgyzstan agreed to join the Russian-led Customs Union, but there 
was little progress made to become a full-fledged member of this organisation. 
 
In fact, these dynamics were present within all multilateral organisations that have 
been formed with the participation of the Central Asian states or in Central Asia. 
For instance, in 1994 Kyrgyzstan along with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan formed 
the Central Asian Union (CAU), which became the Central Asian Economic Union 
(CAEU) in 1998 after Tajikistan’s accession to it, and which was later transformed 
into the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) in December 2001 
(Allison, 2009). In 1996 Kyrgyzstan joined the CIS Customs Union with an attempt 
to recover the trade scales of Soviet period. The Customs Union was formed in the 
mid 1990s with the goal of creating a unitary economic space for its member-states 
to further facilitate economic integration. Later Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would transform the Customs Union into the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC). In 2004 CACO was merged into the EurAsEC 
(Allison, 2009). However, the Central Asian cooperation appeared to be even more 
problematic than the integration through the CIS institutions. The Central Asian 
leaders had different views of regional development and were not eager to commit 
themselves to supranational structures. In addition, both Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan sought the position of a regional hegemon and thus were unwilling to 
sacrifice their national interests for the objectives of regional integration. 
 
Cooperation with China, another immediate neighbour of Kyrgyzstan, was another 
high priority vector for the Kyrgyz leadership to explore after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Although at that time Russia was the largest trading partner of 
Kyrgyzstan, China was substantially increasing its economic presence in 
Kyrgyzstan. This occurrence was related to the deteriorating situation in the 
industrial sector of Kyrgyzstan, as the Kyrgyz economy was becoming more re-
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export and service oriented. The membership in the WTO only contributed to the 
transformation of Kyrgyzstan from an industrial and agricultural republic into a 
transit hub for Chinese goods.  
 
Yet, the Chinese leadership was reluctant to recklessly rush into the Central Asian 
region. Beijing preferred to pursue its long-term goals gradually without irritating 
unnecessarily Russia and the USA. In addition, the Chinese main concerns were 
related to the issues of border demarcation to deter the spillover of instability 
across the borders to the Chinese Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Lewis, 
2008: 218). The problems with the Kyrgyz-Chinese borders persisted long before 
the Kyrgyz independence. The pacts signed by Tsarist Russia and China in the 
1860s and 1880s left the Kyrgyz-Chinese frontiers ill-defined, and little progress 
has been made to resolve the border delimitation issue during the Soviet period 
(Khamidov, 2001). In 1999, the Kyrgyz government has reached an agreement 
with Beijing, according to which 125 thousand hectares of mountainous land in the 
Issyk-Kul region, Uzengu-Kuush, were ceded to China. This decision has sparked 
public outcry, whereas some members of the parliament were keen to initiate 
Akayev’s impeachment for the “treacherous” agreement. Akayev was accused of 
secretly selling the Kyrgyz territory to China. Then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Kyrgyzstan Muratbek Imanaliyev has fiercely dismissed those claims arguing that 
the Kyrgyz government protected the national interests of the country and got 
nearly 70 percent of the disputed land, including the Khan-Tengri peak in Tian 
Shan (Khamidov, 2001). Recalling that period, Ashirov (Former Deputy Chief of 
Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 
October 2012) stated that the border negotiations with China were extremely 
tense, since even the Soviets were unable to resolve this issue. Initially, the 
Chinese side pushed for the ratio of 30 percent of the disputed lands to Kyrgyzstan 
and 70 percent to China, but Kyrgyz diplomats managed to overturn this ratio in 
their favour (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012). Ashirov 
(Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 29 October 2012) believed that this agreement was one of the 
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biggest achievements of the Kyrgyz diplomacy, since even more powerful Russia 
had to cede Damansky Island (Zhenbao Island) to China in 1991. Nonetheless, 
although Uzengu-Kuush was later used by the opposition politicians to rally against 
Akayev, this agreement was conducive to the strengthening of the Kyrgyz-Chinese 
relationships, especially in the sphere of military cooperation and trade. 
 
The general discourse of the Kyrgyz leadership towards China was more of caution 
and fear (Lewis, 2008: 217). China’s long-term goal in Central Asia was often 
perceived in the political circles of Kyrgyzstan as a gradual attempt to subdue 
Kyrgyzstan economically and then absorb it into the Chinese empire (Rumer, 
Trenin and Zhao, 2007; Peyrouse, 2009; Coyer, 2014). These fears were bolstered 
by the nescience and incomprehension of the Chinese foreign policy goals by the 
Kyrgyz leadership along with the historical legacy of confrontation between China 
and Central Asian nomadic tribes. In reality, the economic ties between two 
countries were stronger than political discourses surrounding their foreign policies 
(Peyrouse, 2009). For instance, the Dordoi and Karasuu Bazaars are one of the 
largest retail markets in Central Asia that serve as the entrepot for the Chinese 
goods to be sold to Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Kaminski and Raballand, 
2009). Dordoi alone employs at least 100,000 people, whilst the annual turnover of 
the market amounted to nearly 7 billion USD in 2008 (Popov, 2011a). There is no 
exact data on its real turnover, because such markets are run non-transparently 
and contribute significantly to the strengthening of shadow economy in Kyrgyzstan. 
These bazaars created a cohort of officials, businessmen, security officers and 
criminals who are interested in sustaining a status quo in the country conducive to 
the development of those markets.28 The dependence of all those actors on the 
lucrative and shadow profits of the bazaars posed a serious threat to the ruling 
regimes, since all leaders had to take into account the consequences of their 
decisions to these markets. If there were no imminent threats to the sustainability 
of those bazaars under Akayev and Bakiyev, the future of those markets became 
questionable under Otunbayeva. The decision to join the Russian-led Customs 
Union received a strong resistance and resentment from all actors engaged in this 
28 For instance, see Kupatadze (2007), Kupatadze (2008), 
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sphere, since the closure of the Kyrgyz borders to the cheap Chinese goods will 
result in the demise of the retail markets such as Dordoi and Karasuu (Popov, 
2011b). After the ethnic violence in the south of the country, political instability, 
caused by the prospects of the bazaars closures, was the least Otunbayeva 
needed to ensure a smooth transition of power. Respectively, this factor may 
explain why the Kyrgyz government proposed its own terms for joining the 
Customs Union and delayed the signing of important documents such as the 
roadmap agreement. The inability of Kremlin to force Kyrgyzstan to join the 
Customs Union on Moscow terms also demonstrates the relative weakness of the 
bandwagoning theory and reveals that Kyrgyzstan is not a fully obedient client 
state of Russia.  
 
In addition, despite the fears of being economically trapped by China, the Kyrgyz 
leadership was still keen to utilise the financial and investment capacity of Beijing. 
This incongruity can be explained by the fact that the Chinese capital could have 
been used by the ruling regimes for personal enrichment and to patch the state 
budget. According to a recent report of the parliamentary commission, Kyrgyzstan 
received nearly 1.8 billion USD from China in the form of loans and grants, which 
stands for more than half of Kyrgyzstan’s external debt (Tynaeva, 2014). Most of 
this funding was directed to maintain Kyrgyzstan’s balance of payments and to 
finance the budget deficit (The Times of Central Asia, 2014). This situation 
demonstrates that the Chinese leverage over Kyrgyzstan has grown significantly, 
whilst the Kyrgyz leaders were preoccupied with short-term goals of finding 
resources to sustain the budget of the republic. Ironically, amidst the fears of the 
Chinese expansion, Kyrgyzstan turned out to be the largest debtor to China. 
 
As for the Western orientation, after the dissolution of the USSR the USA appeared 
to be one of the most promising countries to develop closer ties with, especially in 
the backdrop of a collapsing bipolar system and the failures of communism. The 
Western counterparts were offering attractive monetary support and a new model 
of development based on the democratic principles and the idea of free market. 
Facing rapid impoverishment of the country, Akayev needed a quick solution to 
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mitigate the repercussions of sudden independence. Respectively, in the early 
1990s Akayev turned towards the West to fix the worsening economic situation in 
the country and to strengthen external legitimacy for his rule. Akayev’s government 
received an influx of funding in the form of loans and grants, directed at bolstering 
the aspiring democratic regime in Central Asia. First Vice-Prime-Minister of the 
Kyrgyz Republic Dzhoomart Otorbayev stated in an interview on November 24, 
2012, that the Western countries strongly supported Kyrgyzstan bilaterally and 
multilaterally through various institutions such as the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, when the devastation reigned in the country after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This support was expressed not only in the form of financial aid, but also 
included valuable advices on how to minimise the negative consequences of 
USSR’s dissolution (Otorbayev, Vice-Prime-Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 24 November 2012).  
 
However, Akayev failed to bring the benefits of international memberships and 
neoliberal reforms to the common population. Kyrgyzstan’s economy underwent 
severe contractions, whilst the country’s external debt has soared. The capitalist 
experiment brought technical difficulties, corruption and criminality on a hitherto 
unseen scale, which arose when trying to impose Western models of development 
on a state with little tradition of capitalism (Anderson, 1999: 65). Respectively, by 
2001 Kyrgyzstan distanced itself from the USA, whilst Washington did not regard 
Kyrgyzstan as a region of strategic importance. Nonetheless, the cooperation 
between Bishkek and Washington failed to go beyond localised initiatives such as 
the USAID projects, the grants of the National Endowment for Democracy or the 
opening of the American University of Central Asia. The limited American-Kyrgyz 
relations were often expressed in the forms of grants and multilateral loans, 
whereas the early investment of the USA in Kyrgyzstan was rather the offspring of 
the Cold War confrontation. By supporting an aspiring democratic state in Central 
Asia, Washington was interested in further and complete disintegration of the 
Soviet Union.  
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However, the events of 9/11 provided a unique opportunity for both Washington 
and Bishkek to revisit their relationship. Akayev agreed to host an American air 
base Manas at the Kyrgyz civilian airport to support the U.S.-led Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The American air base not only bolstered the 
legitimacy of Akayev’s regime from beyond, but also guaranteed additional sources 
of income to the state budget and to Akayev’s entourage. For Washington, 
Kyrgyzstan was a convenient foothold to support the American troops in 
Afghanistan in addition to Kyrgyzstan’s geostrategic location in the heart of Central 
Asia and between Russia and China. As a result, the Manas air base became the 
most central point of cooperation between the USA and Kyrgyzstan. This 
correlation became especially vivid during the tenure of Bakiyev. Despite the 
growing domestic discontent with the autocratic rule of Bakiyev, the U.S. State 
Department continued to support his regime ignoring human rights violations, high 
level of corruption, and fraudulent presidential and parliamentary elections. Similar 
dynamics were present during Otunbayeva’s presidency. Washington was 
interested in securing the air base at least until the withdrawal of the American 
troops from Afghanistan in 2014 as announced by Barack Obama. Thus, as in the 
cases of both Akayev and Bakiyev, the USA was willing to offer attractive financial 
packages for the lease of the Kyrgyz airport. Nonetheless, Washington was not 
keen in expanding the U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan, which became evident during 
the ethnic violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan. With its narrow focus on the air 
base, the American leadership preferred not to intervene in Osh in June 2010. 
Such approach puts in question Kyrgyzstan’s role in the American foreign policy, 
especially when the U.S. troops leave Afghanistan in 2014. In a similar vein, the 
termination of the airport lease and the extinction of the American interest in 
Kyrgyzstan will demonstrate the real commitment of the new Kyrgyz elites to the 
democratic principles and ideals. 
 
In sum, the Kyrgyz leadership proclaimed to explore its international relations 
equally with Russia, China and the West. However, despite the rhetoric there was 
no thoughtful and coherent foreign policy position towards these vectors. The 
foreign policy orientation of Kyrgyzstan was driven by certain momentums and 
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political conjunctures and failed to translate into a consistent system, which would 
reflect Kyrgyzstan’s national interests. As David Lewis (2008: 215) concluded, the 
Central Asian leaders lacked ideological commitments to any foreign policy poles 
and were rather interested in securing political and economic benefits by playing 
off greater players. Accordingly, the analysis of foreign policy discourses may not 
only reveal the environment within which the decisions are made, but also may 
explain the mechanics of how the Central Asian leaders play off different actors for 
personal benefit. 
 
“Weathercock Diplomacy”29 or Debating Multivectorism  
The formation of Kyrgyz foreign policy has always been accompanied by foreign 
policy discourses, which channelled or sought to channel political ideas. The 
Declaration of Independence, agreed by the Supreme Council of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, was the first major document, which has outlined the status of 
Kyrgyzstan on international arena. It stated that Kyrgyzstan became an 
independent, sovereign and democratic state on the basis of the inalienable right of 
the Kyrgyz nation for self-determination. Accordingly, on August 31, 1991, the 
Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist giving way to the newly 
independent Kyrgyz Republic. Article 13 of the Declaration emphasised that 
Kyrgyzstan strived to actively contribute to the strengthening of international peace 
and security as an equal member of the international community. As a subject of 
international law, the Kyrgyz Republic would also establish relations with other 
states, sign treaties with them, exchange diplomatic, trade and consulate missions 
and partake in the activities of international organisations. Article 14 of the 
Declaration stressed that Kyrgyzstan would adhere to the generally recognised 
principles of friendship and cooperation between nations, fulfil its commitments and 
avoid confrontations in the sphere of international relations.  
 
Henceforth, the Declaration of Independence became the first legislative document 
in the sphere of foreign policy that laid the foundations of the Kyrgyz diplomacy and 
Foreign Service. On May 5, 1993, the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan has ratified the 
29 Akayev used the term “weathercock diplomacy” to characterise the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan 
under Bakiyev.  
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Constitution of the country, which officially declared Kyrgyzstan a sovereign, 
unitary and democratic state, governed by the secular principles and the rule of 
law. As previously outlined in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution 
reinstated the adherence of Kyrgyzstan to the norms of international law and its 
endeavour for universal and just peace and international cooperation. The 
Constitution also officially delegated the right to determine the republic’s foreign 
policy orientation to the president.  
 
Accordingly, being constitutionally responsible for defining the foreign policy 
priorities of the country, Akayev proposed the vision of Kyrgyzstan’s multivector 
foreign policy. This concept assumed that Kyrgyzstan should have utilised the 
opportunity of its geopolitical location to converge the interests of Russia, China 
and the USA for the benefit of Kyrgyzstan and for the mutual cooperation of all 
concerned parties. Akayev (2004) claimed that his multivector foreign policy meant 
not “either” and “or”, but “and” and “and”. This idea was clearly expressed in 
Akayev’s Silk Road Doctrine or the Eurasian Land-Bridge project. Outlined in 1999, 
the Silk Road Doctrine committed Kyrgyzstan to a multilateral foreign policy 
orientation, portraying the country as a microcosm of the Silk Road that linked the 
East and the West (Akayev, 1999; Wood, 2005). Akayev (1999) linked these ideas 
to his national strategy “Kyrgyzstan is our common home”, which stressed 
multiethnic diversity and interethnic tolerance in the country and which was 
supposed to demonstrate the capacity of Kyrgyzstan to become the bridge 
between the East and the West. Respectively, in line with such thinking, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan had the following directives to fulfil 
(Toktomushev, 2001: 22): 
 
• Strengthening of stability and security in the Central Asian region 
• Development of collaborative and friendly relations with neighbouring 
states along with further deepening of integration processes 
• Contribution to the strengthening of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and to the realisation of the union’s economic 
and political potential 
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• Strengthening of collaborative and friendly relations with developed 
states of the West and the East 
• Development of cooperation with the organisations of the United 
Nations, regional international organisations, financial and economic 
institutions 
• Strengthening of cooperation with developing states and states in 
transition 
 
When Bakiyev came to power, he sought to continue Akayev’s so-called 
multivector foreign policy. Bakiyev’s government immediately rejected Akayev’s 
notion of Silk Road diplomacy because of its long-term association with the regime 
of the first president. Instead, on January 10, 2007, Bakiyev approved the Concept 
of Foreign Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic that outlined the foreign policy priorities of 
the country. The adoption of this concept was justified by the expedience to 
accelerate ongoing transformations in Kyrgyzstan after the revolutionary events of 
March 24, 2005, and the general dynamics in international relations related to 
integrationist trends, globalisation and regionalisation of global processes. The 
Concept stressed that the March events of 2005 led to the creation of foreign policy 
that would reflect the interests and responsibilities of all parties, including the state, 
national and local governments, entrepreneurs and civil society. Accordingly, the 
new concept highlighted four main tenets for Kyrgyzstan to pursue: 
 
• Strengthening of national security through foreign policy methods  
• Creation of favourable external conditions for the implementation of 
national development priorities 
• Strengthening of the positive international image of Kyrgyzstan 
• Formation of an effective foreign policy system led by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and in partnership with other 
interested agencies and civil society institutions 
 
Furthermore, the Concept identified three interaction circles around which the 
Kyrgyz foreign policy was to be centred. The first one was the regional circle that 
included China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The concept encouraged 
the strengthening of good relations with those neighbouring states, along with 
Kyrgyzstan’s further participation in the integration processes and regional 
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structures such as the SCO, the CSTO and the EurAsEC. The second circle was 
the continental or the Eurasian one, which included Russia, China, the USA, the 
EU, Germany, Japan, India and Turkey. The third circle, the global one, centred on 
the cooperation with the United Nations and global financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, the Asian Development Bank and the Islamic 
Development Bank. In sum, the Concept emphasized that Kyrgyzstan would 
pursue multivector, balanced and pragmatic foreign policy, based on the actual 
domestic resources and opportunities and the national interests of the country.  
 
Otubayeva’s tenure in power was too short to make significant conclusions 
regarding the continuity and changes of her foreign policies compared to those of 
Akayev and Bakiyev. Nonetheless, the new Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
adopted at the same referendum when Otunbayeva was elected as President, 
outlined new structural changes in foreign policy decision-making. This constitution 
reduced presidential powers, whilst delegating more authority to the parliament. In 
addition, prior to her presidency, Otunbayeva was very vocal of weak Kyrgyz 
foreign policy. Otunbayeva (2009) metaphorically compared Kyrgyzstan’s 
multivector policy to a fig leaf, which has delicately covered the spiritual nakedness 
of the country. Accordingly, Otunbayeva (2009) called for a systemic approach to 
foreign policy, implying the formulation of a clear system of axes with coherent 
guidelines and strong foreign policy poles. This vision was also shared by many 
policymakers and diplomats. As a result, after the April 2010 events, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs along with the members of its Public Advisory Council and foreign 
policy experts began to draft the new Concept of Foreign Policy of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Azamat Temirkulov (Member of the Public Advisory Council of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 3 December 2012) 
asserted that the new concept of foreign policy will be based on principles of 
national security, which are outlined in the newly adopted Concept of National 
Security.  
 
Although Temirkulov stressed that the drafted foreign policy concept is a new 
document, Askar Beshimov (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, 
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interview, 12 November 2012) has referred rather to the “reset” of the Concept of 
Foreign Policy of 2007.30 Beshimov (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Kyrgyzstan, interview, 12 November 2012) emphasized that the Concept of 
Foreign Policy of 2007 has to be rebooted according to the current realities, since 
the concept of foreign policy is a general system of views on the world, which sets 
the plan of actions, goals, and mechanisms to achieve these goals. As an 
illustrative example Beshimov mentioned that only recently the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Kyrgyzstan has issued 8 thousand work permits to 7 Chinese companies, 
whereas the level of investment of China to Kyrgyzstan has already reached 1 
billion USD.31 Yet, the Kyrgyz leadership still prefers to develop hydropower energy 
potential of the republic with Russia, although there are established business 
relations with the Chinese investors who are willing to invest in Kyrgyzstan on more 
favourable conditions. Respectively, Beshimov stressed that these developments 
have to be taken into account whilst “rebooting” the Concept of Foreign Policy.  
 
In general, the idea of orienting towards various poles in international politics has 
been prevailing within the foreign policy discourses of the Kyrgyz leadership. 
Multivector foreign policy was perceived as a sign of a certain maturity of the state, 
since such foreign policy assumed orientation towards different, and often, 
conflicting forces in international relations (Bolshakov, 2010). The positioning of 
Kyrgyzstan in this multivector equation was mostly from the perspective of an 
equal partner. However, the literature on weak states posits that states like 
Kyrgyzstan tend to exhibit a low level of engagement in world politics, rely on 
greater powers and direct their foreign policies at ensuring political and physical 
security. Yet, Kyrgyz foreign policy has not resembled classical bandwagoning 
behaviour. Indeed, the Kyrgyz leadership was accommodating the interests of 
regional hegemons, but the republic was still far from representing a state, which is 
fully subservient to imperial centres, as suggested by the concept of the New Great 
Game in Central Asia. The multivector discourse itself as proposed by Akayev and 
30 In fact, the concept of 2007 was developed by two groups, one of which was led by Beshimov. 
31 For instance, China is investing in the construction of an oil refinery in Kara-Balta, an electrical 
substation Datka, power lines Datka-Kemin, etc. Erlan Abdyldayev (2009) highlighted that a 
commodity circulation between China and Kyrgyzstan has reached 6 billion USD in 2008. 
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then followed by Bakiyev and Otunbayeva contradicts the neorealist notion of 
balance of power, since Kyrgyzstan can neither simultaneously bandwagon 
Russia, China and the USA nor can it balance these states on its own power 
terms. In other words, why did the Kyrgyz presidents promote multivector foreign 
policy, if Kyrgyzstan was purportedly doomed to bandwagon one of the greater 
powers? 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan was not 
always resulting from systemic changes, although systemic factors did shape 
Kyrgyzstan’s international behaviour. As outlined in Chapter II, traditional systemic 
or reductionist approaches to the study of foreign policies of weak states often 
neglect other variables that are crucial for understanding the genuine inter- and 
intra-state dynamics in countries like Kyrgyzstan. Accordingly, the existence of the 
Kyrgyz multivector discourse leads to another explanation, which may supplement 
or provide alternative reasoning of Kyrgyz foreign policymaking. State 
securitisation or security performance is the framework that may explain the 
prevailing multivector discourse. As discussed previously, weak states lack strong 
physical base, effective institutional expression, a monopoly on the instruments of 
violence and a consensus on the idea of the state. These states are distinguished 
by the nature of insecurities and its correlation to the security of ruling regimes. 
The ruling elites become preoccupied with short-term regime security goals 
because of internal and external weaknesses of the state. Accordingly, to protect 
own interests and the interests of their entourages the ruling leaders may securitize 
the state, whilst in reality they will be securitising their regimes. 
 
Accordingly, the discourse of Kyrgyz multivector foreign policy can be a mere act of 
state dramaturgiia. The Kyrgyz presidents or at least Akayev and Bakiyev 
promoted multifaceted foreign policy to justify the fluctuations of Kyrgyzstan on 
international arena before their electorate and the regional players. The concept of 
binding the republic regionally to larger Eurasia assumed courting the protection, or 
at least the preferential treatment and foreign aid, of both greater powers, such as 
Russia, China and the USA, and secondary powers, including Turkey, Iran and 
125 
 
Japan (Wood, 2005). In addition, Central Asian bandwagoning with Russia in the 
CSTO or China in the SCO represented the form of political solidarity against the 
pressures and processes that could have challenged the Central Asian leaders and 
their entourages (Allison, 2008). These pressures were expressed in the form of 
democratic agendas of international agencies in the early 2000s or in the form of 
more conservative values such as the return to presidential governance as advised 
by Medvedev to Otunbayeva in 2011.  
 
The concept of multivector foreign policy was the official, but not the only 
discourse, which prevailed in the Kyrgyz decision-making circles. Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the narratives of conspiracy theories became 
prominent in Kyrgyz politics. Conspiracy theories are the discourses, which explain 
a significant event as secretly planned and executed by an agent or a group of 
agents (Heathershaw, 2012: 612). Being often the ideological artefacts of the Cold 
War, Central Asian conspiracy theories tended to legitimise the predominant order 
and reproduce elitism, patriarchy and patronage as modes of governance in the 
region (Heathershaw, 2012). The conspiracy theories about “deep state” and 
“foreign threat” were amongst the most widespread conspirological narratives in 
Kyrgyzstan. “Deep state” concepts attributed the conspirological narratives to the 
internal affairs of the state such as the inner-workings of the ruling clans, security 
services and powerful presidential families (Heathershaw, 2012). 
 
The conspiracies of “foreign threat” suspected the role of external actors in loitering 
into state affairs (Heathershaw, 2012). For instance, ousted Akayev lambasted that 
U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Stephen Young orchestrated the Tulip Revolution 
of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. Human rights activist and former presidential candidate 
Toktayim Umetalieva (interview, 25 October 2012) claimed that the team of the 
Pakistani president has passed to Akayev an intercepted letter written by Young, 
which outlined the monetary flows directed for the governmental change in 
Kyrgyzstan.32 Likewise, Aleksandr Knyazev (2006: 66-67) accused Kurmanbek 
32 However, the scheduled date was allegedly May 25, 2005 (Umetalieva, Human Rights Activist, 
interview, 25 October 2012). Umetaliyeva further denoted that U.S. State Department 
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Bakiyev, Omurbek Tekebayev and Emil Aliyev discussing a coup against Akayev 
with the U.S. State Department officials in 2003. In a similar vein, the April 
revolution of 2010 was presented by some commentators (Halpin, 2010; 
Greenfield, 2010; Blank, 2010) as Kremlin’s revenge against Bakiyev and his 
family, whilst the June violence of 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan was also often 
regarded as an attempt of the Russian “elder brother” to hinder the pro-
parliamentary political reform in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Nonetheless, similar to the official multivector foreign policy discourses, conspiracy 
theories also turned out to be mostly the acts of dramaturgiia. The March events of 
2005 have not brought the anti-Russian leaders to power, whilst investigations of 
the June 2010 violence did not uncover traces of the Russian security services on 
the ground.33 By means of the “foreign threat” conspiracies Akayev attempted to 
legitimise his unpopular rule and portray himself as a democratic ruler who had to 
flee to Moscow as a result of an unconstitutional overthrow. Similarly, the stories 
about the role of the Federal Security Service of Russia in inciting the ethnic clash 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh belittled the failures and incompetence of 
Otunbayeva’s Interim Government whilst reproducing the hegemonic idea of 
almighty Kremlin.These developments are yet “straw-in-the-wind” evidence, which 
however provides an important benchmark for the investigation of the validity of the 
hypothesis.  
 
These developments are also in line with the state performance explanations, 
since conspiracy theories are also performances, which exist in the discursive 
environments and which affect both official and unofficial actors (Ortmann and 
Heathershaw, 2012: 561; Heathershaw, 2012: 611; Sakwa, 2012). In fact, referring 
to Alexei Yurchak (2006), Heathershaw (2012: 611) delineated constative and 
performative functions of conspiracy theories, “Conspiracy theories are a form of 
representative Lynn also met with the representatives of southern criminal groupings and with 
supporters of Hizb Ut-Tahrir in the south of Kyrgyzstan. 
33 For instance, see Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission (2011), International Federation for Human Rights 
(2010), Human Rights Watch (2010), Human Rights Watch (2011,) Matveeva, (2011), Melvin 
(2011), Amnesty International (2012), International Crisis Group (2012). However, the STRATFOR 
report stressed the presence of the Russian Federal Security Service on the ground during the April 
events of 2010 (Goodrich, 2010), which was not confirmed by the new government of Kyrgyzstan. 
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political discourse which purportedly subverts the existing order in the constative 
sense (making specific claims against the establishment) while, in reality, 
normalizing the status quo in the performative sense (deploying and reproducing 
the prevailing political ideas).” As a result, the narrative of conspiracy theories is 
not about truth or falsehood, but about felicity and infelicity, since the discursive 
mechanism of conspiracy theories re-inscribes the predominant order and 
legitimises or delegitimizes political actions (Ortmann and Heathershaw, 2012; 
Heathershaw, 2012). 
 
The incongruities between formal and informal foreign policy discourses and their 
practices lead to the question why these incongruities exist in the first place. As the 
empirical evidence demonstrates, Kyrgyzstan does not present the case of a 
classical neorealist bandwagoning, since there are traits of both state securitisation 
and rent-seeking, which affect the foreign policy trajectory of Kyrgyzstan. The latter 
two notions are closely related to the regimes that developed and prevailed in the 
republic. In fact, the understanding of the formation of those autocratic and 
mercantile regimes is instrumental to the analysis of Kyrgyz foreign policy. 
 
Kyrgyzstan Adrift 
In sum, diagnostic evidence revealed that Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy from the 
early 1990s to 2011 was non-systematic, inconsistent and reactionary. As Wood 
(2005: 142-143) summarised, Kyrgyz foreign policy was often viewed as “a mish-
mash of guileless reactions to a series of crises” and as a practice of inviting 
random actors to meddle in Kyrgyzstan’s state of affairs. Such a persistent and 
recurring pattern of policy characteristic indicates at the presence of certain factors, 
which could have driven foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan under Akayev, Bakiyev and 
Otunbayeva, and which need to be included into the foreign policy analysis in order 
to better understand and explain incoherent foreign policy trajectories of weak 
states.  
 
Weak Kyrgyzstan, vulnerable to systemic pressures, and a predatory rent-seeking 
regime became the legacy of Akayev’s fifteen-year rule, which was camouflaged 
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by a pseudo multivector foreign policy. The emergence of these variables began in 
the early 1990s, when Akayev found himself in dire need of financing to revitalise 
the rapidly declining Kyrgyz economy. The budget of the Kyrgyz government 
decreased from 38,5 percent of GDP in 1990 to 12,7 percent in 1992 
(Tchantouridze, 2006: 62). The overwhelming majority of population in Kyrgyzstan 
was plunged into chronic poverty and struggled over physical survival (Reznikova, 
2003: 94). In the period from 1987 to 1993 the personal income of the Kyrgyz 
citizens decreased by 58-66 percent, whereas the percentage of people living in 
poverty increased from 12 to 88 percent (Reznikova, 2003: 94). The industrial 
legacy of the Soviet Union was quickly falling into decay, since the infrastructure 
and logistics chains were disintegrated after the dissolution of the USSR. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union revealed a stark dependency of all Soviet republics to 
their core. However, unlike other Central Asian neighbours such as Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan did not possess developed gas and oil 
reserves to maintain economic stability and state budget. Although Kyrgyzstan was 
a monopolist in antimony production in the USSR and also exported uranium, gold, 
mercury, wool, meat, steel, tobacco, sugar and some machinery, Akayev failed to 
ensure stable economic infrastructure for those industries and was unable to 
sustain their development at Soviet level (Tchantouridze, 2006: 62). 
 
Kyrgyzstan emerged from the USSR with a functioning economic base, high 
literacy rate, well-educated middle class, effective healthcare system and strong 
welfare state institutions, but these advantages soon diminished after the 
implementation of reforms advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Tchantouridze, 2006: 63; Musuraliyev, 2013; Igamberdiev and Tegizbekova, 
2014). The IMF and the World Bank pushed for decentralisation and privatisation 
of state-run enterprises and state-held monopolies without any attempts of 
sequencing their advocated reforms and establishing well-functioning legal 
institutions (Tchantouridze, 2006: 63; Igamberdiev and Tegizbekova, 2014). As a 
result, in the period from 1993 to 1995 nearly 450 major industrial units have been 
dubiously privatised in Kyrgyzstan, and most of them then went either bankrupt or 
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were sold abroad, often for scrap (Begunova, 2014).34 By 1995, in comparison to 
the early 1990s, the industrial output of the republic decreased by two-thirds 
(Begunova, 2014). Recommendations of the international financial institutions 
contributed successfully to the destruction of Soviet economic potential in 
Kyrgyzstan, but were unsuccessful in helping create an effective market-based 
economy (Lantsov and Aliyev, 2006). Following the neoliberal conceptions of 
economic reforms, the Kyrgyz leadership significantly cut social expenditures and 
imports, however, the trade balance remained negative (Lantsov and Aliyev, 2006; 
Igamberdiev and Tegizbekova, 2014). In 1994, Akayev’s government lifted control 
mechanisms over fuel and food and removed controls over exports and profit 
margins, which, in turn, immediately led to colossal inflation and striking poverty 
growth in Kyrgyzstan (Tchantouridze, 2006: 63). Kyrgyzstan’s limited resource 
endowment further constrained economic progress (Gleason, 2001: 174). 
Hydropower energy and gold mining appeared to be the most promising areas to 
centre economic development around in Kyrgyzstan. However, both sectors 
required significant modernization and investment and quickly became tied to 
major corruption scandals.  
 
On one hand, Akayev’s reforms turned Kyrgyzstan into one of the weakest states 
in the world incapable of projecting power beyond its borders. On the other hand, 
Akayev created a thin layer of oligarchs who made nefarious fortunes and 
managed to capture the state. These developments were the legacy of Akayev that 
all subsequent Kyrgyz leaders had to face, and there was little progress made by 
both Bakiyev and Otunbayeva to rectify the situation. Being independent for slightly 
more than 20 years, Kyrgyzstan managed to accrue an external debt of nearly 3 
billion USD along with an undiversified economy based on the transit of Chinese 
goods, which further increased the vulnerability of the country (Beshimov, Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, interview, 12 November 2012). The 
Kyrgyz foreign policy became driven by the conjuncture of finding financial 
34 In the period from 2001 to 2004 Akayev’s government would further privatise 342 state-owned 
enterprises for only 12 million USD in total, including Kyrgyz mining and metallurgical combine, Kant 
cement and slate factory, Bishkek antibiotics factory, Issyk-Kul fish combine, TyazhElektromazh 
factory, Kayndy sugar factory, Ak-Suu corn processing combine, Alamedin hydropower energy 
stations, and others (Krasilnikova and Nochevkin, 2014). 
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resources to patch the holes in the budget, which in turn led to further dependence 
of Kyrgyzstan on other countries (Beshimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Kyrgyzstan, interview, 12 November 2012).  
 
Not only the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan was perceived as directly dependent on 
the actions of greater players, but even the country’s domestic policies were 
presumed to be a reaction to external influences. Political, economic and social 
realities created preconditions, which compelled Kyrgyzstan to move along the 
fairway of different states and take into account the policies of various geopolitical 
organisations (Beshimov, 2007). For instance, these arrangements were evident 
during Bakiyev’s early years in power. Russia has never been perceived as a 
threat to Kyrgyz statehood. Nonetheless, the presence of a large pool of Kyrgyz 
migrants working in Russia, Kyrgyz dependency on Russian fuel and Kyrgyzstan’s 
own systemic vulnerabilities justified Bakiyev’s fears of Russia as a destabilising 
force. After the ousting of Akayev the confronting groupings and clans began a 
vehement strife for political power and control over the lucrative business spheres 
in Kyrgyzstan. The revolutionary partners realised that their goals and objectives 
were conflicting, whilst they were previously united only by the common vision of 
toppling Akayev. Bakiyev’s priority was to eliminate political rivals and strengthen 
his vertical of power within the country. Thus, in that stint, Bakiyev needed to 
minimise the points of friction with Kremlin, since domestically Bakiyev’s positions 
were still quite unstable. 
 
In other instances, systemic weaknesses of Kyrgyzstan were manifested in more 
assertive and explicit forms. For example, Former Diplomat at the Kyrgyz Embassy 
to Russia (Anonymous, interview, 13 November 2012) claimed that there was an 
absolute diktat of Moscow in the Russian-Kyrgyz relations. Diagnostic evidence 
also supports this statement. According to the Wikileaks cable dated February 10, 
2009, opposition politician Bakyt Beshimov in a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador 
Tatiana Gfoeller claimed that his younger brother Askar Beshimov was dismissed 
from the position of Deputy Foreign Minister for CIS affairs after a direct request 
from the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. At a closed meeting of the 
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deputy foreign ministers of the CIS countries, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Denisov was reportedly upset with Askar Beshimov’s arguments against 
Kyrgyzstan’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Wikileaks, 2006; 
Anonymous, Former Diplomat at the Kyrgyz Embassy to Russia, interview, 13 
November 2012). As a result, Kremlin was displeased with these comments and 
requested Bakiyev “to rein in” the Kyrgyz official (Anonymous, Former Diplomat at 
the Kyrgyz Embassy to Russia, interview, 13 November 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, despite convincing empirical cases the tenets of structural realism do 
not portray the full picture of Kyrgyz politics. There is space for the Kyrgyz 
leadership to manoeuvre within the environment of systemic pressures and 
constraints (Usubaliyev, Former Representative of Kyrgyzstan to NATO, interview, 
18 December 2013; Bayaman, Former Deputy Minister of Communications and 
Transport of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 24 December 2013). For example, 
Jomart Ormonbekov (Former Attaché at the Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to the 
Kingdom of Belgium, Mission to the EU and NATO, interview, 5 December 2012) 
recalled the meeting at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, when Kosovo 
declared its independence in 2008. Permanent Representative of Russia to NATO 
Konstantin Totsky advised all members of the CIS countries to openly oppose the 
secession of Kosovo, but Ormonbekov decided to disobey this directive despite the 
Russian pressure. Temirbek Sultanbayev (Director of the Department of Europe 
and the USA at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 5 
December 2012) also recalled similar cases from his diplomatic experience. At the 
Human Rights Council meeting in Geneva, the Kyrgyz side was strongly advised 
by their American counterparts to vote in support of the resolution on Northern 
Sudan. However, at that time Kyrgyzstan was expecting investments from Pakistan 
and Kuwait, which would have opposed this resolution. Thus, the Kyrgyz side 
decided to abstain despite the American warning of taking into account the Kyrgyz 
decision not to vote for the resolution. In a similar vein, in the early 1990s the 
Turkish diplomats asked Kyrgyzstan to support their position on Cyprus, but the 
Kyrgyz side declined to acquiesce with their request notwithstanding Turkish 
support of Kyrgyzstan after the independence (Sultanbayev, Director of the 
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Department of Europe and the USA at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 5 December 2012). Even the aforementioned dismissal of 
Beshimov’s younger brother from office could have been attributed not to the role 
of Moscow, but to political activity of Bakyt Beshimov, an outspoken critic of 
Bakiyev’s rule.  
 
The ability of Kyrgyz diplomats to make independent foreign policy decisions 
despite pressures from greater players demonstrates that there are other factors, 
alternative to systemic theories, which may explain the trajectory of Kyrgyz foreign 
policy. The type of the ruling regime in Kyrgyzstan is one of those factors that 
unpacks Kyrgyz foreign policy milieu from a different perspective. As Chapter II 
describes, rent-seeking patterns prevail in Central Asia, and Kyrgyzstan is not an 
exception. Kyrgyz officials and decision makers are joined in intricate networks of 
mutual exchange that are solidified by clan or family bonds. The repercussions of 
this phenomenon are evident in Kyrgyz foreign policymaking, which is expressed in 
a conjunctive form of erratic and mercantile foreign policy interests. For instance, 
one of the key foreign policy decisions to host an American air base on Kyrgyz soil 
contradicted official Kyrgyz foreign policy discourses and was rather based on the 
political conjuncture of Akayev and his private commercial interests (Ashirov, 
Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 29 October 2012). Felix Kulov, Former Vice-President of 
Kyrgyzstan and political rival of Akayev, stated in an interview on 3 July 2013 that 
initially the experts suggested locating the base in Kant, but Aidar Akayev, the 
president’s son, intervened to ensure the base would be situated in Bishkek. Kulov 
himself proposed to open the base in the south of the republic at the Osh airport to 
deal directly with the issues of drug trafficking, terrorism and state security. 
However, Aidar Akayev was more interested in selling fuel to the Americans, and, 
as diagnostic evidence confirmed, Aidar Akaey managed to successfully capture 
fuel supplies to the American air base (Cloud, 2005; Roston, 2006; USHR, 2010; 
Kulov, Former Vice-President of Kyrgyzstan, interview, 3 July 2013).  
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Mercantilism of Kyrgyz foreign policy was the strongest common trait of Akayev’s 
and Bakiyev’s tenures. Rent-seeking interests of power groups, which perceived 
external actors as the wealth fund, became the driver of Kyrgyz foreign policy 
(Baktygulov, 2012). For instance, in the early 1990s LG Electronics, known 
previously as Gold Star, and Daewoo-Auto withdrew their interests for opening 
factories in Kyrgyzstan after Kyrgyz officials requested kickbacks and bribes 
(Sariyev, 2012). State institutions were incapable of formulating national interests, 
but were well equipped and experienced at requesting grants, loans and free gifts 
(Omarov, 2007). The attracted capital was either embezzled or directed to patch 
the budget deficit. In 1992, international institutions financed half of Kyrgyzstan’s 
17 percent budget deficit; in 2002, contributions of foreign donors reached the 
mark of 539 million USD; in 2001, the external debt soared to 1,7 billion USD, 
whilst by the end of 2005 the external debt reached nearly 2 billion USD  
(Tchantouridze, 2006: 64). However, the Kyrgyz leadership was least preoccupied 
with the possibility of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign peonage, since the ruling elites were 
mostly driven by the personal enrichment calculi. These tendencies led to 
inconsistent pattern of Kyrgyz foreign policy behaviour. For example, on one hand, 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev was making official visits to Moscow, where he was 
expressing emphatic loyalty to Kremlin and eagerness to jointly develop Kyrgyz 
hydroenergy potential. On the other hand, his son Maksim was meeting the 
American diplomats to re-negotiate the terms of the Manas air base and Russian 
disgraced oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Telman Ismailov to discuss business 
initiatives, including the upcoming Russian hydroenergy projects in Kyrgyzstan 
(Anonymous, Political Adviser, interview, 6 May 2013).35  
 
The imitative and irrational nature of Kyrgyz foreign policy was often ascribed to 
the lack of coherent domestic policy guidelines with clearly defined national 
35 It is difficult to cross-check this information, although circumstantial evidence suggests that 
Berezovsky and Ismailov could have visited Kyrgyzstan. For instance, in 2006, the members of the 
Kyrgyz Parliament declared that Berezovsky paid a private visit to Bishkek in order to meet Maksim 
Bakiyev, and thus the parliamentarians requested the Office of the General Prosecutor of 
Kyrgyzstan to react accordingly (for example, see http://lenta.ru/news/2006/10/31/kyrgyz or 
http://www.newsru.com/world/14sep2006/oproverg.html). Nonetheless, the General Prosecutor of 
Kyrgyzstan Kongantiyev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Boris Berezovsky affirmed that such a visit has 
not taken place.  
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interests (Abdurazakov, n.d.; Omarov, 2007; Baktygulov, 2012; Bayaman, Former 
Deputy Minister of Communications and Transport of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 24 December 2013). For instance, Valentin Bogatyrev (2012) 
emphasised the following pillars, on which Kyrgyz foreign policy should have 
rested upon, but which were missing during the tenures of Akayev and Bakiyev: 
 
• Real assessment of the interests of foreign actors and respectively no 
consideration of those interests when devising Kyrgyz foreign policies 
towards these players 
• Clear understanding of Kyrgyz national interests   
• Domestic doctrine on security, strengthening and development of 
sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan and how these factors might project on foreign 
policy, e.g. the relations with what actors strengthened or weakened 
national security 
• Diversification of foreign policy orientations, e.g. the relations with what 
countries needed to be enhanced  
• Departure from ideological understanding of foreign policy 
 
The inability of statesmen to articulate the vision and objectives of Kyrgyz foreign 
policy was attributed to their lack of strategic and tactical understanding of foreign 
policy (Omarov, 2007). Nur Omarov (2007; n.d.) argued that the ruling regimes 
became the hostages of regional and clan constructions, which hindered the 
development of a strategic vision of the country. Nonetheless, it was the ruling 
regimes, which created and maintained this elaborate system of mutual 
exchanges. The tenets of patron-client relationships remained intact even after the 
changes of rulers.  
 
As a result, the implementation of consistent foreign policy proved to be 
problematic on both conceptual and administrative grounds. Notwithstanding the 
meritocratic expectations of foreign service, many positions at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan were occupied based on the rent-seeking practices 
and clan and family attributions. Such recruitment methods only exacerbated the 
problems existing within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan. The 
participation of Kyrgyzstan in Soviet foreign policymaking was minimal, and only 
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few Kyrgyz nationals were employed at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Anonymous, Former Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the USA, 16 December 2013). 
As a result, independent Kyrgyzstan lacked both the material and technical base 
and the professional cadres to run the diplomatic service (Anonymous, Former 
Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the USA, 16 December 2013). Akayev had to rely on 
the academicians and scholars to fill this void and implement Kyrgyz foreign policy 
(Anonymous, Former Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the USA, 16 December 2013). 
On June 12, 2001, Akayev issued a decree №197, which created the Diplomatic 
Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan (Anonymous, Former 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 
2013; Toktomushev, 2001: 18). Nonetheless, the quality of education at this 
institution was poor.  
 
Although most of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan were qualified 
diplomats, in reality they could not devise foreign policies independently from the 
Office of the President. The ministers were simply high-level employees who were 
responsible for the execution of the presidential will or the directives of his inner 
circle (Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 23 December 2013; Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of 
the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 
2012). For instance, U.S. Charge d'Affaires Lee Litzenberger reported in a 
confidential cable to the U.S. State Department how deferential Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sarbayev was to Maksim Bakiyev during their dinner at a private restaurant 
on July 13, 2009, after the entry of new Manas Transit Centre agreements into 
force (Wikileaks, 2009e). Sarbayev stressed to the U.S. Charge d'Affaires that he 
was only the executor of Maksim’s plan to keep the American air base. 
Litzenberger communicated to the U.S. State Department that Sarbayev was very 
nervous before and during the presence of Bakiyev’s son who in turn was calm 
throughout and exhibited tastes to expensive scotch and Cuban cigars with his 
name on the label (Wikileaks, 2009e). This case explicitly demonstrates how the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was serving the interests of the president’s family, if the 
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minister himself was subservient to Maksim Bakiyev who held no official state 
position at that time. 
 
This trend continued when Maksim Bakiyev was appointed the Head of the Central 
Agency for Development, Innovation and Investment of the Kyrgyz Republic. For 
instance, Maksim Bakiyev headed the Kyrgyz delegation to China in January 2010, 
where he held meetings with several high-profile Chinese officials. Although the 
Kyrgyz delegation included three ministers, the delegation was still led by the 
president’s son. The Kyrgyz and Chinese sides discussed the construction of a rail 
line, which would link Kyrgyzstan, China and Uzbekistan, the investments into the 
Bishkek Combined Heat and Power Plant and the development of a 500-kilowatt 
power transmission line (Wikileaks, 2010). The Kyrgyz delegation was also 
interested in developing the mining and agricultural sectors jointly with the Chinese 
counterparts and establishing cooperation with the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Chinese Development Bank (Wikileaks, 2010). The unusual diplomatic 
hierarchy of the Kyrgyz delegation demonstrated the importance of the Chinese 
vector for the Bakiyevs, since Maksim Bakiyev, Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s son and then 
his likely presidential successor, personally led the negotiations over strategic and 
lucrative projects with China. This hierarchy also revealed the power and authority 
of the president’s son who was making state-level decisions without consulting the 
Prime-Minister of Kyrgyzstan. Maksim Bakiyev also turned the participation of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Kadyrbek Sarbayev in this delegation into a symbolic act 
by exercising the minister’s powers himself such as inviting the Chinese 
counterparts to Kyrgyzstan and expressing satisfaction regarding the progress of 
the bilateral cooperation. The Chinese side felt insulted by the “nepotism of 
sending a dictator’s son to negotiate state-to-state agreements”, but still agreed to 
set the meetings with the Chinese deputy ministers (Wikileaks, 2010).  
 
Unlike the high-level appointees, the mid-level and junior personnel of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was shaped by different educational upbringing compared to the 
elder Kyrgyz diplomats, which, however, did not translate necessarily into a more 
liberal and better-quality outlook (Wood, 2005: 183-184). The state service within 
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the diplomatic branch was considered to be one of the most prestigious in the 
country and thus was often filled with the relatives and cronies of high-profile 
officials. The appointments to the embassies abroad were often conducted in 
accordance to similar principles, but sometimes resembled honorary exiles for 
powerful, but inconvenient politicians. Quite often certain positions were simply 
sold (Engvall, 2011). Consequently, the expertise and professionalism of the 
diplomatic servants was often very questionable. Ashirov (Former Deputy Chief of 
Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 
October 2012) recalled the period when he worked as the head of one of the 
departments at the EurAsEC: 
 
The interests of Kyrgyzstan were championed at the EurAsEC by the 
permanent representatives of Kyrgyzstan, whilst I was employed there as 
an international official. However, what disconcerted me was the low level 
of preparedness of Kyrgyz officials. For instance, the Russian colleagues 
have approached all issues very rigorously, taking into account various 
possible factors and analyzing the consequences, whereas the Kyrgyz 
side was often prepared very superficially. Moreover, the negotiators at 
this level should have been permanently appointed to the organisation to 
understand all pitfalls and political undercurrents. However, the Kyrgyz 
representatives were often appointed for a short term, and in general 
there was a shortage of qualified staff to fill these positions. 
 
In a similar vein, Ashirov (Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012) further 
lamented that, when he was an Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to Turkmenistan, 
Saparmurat Niyazov promised Akayev to fulfil the domestic needs of Kyrgyzstan in 
oil and gas. However, there was no prompt Kyrgyz follow-up, and this promise 
became prolonged and then forgotten. 
 
In addition to the cadre problem, during the tenure of Otunbayeva there were some 
institutional challenges that further complicated the foreign policymaking 
procedures. The new Constitution of Kyrgyzstan of 2010 established the 
presidential-parliamentary form of governance and diffused foreign policymaking 
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authority between the president, the parliament, and the government. However, the 
mechanics of foreign policymaking remained unclear. For instance, the 
government of Kyrgyzstan is formed by a parliamentary majority, which is the 
coalition of factions. Accordingly, both the largest party in the parliament and the 
party with the prerogative to appoint the Minister of Foreign Affairs can propose the 
concept of foreign policy, but which one has the priority and needs to be chosen 
remains uncertain. Furthermore, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan 
Ednan Karabayev (2012) questions how the parliament should approve the cabinet 
of ministers in case there is a significant disjuncture between the foreign policy 
priorities of the parties, which comprise the parliamentary majority. The Article 88 
of the new Constitution only parsimoniously affirms that foreign policy and foreign 
economic activity of the country should be implemented by the Kyrgyz government. 
This situation may lead to a conundrum when the government is either 
unprofessional, but loyal to the party values, or professional, but distant from the 
party electoral theses for which the people have voted (Karabayev, 2012).  
 
Also, according to the new Constitution the speaker represents the parliament in 
Kyrgyzstan and outside its borders. However, Karabayev (2012) argues that the 
speaker cannot be responsible for the foreign policy of the country, because 
foreign policy falls within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, whereas the 
parliament is a legislative body. The president has the right to represent the 
country on international level, but the president should acquire prior consent of the 
Prime Minister to conduct negotiations or sign international treaties. In turn, the 
Prime Minister receives the permission to implement foreign policy of the country 
from the parliamentary majority, although the main mechanisms of foreign policy 
remain within the authority of the parliament, e.g. the ratification and denunciation 
of international treaties or the use of Kyrgyz armed forces outside the territory of 
the republic. As a result, such legislative nuances further dilute the already diluted 
Kyrgyz foreign policymaking. 
 
In general, a corrupt system of governance is a strong indicator that regime 
security and rent-seeking interests dominate the agenda of the ruling elites. Apart 
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from being the goal of the ruling elites, the acquisition and the redistribution of 
rents within such political systems also serves as a technique for the autocratic 
leaders to co-opt the non-ruling elites into their patron-client network in order to 
pre-empt inter-clan rivalry and mitigate domestic political instability. In fact, the 
presence of such a corrupt patron-client system on its own is a “smoking-gun” 
proof that personal interests of the ruling elites prevail over national interests, since 
foreign policy directives of the country are likely to be developed through the prism 
of regime security in the first instance. 
 
Kyrgyzstan’s history of independence was marked by a series of turbulent events 
and rapid developments, which failed to transform the republic into the flagman of 
democracy in the region. By the end of 2011, Kyrgyzstan represented a weak state 
vulnerable to systemic pressures and external influences. Furthermore, Akayev’s 
ineffective and corrupt governance led to the creation of a rent-seeking regime, 
which was further solidified by Bakiyev and remained unchallenged by 
Otunbayeva. The Kyrgyz foreign policymaking institutions also became ingrained in 
the rent-seeking schemes of the ruling elites. As a result, the meritocratic 
expectations of foreign service were substituted by unprofessional, mercantile and 
deferential values that rarely went beyond the commercial preferences of the 
powerful elites. 
 
Conclusion 
The retrospective scrutiny of the development of Kyrgyz foreign policy 
demonstrates that the general conception of the multivector orientation of the 
republic and its real implementation has not run in parallel. Kyrgyzstan is a weak 
state with low economic capacity, ineffective state institutions and growing external 
debt. The failure of the Western economic reforms and rapid impoverishment of the 
republic under Akayev predetermined the place of Kyrgyzstan in the regional 
geopolitical system of axes. Surrounded by powerful and ambitious neighbours, 
Kyrgyzstan was not in the position to develop strong foreign policy orientations. As 
a result, Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy was often erratic and fragmentary 
(Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
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interview, 23 December 2013). As Leonid Bondarets (n.d.) emphasised, “Today 
[Kyrgyz foreign policy] was oriented towards one side, tomorrow – towards 
another.” Instead of bridging the East and the West, Kyrgyzstan was fluctuating 
between the East and the West. Multivector approach of seeking support from 
different and often contradictory actors resembled international beggary. The 
prevailing political discourses attributed bandwagoning behaviour of Kyrgyzstan to 
systemic constraints, which runs in line with the reductionist and great power 
frameworks of analysis. Dependency of Kyrgyzstan on other actors was often 
justified by the idea that small and weak states are more prone to external 
influences, since even stronger and more powerful countries cannot always 
implement independent foreign policy (Beshimov, 2007; Karabayev, 2012; Ashirov, 
Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 29 October 2012).  
 
However, these developments were not only related to systemic weaknesses of 
the country, but were also rooted to the autocratic and rent-seeking regimes that 
flourished in the country. Accustomed to grants, loans and international financial 
aid, the priorities of the ruling governments have rarely gone beyond the 
commercial preferences of the ruling elites (Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). To justify 
opportunistic and mercantile deviations of the Kyrgyz foreign policy, the Kyrgyz 
leadership used official and unofficial foreign policy discourses. The concept of 
multivector foreign policy appeared to be a mere act of state performance aimed at 
reproducing the predominant order. As a result, Kyrgyzstan continued its 
fluctuations between different power poles notwithstanding the proclamations by 
Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev to bridge the East and the West and run a 
multifaceted foreign policy. Despite being a career diplomat, Roza Otunbayeva 
also had little opportunity and power to re-formulate the country’s foreign policy. 
Apart from a few cases when the Kyrgyz policymakers were guided by national 
interests, the leadership of Kyrgyzstan has mostly exploited the space for the so-
called foreign policy manoeuvring in its own mercantile and regime security 
interests.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Military Security and Foreign Policy 
 
Central Asia is one of those parts of the world that presents a variety of empirical 
puzzles to explore. One such conundrum is related to the nature of security 
institutions in the region. Why do security services in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
emphatically protect the ruling regimes from any political challenges and civil 
unrests? Why, on the contrary, are the security forces of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
unwilling to be bound to a particular regime? Why did the incorporation of security 
structures into the rent-seeking schemes in Kyrgyzstan fail to create a strong state 
security apparatus, like in Uzbekistan? In a similar vein, why has the fragmentation 
of the security services of Kyrgyzstan not led to civil war, as in Tajikistan? The 
multitude of questions reveals the complicated nature of the security landscape in 
the region. In this respect, this chapter on military security in Kyrgyzstan seeks not 
only to contribute to the understanding of foreign policies of weak states, but also 
to open the avenue for further research of political instability in weak and failed 
states.  
 
Since the first two chapters situated the argument of this thesis within broader 
debates of IR and political science, whilst Chapter III introduced Kyrgyzstan as an 
empirical referent, this chapter seeks to further explore the schism between the 
domestic and international dimensions of state and regime security in Kyrgyzstan. 
In particular, Chapter IV will test the hypothesis of this thesis vis-à-vis the politics of 
bandwagoning and state performance. Accordingly, the first section of this chapter 
will provide a retrospective overview of the development of the Kyrgyz army. The 
subsequent three parts will explore military cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Russia, 
China and the USA, within the frameworks of the CSTO, the SCO and the NATO 
respectively. The fifth section will scrutinise the role of Kyrgyzstan’s security 
structures and its military partners during the ethnic violence of June 2010 in the 
south of Kyrgyzstan. The last section will examine the role of Kyrgyz internal 
security forces in maintaining the primacy of regime security. In sum, this chapter 
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will reveal that the regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev performed the acts of virtual 
politics through the participation in regional military structures in order to 
accommodate the ambitions of regional hegemons and to sustain their own 
monopoly of violence within Kyrgyzstan. The outcomes of state dramaturgiia 
became evident during the tenure of Otunbayeva, when the Kyrgyz leadership 
found itself in a situation of international abandonment and when the new regime 
had to rely on the military structures it had no trust in. 
 
Kyrgyz Army at a Glance 
Despite the plethora of the Kyrgyz folklore about mighty heroes and valiant 
warriors, modern Kyrgyzstan is the least militarized state in Central Asia (Olcott, 
1996: 110). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the army of the Kyrgyz 
Republic has been in a permanent condition of turmoil and doom. Spending less 
than 1% of its GDP on defence, the leadership of Kyrgyzstan has always perceived 
the Kyrgyz army as a necessary attribute of statehood, but never beyond that 
conceptualization (Kamilov, 2005: 57). The modern Kyrgyz army and air force 
consists of 8,500 and 2,400 troops respectively, whilst Kyrgyz paramilitary amounts 
to 9,500 units (IISS, 2013: 223). The composition of the Kyrgyz army includes one 
Special Forces brigade, two motor rifle brigades, one mountain motor rifle brigade, 
one artillery brigade and one air defence brigade (IISS, 2013: 223). The air force 
consists of one regiment with L-39 Albatros, one aviation regiment with MiG-21 
Fishbed, An-2 Colt and An-26 Curl, one regiment with Mi-24 Hind and Mi-8 Hip, 
and few regiments with S-125 Pechora and S-75 Dvina (IISS, 2013: 223). 
Paramilitary includes 5,000 border guards, 3,500 interior troops and 1,000 national 
guards (IISS, 2013: 223). 
 
The core of the Kyrgyz army originates from the forces of the former Turkestan 
military district, which was dissolved after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On 
June 1, 1992, when the Kremlin discontinued financial support to the CIS troops, 
the Kyrgyz leadership announced the nationalisation of all serving personnel and 
military hardware located on the Kyrgyz territory (Olcott, 1996: 110). Major-General 
Dzhanybek Umetaliyev, the head of the newly established Defence State 
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Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, took under his jurisdiction the residuary forces 
of the Turkestan Military District. In 1993, the Defence State Committee has been 
transformed into the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic. Initially, nearly 
15,000 soldiers were serving in the Kyrgyz army in the early 1990s (Olcott, 1996: 
110). However, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the military 
personnel of Russian ethnicity began to repatriate to Russia (Olcott, 1996: 110). In 
turn, nearly 2,000 Kyrgyz officers returned to Kyrgyzstan (Olcott, 1996: 111). 
 
From the very first days of independence, president Akayev has been promoting 
multivector tilt of the Kyrgyz foreign policy, claiming Kyrgyzstan had no external 
state enemies. Due to this political course and poor military capacity of the republic 
the use of military power has never been on the agenda of the Kyrgyz government 
as a means to achieve foreign policy goals (Anonymous, Former Officer of the 
Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 14 December 2013). 
Furthermore, during the August putsch of 1991, prior to the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, president Akayev openly condemned the actions of the State Committee on 
the State of Emergency (GKChP). On the contrary, the military elites of Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan sympathised to the goals of the putschists. Asankulov, the head of the 
Kyrgyz KGB at that time, advised Akayev and his Minister of Interior Affairs Felix 
Kulov of possible repercussions if they would not support GKChP, whilst military 
helicopters repeatedly simulated the missile attacks of the presidential palace 
(Klimentov, 2000). In turn, the Ministry of Interior Affairs blocked the military 
cantonments and KGB offices (Klimentov, 2000). Only when the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs of Soviet Kyrgyzstan fully expressed its support to Akayev, the defence 
establishment acquiesced with Akayev’s pro-independence inclinations (Marcus, 
2002: 125-126). Although this evidence on its own is a “straw-in-the-wind”, it still 
acts as a promising lead to understand Akayev’s decision-making rationale.  
 
Thus, when Kyrgyzstan proclaimed its independence, Akayev was reluctant to rely 
on military elites (Marcus, 2002). Akayev claimed that newly established 
Kyrgyzstan had no external enemies to have a strong military, whilst in reality the 
president was more concerned with the anti-independence sentiments within the 
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Ministry of Defence (Marcus, 2002:  126). As a result, the allocated budget for the 
ministry was scarce, whilst all military equipment was the Soviet remnants 
(Marcus, 2002: 126). In 1997, Akayev further cut the number of military personnel 
to retain only a symbolic number of the National Guards (Marat, 2010: 70).  
 
From its inception the Ministry of Defence was itself constantly at centre of various 
resonant corruption scandals, mostly related to the sale of valuable equipment and 
hardware, such as the offloading of the majority of Kyrgyz MI-24 helicopters to 
China (Marcus, 2002: 126). The reputation of the army was low as well. Small 
wages of the military personnel along with the persistent problems of hazing in the 
army transformed the service in the Kyrgyz armed forces from prestigious to 
completely unattractive. The military service became the fate of the rural youth, 
who could not afford to go to the university with the military classes or were unable 
to bribe off the defence officials. In addition to low morale in the army, the level of 
the combat training was also extremely poor, which was resultant mostly from the 
insufficient funding. The army leadership suffered from the lack of the competent 
and professional cadres. Promotions of the military personnel were often 
conducted on the basis of loyalty and clan attribution, producing a cohort of 
“ceremonial queens” who had diverse ranks and privileges, but no field expertise.  
 
The repercussions of Akayev’s military reforms became apparent when the 
extremists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) invaded the south of the 
republic in August 1999 and 2000. Several hundred guerrillas of the Namangani 
group wreaked havoc in the Batken region, terrorizing the locals and taking 
hostages, amongst which were Japanese geologists and high-ranking Kyrgyz 
officials. Former Officer of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(interview, 14 December 2013) stated that most likely the number of the 
Namangani guerrillas has not exceeded 60-70 units and was deliberately 
exaggerated by the Ministry of Defence to hide the doomed situation in the Kyrgyz 
armed forces. In total, nearly 60 people died from the Kyrgyz side during the 
clashes with the IMU guerrillas in 1999 and 2000. The Batken events exposed 
serious problems that existed in the military and security structures of Kyrgyzstan, 
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especially the lack of field training and necessary munitions. Most of the Kyrgyz 
military officers had Soviet training based on the World War II scenarios and knew 
how to operate an infantry platoon or a tank company on the plains or in the 
forests, but had no expertise of dealing with mobile groups of enemies in the 
mountainous areas (Anonymous, Former Officer of the Ministry of Defence of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 14 December 2013). Philipp Shishkin (2013:18) 
stresses the poor condition of the Kyrgyz army by quoting a Kyrgyz soldier, whose 
battalion had a mission to pursue the Islamic extremists, “[We] spent half a day 
chasing after mountain goat, and finally we bagged three of them. We ate them 
immediately.” Former Officer of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(interview, 14 December 2013) himself recalled that they had no means of 
communication on the ground and had to risk their lives for the salary of 30 USD 
per month. However, not only were the Ministry of Defence, the Border Guards and 
the Ministry of Interior Affairs unprepared to repel the extremist incursions, but 
Akayev and his government under Amangeldy Muraliyev also demonstrated short-
sightedness and incompetence in dealing with Namangani’s guerrillas and 
negotiating the release of hostages. For instance, during the first Islamist incursion 
Akayev remained on holiday leave at his Cholpon-Ata resort residence, whilst his 
government had to pay 50,000 USD to the guerrillas to release four local hostages 
(Omuraliev and Elebayeva, 2000). To release four Japanese geologists, members 
of the Parliament, Tursunbai Bakir Uulu and Bayaman Erkinbayev, personally 
visited Hait village in Tajikistan to meet Juma Namangani and purportedly deliver 
him the ransom (Amin, 2012).36  
 
The Batken crisis has led Akayev to reconsider his perceptions of the role of the 
army in national and regime security. As Erica Marat (2010) emphasises, after the 
Batken events Akayev has significantly increased the financing of state defence, 
enlarging the troops and revisiting “his cadre politics”. The military budget was 
increased from 14 million USD in 1999 to 24 million USD in 2000 and to 30 million 
36 According to Western diplomats, the Japanese government secretly transferred two to six millions 
USD to the Kyrgyz officials to release its citizens (Rashid, 2002). Tursunbai Bakir Uulu, however, 
asserted that the Tajik and Kyrgyz officials have produced a fake footage of the hostage release to 
the Japanese government and have split between themselves a 3 million USD ransom received 
from the Japanese ambassador (Ozodagon, 2013). 
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in 2001 (Marcus, 2002: 127). The Security Council of Kyrgyzstan has also adopted 
the Kyrgyz military doctrine endorsed in May 2002 (Ministry of Defence, n.d.). 
Before that doctrine, the Ministry of Defence was guided by the National Security 
Strategy document, which copied the Soviet understanding of security threats and 
military strategy (Marat, 2010: 70). The new doctrine of 2002 aimed at reforming 
the Kyrgyz army and creating small mobile units based on the contractual 
conscriptions (Ministry of Defense, n.d.). The proposed reforms also included the 
creation of Border Guard Forces, Rapid Reaction Forces and Immediate Reaction 
Forces (Marat, 2010: 71). The doctrine sought to establish a better control of 
military spending and administration and outlined that external financing should be 
pursued via bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Marat, 2010: 71). Both the NATO 
and the CSTO were perceived as favoured platforms for the collaboration (Marat, 
2010: 71). The new doctrine, however, had rather envisaged a document that 
loosely outlined the rationale of the army and military planning (Marat, 2010: 71). 
The doctrine had a declarative nature without determining the directions of the 
military development and the mechanisms of military policy realization (Kamilov, 
2005: 57). The reforms have been widely criticized, whilst most military decision-
making was executed on an ad hoc basis (Marat, 2010: 71).  
 
The March revolution of 2005 and the ousting of Akayev appeared to be a 
promising momentum to change the prevailing dynamics within the Ministry of 
Defence. Bakiyev appointed Ismail Isakov as the Minister of Defence to augment 
the internal morale of the army (Marat, 2010: 72). Isakov was an outspoken critic of 
Akayev, his military reforms and the actions of the army leadership during the 
Batken events. Portraying himself as a champion of people’s interests, Isakov has 
prioritized the solution of social problems in the army. For the first time in the 
history of Kyrgyzstan, the Ministry of Defence began the construction of housing for 
the military personnel, and already in the period from 2005 to 2007 nearly 140 
officers moved into new homes (Mikhailov, 2010). The period of conscription was 
also shortened from 18 to 12 months, whilst the draftees could have undergone an 
alternative two-year service. In addition, in 2006, Air Defence Forces have been 
established in the country, along with the introduction of the Kyrgyz language into 
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the clerical work of the Ministry. However, Bakiyev continued to reshuffle his 
cabinet of ministers, as president’s popularity was steadily falling. Bakiyev 
dismissed Isakov from the ministerial position, but appointed him as the Secretary 
of the Security Council to prevent the authoritative general from joining the 
opposition. Isakov’s successor Bakytbek Kalyev has switched the social focus of 
the military reforms to the actual combat readiness. The focus of the ministry was 
again on the contractual conscriptions, the creation of mobile units and the 
establishment of a new centre to combat terrorism and illegal armed groupings. 
Also, in 2008 the Kyrgyz Parliament began to develop a new draft of the military 
doctrine. Nonetheless, the appointment of Kalyev was rather related to a difficult 
political situation in the country. The increasing grievances within the society and 
the strengthening of the political opposition forced Bakiyev to appoint most loyal to 
his regime to the key governmental positions, such as Kalyev to the Ministry of 
Defence or Janysh Bakiyev, his younger brother, as the Head of the State Security 
Service. The reshuffling of the security cadres has not prevented the unification of 
the opposition and the popular uprising against the authoritarian rule of Bakiyev in 
April 2010.  
 
Ironically, Interim President Otunbayeva occupied the building of the Ministry of 
Defence as her temporary residence during the April events of 2010. However, 
under Otunbayeva there were no significant strategic changes within the Ministry of 
Defence, apart from the delegation of some functions of the dissolved State 
Security Service to the Ministry of Defence. The ousting of Bakiyev has led to 
several resonant legal cases against his entourage, including a few high ranking 
officials in the Ministry of Defence. However, the new Ministry of Defence and 
Isakov, the then-acting Minister of Defence at the post-revolutionary Interim 
Government, became themselves the focus of different investigations. In the 
aftermath of the Bakiyev flight, the clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic 
Uzbeks broke out in Osh and Jalal-Abad on June 10, 2010. Four days of violence 
in the south of Kyrgyzstan left nearly 420 dead and thousands injured and 
displaced. Several national and international investigations, including the Kyrgyz 
Inquiry Commission (KIC) led by Kimmo Kiljunen of the OSCE Parliamentary 
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Assembly, attempted to establish the causes and chronology of events, whilst 
determining responsibilities and proposing recommendations on conflict 
prevention, reconciliation and accountability.37 The Ministry of Defence was one of 
the most exposed to the criticisms and public scrutiny. The army troops not only 
lacked sufficient equipment, but also necessary training to use non-lethal force in 
situations of violent civil disorder as prescribed by the State of Emergency Organic 
Act 2003 (KIC, 2011). It appeared that the Ministry of Defence was more 
preoccupied with the possible involvement of Uzbekistan in the conflict than with 
the prevention of mass unrest by all available means (KIC, 2011). Disturbing 
example of the Kyrgyz military unprofessionalism was the loss of military weapons, 
equipment and ammunition, including the surrender of armoured personnel 
carriers, some of which were later used by the mobs to break the barricades of the 
Uzbek mahallas. In addition, apart from the failure to intervene, some members of 
the army were accused of being directly involved in the attacks on Uzbek 
households (KIC, 2011). Accordingly, these accusations found no support amongst 
the ruling elites in Kyrgyzstan and were dismissed as groundless or biased. 
 
In sum, from the onset of independence the Kyrgyz military was weak, poorly 
equipped and with low fighting capabilities. The army structure resembled its 
Soviet prototype, whilst its operative and fighting capacities were considerably low 
due to insufficient funding (Kamilov, 2005: 57-58). Since the collapse of the USSR, 
Kyrgyzstan had no financial resources to update its armament. As a result, nearly 
50% of its military-technical equipment has become unusable (Kamilov, 2005: 57). 
The problems in the Kyrgyz military sector have been further exacerbated by the 
planned budget sequestration of 2012 (IISS, 2013). Kyrgyzstan with its core 
defence budget of 40 million USD depends mainly on foreign military donations 
37 For instance, see Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission (2011) Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010; Amnesty International 
(2012) Kyrgyzstan: Dereliction of Duty, London: Amnesty International Publications; Human Rights 
Watch (2010) “Where Is the Justice?”: Interethnic Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan and Its 
Aftermath. USA: Human Rights Watch; International Crisis Group (2012) Kyrgyzstan: Widening 
Ethnic Divisions in the South. Asia Report No 222, 29 March; International Federation for Human 
Rights (2010) Kyrgyzstan: A Weak State, Political Instability: The Civil Society Caught Up In the 
Turmoil. Melvin, N. (2011) Promoting a Stable and Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes 
and Legacies of Violence. Occasional Paper Series No. 3, New York: Open Society Foundations; 
National Commission of Inquiry. 
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and credits, but even targeted foreign aid and international security support 
programmes failed to improve the country’s armed forces and tackle its perennial 
problems, such as endemic corruption, defence planning and unit cohesion (IISS, 
2013: 212). In addition, in the early 1990s Akayev identified the military forces as a 
potential challenger to his authority, but throughout his rule Akayev’s perception 
evolved to understand the army more as a symbolic attribute of statehood. Akayev 
exploited the participation of Kyrgyzstan in regional security structures as the 
showcase of his allegiance to certain players in order to gain favourable 
predispositions. However, during the Batken events of 1999 the ruling elites found 
themselves in a situation, where national security and integrity of the country have 
become incremental to their grip on power. Being incapable of repelling the 
extremist incursion, Akayev’s government went as far as paying off the Namangani 
extremists with hope that the IMU Islamists would continue its march to Uzbekistan 
without any prolonged stays in Kyrgyzstan. Nonetheless, even after the second 
invasion of the extremists to Batken in 2000 the Kyrgyz leadership has been 
confident of the absence of threats to the Kyrgyz statehood from beyond. In a 
similar vein, Bakiyev’s engagement with regional military structures resembled an 
attempt to perform virtual politics in order to sustain his monopoly of violence within 
the state. The empirical evidence demonstrated that neither the national army nor 
the forces of the CSTO, the SCO or the NATO were ready to protect the integrity of 
the republic during the Batken events or the established governing arrangements 
during the March events of 2005 and the April events of 2010. In this respect, the 
ethnic violence of June 2010 served as the vivid example of the non-committal 
nature of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements.  
 
Russia and the CSTO 
Military cooperation with the Central Asian states was important for Moscow to 
ensure its leading role in the region amidst the growing presence of other actors in 
the area. The empirical evidence demonstrated that in reality however neither 
Russia nor Russian-led military institutions were willing and capable of defending 
the integrity of Kyrgyzstan despite the Russian reassurance to protect the Kyrgyz 
republic against external extremist threats. Nonetheless, for the Kyrgyz ruling 
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elites, bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with Russia was an opportunity 
to accommodate the ambitions of the regional hegemon in order to mitigate any 
challenges to their rule by Moscow. Participation in the CSTO treaties and military 
drills appeared to be the acts of dramaturgiia performed by the Kyrgyz leaders to 
express their virtual allegiance to the Kremlin. The Kyrgyz leaders have learned to 
play on the Russian sentiments of great empire to foster their own legitimacy and 
to project the symbols of Kyrgyzstan’s statehood, sovereignty and independence 
within and beyond. 
 
Russia has always been perceived as the most natural and reliable guarantor of 
security in Central Asia. As part of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan partook in the 
defeat of fascism during World War II and jointly, with other fourteen socialist 
republics, lost the Cold War to the USA. Respectively, the general security 
discourses of the early 1990s in Kyrgyzstan were sympathetic to the alliance with 
Russia. At that time the Kyrgyz generalship believed that Russia was the only real 
military partner of Kyrgyzstan, whereas the North Atlantic counterparts were 
feeding “the fairytales” to Kyrgyz leadership to further disintegrate the remnants of 
the Soviet Union (Anonymous, Lieutenant Colonel of the Ministry of Defence of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 16 December 2013). As former officer of the Ministry of 
Defence of Kyrgyzstan Taalaibek Usubaliyev (Former Representative of 
Kyrgyzstan to NATO, interview, 18 December 2013) emphasised, participation of 
Kyrgyzstan in the Russian-led collective security system was important for national 
security of the republic, since the Soviet Union has no longer existed. 
 
Indeed, in contrast to economic assistance, Moscow had more to offer to 
Kyrgyzstan in the field of security and military cooperation. Although the Kremlin 
was reluctant to send its troops for service to Central Asia, Russia remained the 
key supplier of weaponry and hardware to Kyrgyzstan (Marcus, 2002: 135). The 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) appeared to be the most 
favourable platform for the military cooperation with Russia. Out of all diverse 
efforts in the post-Soviet space to create a collective security system, the CSTO 
was the only integrating structure with a precise military dimension (Rozanov and 
151 
 
Dovgan, 2010). The CSTO started as the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Initially, the CST was signed on May 
15, 1992, by Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Armenia 
with the idea that “[i]f one of the Member States undergoes aggression (armed 
attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty), it will be 
considered by the Member States as aggression … to all the Member States of this 
Treaty” (CST, 1992). Later Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, 
which came into effect in 1994. In 1999, only six member-states signed an 
extension of the CST protocol, since Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan 
preferred to join the GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic 
Development instead.  
 
The Batken events, however, served as “smoking-gun” evidence, which underlined 
that the CST rather resembled a symbolic organization, whose mission was to 
further facilitate “a civil divorce” of the former Soviet member-states. Its collective 
security system proved to be ineffective, whereas Article 4, which ensured 
collective security against external threats, has never been exercised (Anonymous, 
Former Officer of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 14 
December 2013). To initiate a military action there was a need for the approval of 
such action by all member-states, which could not happen quickly due to 
institutional problems of the CST and internal political bargaining processes 
(Yalovkina, 2013). As Toktogul Kakchekeyev emphasized, all member-states 
deliberately agreed to create a series of institutional mechanisms to limit the 
possibility of the interference of this regional organization into domestic affairs of 
each member-state, when the CST was signed (Shuvalov, 2013). Thus, at that 
time, the Russian-led institution was not considered seriously as a strong and 
effective regional security structure by the Central Asian military elites 
(Anonymous, Former Officer of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 14 December 2013). 
 
Accordingly, reassessing the CST failures in Batken at the Minsk session of 2000, 
the CST member-states adopted a broader package of documents and decisions 
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to ensure that there were practical mechanisms of providing timely support to the 
member-states in crisis situations (Rozanov and Dovgan, 2010: 10-11). The 
creation of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) was one of those 
practical steps agreed by the member-states at the Bishkek meeting in October 
2000, whereas this decision was finalised at the Yerevan meeting in 2001 
(Rozanov and Dovgan, 2010). The CRDF consisted of 1,500 personnel, including 
Russian tactical and communications battalions, a Tajik assault battalion, a Kyrgyz 
infantry battalion and a Kazakh attack battalion, and its main purpose was to ward 
off external extremist aggression (Rozanov and Dovgan, 2010: 13; Tolipov, 2009). 
By 2005, the CRDF consisted of 4,000 personnel and 10 battalions, ready to be 
mobilized by the first call of the CSTO leadership (CSTO, 2005). The incursion of 
the Islamists also encouraged Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to 
offer units for the joint command-and-staff exercise CIS Southern Shield-99 and 
CIS Southern Shield-2000 (Allison, 2001: 228). These exercises were one of the 
largest held in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as they involved 
combat training and interaction of armed forces, border guards, interior troops and 
security services (Allison, 2001: 228).  
 
On October 7, 2002, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus and 
Armenia transformed the CST into the CSTO. The goal of the CSTO was “to 
continue and increase the close and all-round allied relations in foreign policy, 
military and technical areas, as well as in the sphere of counteraction to the 
transnational challenges and menaces to the safety of states and peoples” 
(Charter of the CSTO, 2002). On June 23, 2005, at the Moscow session, the 
presidents of the CSTO member-states endorsed the Plan for Coalition Military 
Formation and the agreements on intergovernmental cooperation and development 
of collective security system (CSTO, n.d.; Rozanov and Dovgan, 2010: 16). The 
presidents also agreed to transfer the Interstate Commission of Military-Economic 
Cooperation into the CSTO framework (CSTO, n.d.; Rozanov and Dovgan, 2010: 
16). In June 2007, Kyrgyzstan assumed the rotating presidency at the CSTO. On 
October 6, 2007, the leaders of the CSTO decided to create joint peacekeeping 
forces at the CSTO Dushanbe session. The member-states agreed to collectively 
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deploy military, police or civilian personnel to prevent or terminate military actions 
within or between the states in case of a third party intervention (Rozanov and 
Dovgan, 2010: 61). At the same session in Dushanbe, the leaders of the CSTO 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the SCO, which outlined avenues of 
security cooperation between two organisations. Moreover, on February 4, 2009, 
the presidents of the CSTO member-states agreed to create Collective Rapid 
Reaction Forces (CRRF), the purpose of which was to repel military aggressions 
against the CSTO member-states and combat terrorism, drug trafficking and 
transnational organised crime (CSTO, n.d.). The CRRF were divided into two 
components – contingents of mobile armed forces and contingents of special 
purpose forces – and amounted to nearly 18,000 personnel in total (Rozanov and 
Dovgan, 2010: 62). 
 
Nonetheless, despite the reassuring rhetoric the CST organisation continued to 
represent a mere artefact of the Cold War. The restructuring or rather the renaming 
of the organisation from the CST into the CSTO had little impact on the real 
provision of security to its member-states. The CSTO’s pledge of collective security 
resembled a self-complacent mythical vow directed at bolstering legitimacy of the 
ruling regimes of the CSTO countries within and beyond their borders. Based on 
the Warsaw Pact, the CSTO was not initially equipped to deal with the threats, 
such as Islamic radicalism, and represented more a geopolitical organisation 
aimed at demonstrating Russian ambitions and power. The vantage of the large 
command-and-staff exercises was very questionable, since there was little utility of 
the dinosaurian military drills with the use of heavy artillery in the context of the 
newly emerging threats in Central Asia. A small number of Kyrgyz soldiers and 
officers engaged in the CSTO military exercises also casted doubts on the 
importance of Kyrgyzstan in those trainings. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has 
delegated 30 soldiers to the CSTO’s 7000-soldier military exercise Interaction-
2009. The opening of a Russian military air base in Kant in 2003 was a significant 
breakthrough for the Kyrgyz-CSTO relations, especially taking into account that the 
Kant base has become the first Russian military installation abroad since the 
collapse of the USSR. The initial goal of the base was to support the CRDF of the 
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CSTO. However, the aircrafts and hardware transferred to Kant were not fully 
operational to provide necessary support to the CRDF (Anonymous, Lieutenant 
Colonel of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 16 December 
2013). The limited capacity of the Russian military weaponry reflected the general 
situation in the Russian armed forces. Equipped to engage in large-scale 
conventional battles, the Russian army turned out to be incapable of dealing 
successfully with the low-intensity conflicts that involved non-state actors, terrorist 
groups and partisan tactics like in Chechnya.  
 
However, from the onset of independence Kyrgyzstan remained committed to the 
Russian-led military frameworks. The Kyrgyz leadership has never distanced itself 
from the CSTO despite its apparent lack of effectiveness and structural flaws. 
Lieutenant Colonel of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic (interview, 16 
December 2013) argued that there were practical benefits for Kyrgyzstan from the 
CSTO memberships. The CSTO military drills and trainings were useful in 
enhancing knowledge, skills and expertise of the Kyrgyz officers and soldiers who 
had to maintain combat readiness (Anonymous, Lieutenant Colonel of the Ministry 
of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 16 December 2013). In addition, 
although there was no cash support from Russia, Moscow was willing to provide 
assistance in terms of hardware and qualification training to Kyrgyzstan 
(Anonymous, Former Officer of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 14 December 2013).  
 
Nonetheless, the real commitment of the Kyrgyz leadership to the CSTO can be 
explained through the acts of virtual politics. The “straw-in-the-wind” clues favour 
the hypothesis that regime security could have impacted Kyrgyzstan’s engagement 
with the Moscow-led military organisations. The CSTO and its drills resembled a 
multistage theatrical performance from Russia to persuade the Western audience 
of Russian omnipotence and from the CSTO member-states like Kyrgyzstan to 
demonstrate their bandwagoning attitudes to Russia. The latter performance has 
been conducted by the Central Asian states to minimise the engagement of 
powerful Russia into the domestic affairs of its neighbours.  
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 In addition, Russia was a convenient actor to play virtual politics with, since Russia 
with its concept of sovereign democracy was not demanding democratic 
transformations from Kyrgyzstan, unlike its Western counterparts. These 
arrangements explain why the Kyrgyz leadership used to send even a small 
contingent of forces to the joint military drills. The actual presence of the Kyrgyz 
troops at such events was more important than the quality of the delegation. Also, 
the engagement of Kyrgyzstan in military exercise accentuated Kyrgyzstan’s 
statehood and sovereignty, which were important for the projection of legitimacy of 
the Kyrgyz ruling regimes.  
 
Taking into account the relative weakness of Moscow in the period from the early 
1990s to the late 2000s, such acts of dramaturgiia were conducive to both virtual 
patron Russia and virtual client Kyrgyzstan. Diagnostic evidence suggests that 
Russia was wishing for leadership in Central Asia without any obligations, whilst 
Bishkek was wishing for Russian obligations without Russian leadership. In 
addition, circumstantial evidence indicates that neither Akayev nor Bakiyev should 
have expected Russia to protect their regimes. For instance, the Batken events 
exposed institutional flaws of the CSTO and the unwillingness of Kremlin to engage 
directly in the military conflicts in Central Asia. However, Akayev continued military 
cooperation within the framework of the CSTO despite its failure to ward off Islamic 
extremists. In a similar vein, Bakiyev should have realised that the CSTO would not 
interfere in Kyrgyzstan to protect Bakiyev’s regime based on the experience of 
Akayev. On the contrary, there were more chances that the CSTO would support 
the opposition leaders after the Kremlin’s expression of the vote of no confidence 
to Bakiyev and his family ruling in late 2009.38 In turn, Kyrgyzstan’s call for the 
Russian military engagement in June 2010 was rather an act of despair and 
powerlessness by Otunbayeva’s government to stop the violence in the south of 
Kyrgyzstan, which also failed to translate into concrete actions from Russia. 
38 In the alleged phone conversation between Maksim and Janysh Bakiyev, secretly recorded by 
unknown intelligence services after the April events of 2010, two powerful relatives of the ousted 
president discussed the scenario of potential Russian interference to protect the Interim 
Government in case of counterrevolution. 
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Practically, military cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Russia did not represent the 
classical patterns of weak states’ behaviour, because the rationale of Kyrgyzstan’s 
bandwagoning was attributed to the security of the ruling regimes. The “straw-in-
the-wind” clues indicate that the Kyrgyz leadership performed virtual politics and 
projected the symbols of statehood to ensure the accommodation of Russian 
ambitions whilst protecting its own interests.  
 
China and the SCO  
Since the general discourse of the Kyrgyz leadership towards China was more of a 
caution and fear, Kyrgyzstan preferred to develop military relations with Beijing via 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Such arrangements provided some 
sort of leverage to the Kyrgyz ruling elites over powerful neighbour, because the 
engagement of Russia ensured that China would need to deal with Moscow in 
case Beijing decides to expand its presence in Central Asia. In addition, the 
ambitions of Russia were also accommodated within this framework. Thus, 
Bishkek was willing to extend its politics of state performance to China akin to its 
military cooperation with Russia. 
 
The SCO was initially established in 1996 as the Shanghai Five to set the 
framework for strategic cooperation on matters related to security on border 
regions between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and China. In 2001, 
the leaders of these states decided to reformulate the goals of the organization and 
expand its scope of activities to include political, economic and military 
cooperation. Uzbekistan also agreed to join this club, and on June 15, 2001, the 
SCO was created. As a result, the Kyrgyz leadership received another 
reassurance, now from China, against external extremist threats, which was yet to 
be tested.   
 
Nonetheless, China began to provide military assistance to Kyrgyzstan, although 
not as part of the SCO, but rather on ad hoc bilateral basis (Allison, 2004: 479). For 
instance, after the incursions of the extremists to Kyrgyzstan, China provided 
600,000 USD worth of aid, such as tents and military gear to the Kyrgyz Republic 
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(Marcus, 2002: 135). In 2004, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was 
established as the permanent entity of the SCO. The objective of the RATS was to 
promote further cooperation between the member-states to fight extremism, 
terrorism and separatism (Lukin and Mochulskyi, 2005: 20). In August 2005, 
Kyrgyzstan participated as an observer in Peace Mission 2005, a joint counter-
terrorism military exercise between Russia and China, which involved nearly 
10,000 troops and heavy firepower. In August 2007, Kyrgyzstan became involved 
as a full-fledged participant in Peace Mission 2007, which was conducted under 
the aegis of the SCO. In March 2006, Kyrgyzstan participated in a joint anti-terror 
exercise of the SCO in Uzbekistan, whilst in May 2007 Kyrgyzstan hosted the SCO 
military exercise Issyk-Kul Antiterror 2007 (De Haas, 2007: 12). There were similar 
war games in 2009 and 2010, which involved several thousand troops, heavy 
infantry and air forces of the SCO member-states, but mostly those of Russia and 
China. In addition, at the Moscow session of 2002, the leaders of the CSTO 
expressed their readiness to collaborate with the SCO, and in October 2007 the 
SCO and the CSTO signed an agreement on security cooperation. 
 
Although the goal of the organisation was to strengthen “good-neighbourly” 
relations between the member-states and maintain stability in the region, the SCO 
was immediately regarded by many analysts and policymakers as a potential 
balancing instrument of Russia and China to counter the American engagement in 
Central Asia. Yet, to date, this view of the SCO has not materialized. The 
organisation with the budget of 4 million USD was perceived just a little more 
powerful than a discussion forum (Olcott, 2006; Bykov, 2011). Military cooperation 
within the framework of the SCO also hardly moved beyond political discourses 
and non-lethal military assistance. Despite its potential the military component of 
the SCO cooperation remained least developed. The aid was delivered mostly on 
bilateral basis, whilst the quantity and quality of information about external threats 
shared by the Russian and Chinese counterparts was of limited nature 
(Anonymous, Lieutenant Colonel of the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 16 December 2013). Beijing remained reluctant to get involved directly in 
the security matters of Central Asia, notwithstanding its concerns with Islamic 
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separatists in Xingjian. In addition, it was unclear whether the SCO could 
guarantee a security shield against the newly emerging threats in the region.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the lack of significant material benefits to the country from the 
SCO membership Kyrgyzstan remained a full-fledged member of the organisation. 
As in the case of Kyrgyzstan’s engagement with the CSTO, “straw-in-the-wind” 
evidence suggests that Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the SCO can be explained 
through the prism of virtual politics. On one hand, such attributes as symbolic 
engagement of Kyrgyzstan in the war games or its insignificant contributions to the 
SCO budget resemble the state performances conducted by the Kyrgyz leadership 
to display the solvency of the republic. On the other hand, these developments 
also demonstrate the willingness of the Kyrgyz ruling elites to showcase their 
bandwagoning attitudes towards greater neighbours in order to turn such 
deferential positions into political currency. As Allison (2008b) emphasised, virtual 
regionalism was not about tangible achievements, but about reinforcing domestic 
regime security. Respectively, the SCO was a convenient structure for the Kyrgyz 
leadership to protect domestic governing arrangements by accommodating the 
ambitions of both Russia and China within one framework. Neither Russia nor 
China were interested in the radicalization of Central Asia and thus were willing to 
cooperate, even at the expense of their own strategic interests. In addition, whilst 
sharing the burden of security risks in the region, both Russia and China were not 
demanding democratic transformations from Kyrgyzstan, which was also 
conducive to the Kyrgyz acts of dramaturgiia. Alliance with autocratic neighbours 
decreased some pressures from Kyrgyz autocratic presidents, since the 
membership in the SCO provided certain legitimacy by association. 
 
The USA and the NATO 
After being quite openly pushed away by Moscow in the early 1990s, the Kyrgyz 
leadership perceived the Western countries as the promising avenue for potential 
military cooperation. The US-led NATO bloc was more experienced in addressing 
the new emerging threats and was better equipped to engage in low-intensity 
conflicts. In addition, the rapprochement with the West seemed to be beneficial for 
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the Kyrgyz ruling regimes in terms of the financial package and political agenda. 
Although the Kyrgyz leaders were reluctant to be bound to any new big brother, 
they were willing to play the democratic card to produce beneficial outcomes 
(Olcott, 1996; Lewis, 2008). 
 
In comparison to the activities of the CSTO and the SCO, military cooperation of 
Kyrgyzstan with the USA was not as plentiful. Kyrgyzstan started the dialogue with 
the NATO in 1992 within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 
later renamed to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (NATO, 2012). In 1994 
Kyrgyzstan joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, aimed at 
developing a partnership between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and the NATO 
in the military sphere according to the needs of the PfP participants (NATO, 2012). 
In 2007 Kyrgyzstan joined the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), the 
NATO mechanism to assess the conditions and capabilities of the partner forces 
for their improvement and transformation (NATO, 2012). Nonetheless, initially there 
were no significant achievements within the NATO line. The leadership of 
Kyrgyzstan was wary of military cooperation with the NATO and thus was reluctant 
to fully commit to the PfP programme (Anonymous, Lieutenant Colonel of the 
Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 16 December 2013). For 
instance, Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the NATO Chinghiz Aitmatov had to call 
Bakiyev several times to explain all advantages of the PARP, including additional 
financing, before the president eventually signed the agreement (Ormonbekov, 
Former Attaché at the Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Kingdom of Belgium, 
Mission to the EU and NATO, interview, 5 December 2012). 
 
Such actions of the Kyrgyz leadership could be explained both through the model 
of virtual politics and the American interest in Central Asia. Bishkek was 
intentionally stalling any advancement within this framework, whilst, for instance, 
Kazakhstan was actively exploring military cooperation with the NATO. 
Kyrgyzstan’s cautious position towards the NATO was often justified by Moscow’s 
irritation of the NATO enlargement (Anonymous, Former Officer of the Ministry of 
Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 14 December 2013). In reality, 
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however, this occurrence was related to the willingness of the Kyrgyz leadership to 
express its virtual allegiance to the Kremlin, especially since there were no tangible 
benefits from the NATO cooperation. PfP membership did not provide security 
guarantees, and thus would not address significant external challenges to the 
security of its participating members, unlike the NATO membership (Jonson and 
Allison, 2001). The functions of the PfP programme were those of education, 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy and political consultation without any 
mechanisms of responding to violent conflicts (Jonson and Allison, 2001; Allison, 
2001: 231). Despite its encouragement to create joint Central Asian battalion 
Centrasbat, the North Atlantic bloc remained uncertain about the practical 
assistance to the Central Asian states against the low-intensity threats (Allison, 
2001: 232). In addition, the NATO member-states were reluctant to provide lethal 
weaponry to Kyrgyzstan, which the Kyrgyz leadership would have welcomed. For 
instance, following the IMU incursions Turkey and Germany provided aid to 
Kyrgyzstan to mitigate the repercussions of the conflict, which was expressed in 
the form of nonlethal support and included weather gear and military training 
(Marcus, 2002: 136).   
 
However, the events of 9/11 provided an opportunity for the Kyrgyz leadership to 
bring the Kyrgyz-American security relations on to a qualitatively new level. Akayev 
utilized the American unipolar moment to develop closer ties with Washington 
without damaging its relationships with Moscow and Beijing. In December 2001 
Kyrgyzstan’s civilian Manas International Airport opened its runways to the 
American aircrafts as part of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan. The Manas air base would become the focal point of the Kyrgyz-
American cooperation throughout the governance of Bakiyev and Otunbayeva as 
well. The U.S. air base brought sizeable benefits to Akayev, as his inner circle 
managed to capture lucrative fuel supplies. The contribution to the US-led war 
against terrorism in Afghanistan also yielded American support to autocratic 
Akayev. Nonetheless, despite hosting coalition forces in Kyrgyzstan, Akayev still 
had to perform virtual politics to sustain his unpopular regime and attract 
international funding. Being portrayed as a reformist and a progressive liberal in 
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the West, Akayev camouflaged his regime security goals through the promotion of 
democratic governance and market-based economy.39 In addition, the SCO was 
perceived more as a union of non-democratic countries, whilst the CSTO was 
regarded as an offspring of the Cold War. Respectively, closer cooperation with the 
NATO via the support of the US-led war against terrorism implied association of 
Akayev’s regime with more advanced democratic states. 
 
In a similar vein, Bakiyev exploited the American air base for his personal 
enrichment and to widen the financial channels to impoverished Kyrgyzstan. 
However, unlike Akayev, Bakiyev was less proactive in simulating democratic 
changes to boost his claims for legitimacy. Instead, Bakiyev’s discourses gravitated 
more towards Russia and the CSTO. As a result, by playing his pro-Russian card, 
Bakiyev managed not only to increase significantly the annual rent for the air base, 
but also to capture the Pentagon’s lucrative fuel contracts. The U.S. Department of 
Defence was keen to save its key logistic hub in Central Asia to the extent that 
Washington turned a blind eye on opaque fuel practices at the base. The 
Pentagon’s position was that any misappropriation of funds by the Kyrgyz 
leadership was not in the American jurisdiction. Interim President Roza 
Otunbayeva would complain later that during Bakiyev’s reign American 
Ambassador Tatiana Gfoeller downplayed human rights violations in Kyrgyzstan, 
avoided meetings with the opposition and coddled with Bakiyev and his son to 
save the air base. Despite those criticisms the Manas air base remained the 
narrow focus of the American security agenda in Kyrgyzstan during the tenure of 
Otunbayeva, which was evident during the June events of 2010. 
 
In sum, the Kyrgyz-American military cooperation was limited to the Manas air 
base as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Neither Bishkek nor 
Washington was interested in expanding their relations within the programme 
initiatives of the NATO such as PfP. Although the Kyrgyz leadership mimicked 
democratic reforms to the Western audience, this virtual politics have been 
39 However, Ashirov (Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
interview, 29 October 2012) suggested that early Akayev was different, as he did believe in 
democracy and the idea of building a new state based on the democratic principles. 
162 
 
                                                          
conducted by the ruling elites in Kyrgyzstan on a permanent basis and without any 
particular ties to military and security agenda.  
 
Ethnic Violence in the South of Kyrgyzstan 
The ethnic violence of June 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan serves as an infamous 
empirical referent to examine the weaknesses of the concept of an external 
security shield. None of the security structures and military partners was willing to 
interfere in Kyrgyzstan to stop the bloodshed between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks. 
Otunbayeva’s government found itself in a situation of remarkable international 
abandonment. Even the Kremlin preferred to remain non-committal despite the 
prevailing claims that Kyrgyzstan was the Russian dominion. In turn, this 
occurrence proved that Kyrgyzstan was not a classic client state to Russia. In 
general, the June event of 2010 exposed that after nearly twenty years of 
practicing virtual politics the Kyrgyz leadership gained security guarantees from its 
partners, which were also virtual and did not translate into real currency.  
 
On June 10, 2010, a clash between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks near the local casino 
sparked mass rioting across the city of Osh. The police and local security forces 
were unable to disperse aggressive crowds of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, as the situation 
was escalating at alarmingly extraordinary speed. The rumours of the rape at the 
Kyrgyz dormitory by the Uzbek gangs fostered mobilisation of the rural Kyrgyz who 
began to advance towards Osh, whilst the Uzbeks began to barricade their 
mahallas. In a very short stint, the violence, arson and rape poured into the streets 
of Osh, as the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks crowds clashed. In few hours, the ethnic 
violence quickly spread across the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions. The government 
declared the state of emergency and issued a shoot-to-kill policy to hinder the 
violence. However, the situation stabilised only on June 14, with sporadic acts of 
violence continuing throughout the following days. As a result, this conflict left 
nearly 470 people dead and thousands injured and displaced. Dissecting the 
course of the June events, various national and international investigations 
revealed that structural and contextual variables created pre-conditions for the 
outbreak of violence and its further escalation in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Amongst 
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these causes were the complex relationships between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
communities as an echo of the early 1990s, the rise of ethno-nationalism, the 
political vacuum after the ousting of Bakiyev, the fragility of the state institutions 
and the weak rule of law, to name a few. Some investigations, including the 
conclusions of the Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission (KIC), stressed that the Interim 
Government was also responsible for the bloodshed, since the post-revolutionary 
leaders have been either preoccupied with power and asset re-division at the 
expense of inter-ethnic policy or have not adequately responded to the outburst of 
violence in the south.  
 
The June bloodshed posed a significant challenge not only to the governing 
arrangements of the ruling elites, but also to the integrity of the republic in general. 
Security shield, which Kyrgyz presidents have long sought from abroad, proved to 
be once again an elusive concept, effective mostly on paper. When the magnitude 
of the conflict escalated to the extreme, Otunbayeva decided to call for 
international intervention to stop the violence. Russia appeared to be the most 
natural partner to request humanitarian intervention.40 Otunbayeva spoke 
personally to both Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin urging them to initiate a 
peacekeeping operation to Kyrgyzstan. At that time, not only Kyrgyzstan, but the 
international community as well was expecting Russian interference (Matveeva, 
Former Head of the Research Secretariat of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, 
interview, 31 May 2013). In fact, there were no legal and logistical obstacles for the 
initiation of the Russian peacekeeping operation (Matveeva, 2011). Moscow could 
have used Otunbayeva’s official invitation as the legal basis for intervention to 
mobilise the troops from its base in neighbouring Tajikistan, where the Russian 
201st Motor Rifle Division was stationed (Matveeva, 2011: 9-10). In addition, there 
was a CSTO air base in Kant, which was reinforced by the Russian airborne 
assault brigade. However, the Russian side decided to remain non-committal by 
qualifying the events in Kyrgyzstan as an internal matter of the republic (Matveeva, 
2011: 9). Without clear endorsement signals from the international community, and 
fearing the repetition of adverse publicity and international isolationism akin to 
40 Few months prior to the June conflict of 2010 Kremlin expressed support to the Interim 
Government, since the new regime appeared to be more convenient to Moscow. 
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those that followed after the Russian intervention in South Ossetia, Moscow 
preferred to concentrate on the post-humanitarian relief measures (Matveeva, 
2011). 
 
To the disappointment of the Interim Government, similar dynamics prevailed both 
within the CSTO and the SCO. The peacekeeping operation could have become 
an excellent opportunity for the CSTO to demonstrate its effectiveness and 
viability. The Russian-led international operation, consisting of international and 
Central Asian troops, was an appealing option to deploy in order to mitigate 
adverse effects within and beyond Kyrgyzstan. Nonetheless, the member-states of 
the CSTO turned out to be reluctant to commit their troops for the military 
engagement in the neighbouring country. As President of Belarus Lukashenko 
lamented, "What sort of organization is this one, if there is bloodshed in one of our 
member states and an anti-constitutional coup d’état takes place, and this body 
keeps silent?" (Makhovsky, 2010). In this context, the engagement of the SCO was 
not even seriously considered, since the repercussions of the intervention were 
perceived to outweigh the benefits both for Russia and China (Matveeva, 2011). 
Predictably, the regional cooperation, including the contribution of Kazakhstan, 
which chaired the OSCE at that time, was also of limited nature, although 
Uzbekistan responded to the refugee crisis with caution, but efficiently (Matveeva, 
2011). 
 
In the absence of the Russian involvement, the rest of the international community 
preferred to remain reticent regarding possible humanitarian intervention. 
Washington, with its narrow political focus on the Manas air base, was equally 
unprepared and unwilling to intervene in Kyrgyzstan, notwithstanding its open 
support to the Interim Government’s initiatives to reform the political system of the 
country (Melvin, 2011: 37). For instance, when Elmira Ibragimova of the Interim 
Government asked the U.S. Ambassador to provide at least the armoured jeeps to 
deliver ambulance crews, the American side refuted this request due to some legal 
reasons (Matveeva, Former Head of the Research Secretariat of the Kyrgyzstan 
Inquiry Commission, interview, 31 May 2013). In reality, akin to Russia, the USA 
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was more concerned with the adverse publicity and misinterpretation of its actions 
by Russia and China. As a result, even when the Americans decided to fly 
humanitarian supplies to Osh, they hired the Russian transport airplanes and flew 
them as the Russian humanitarian aid (Matveeva, Former Head of the Research 
Secretariat of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, interview, 31 May 2013). 
 
In a similar vein, the engagement of the UN and the OSCE was limited to the post-
conflict humanitarian aid. Both the UN and the OSCE lacked a non-Russian-based 
peacekeeping strategy and ground capacities for intervention (Matveeva, 2011: 
13). There were no attempts of transforming the OSCE Office in Kyrgyzstan into 
the operational platform for joint cooperation between the USA, EU, and Russia 
(Matveeva, 2011: 9). Consequently, when the violence broke out and the Kyrgyz 
government, along with the warring parties, appealed for international involvement, 
the OSCE found itself incapable of neither launching a peace operation during the 
conflict nor serving as a post-conflict stabilizer with its mandate, capacity and 
primary responsibilities for conflict prevention and management (Melvin, 2011: 35). 
The High Commissioner on National Minorities released a formal early warning 
only two days after the eruption of the violence, whilst the decision to deploy a 
modest police unit to the region, which was eventually rejected by the Kyrgyz party, 
was agreed after considerable discussions and significant “watered down” 
amendments (Melvin, 2011: 36). It appeared that the International Committee of 
the Red Cross was the only organization that was deploying its staff to the zone of 
conflict, whilst other international actors were, on the contrary, preoccupied by the 
evacuation of their personnel from southern Kyrgyzstan (Matveeva, 2011: 14). In 
general, the international community proved to be both unwilling and incapable of 
effectively responding to the outbreak of violence.  
 
In sum, all bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, which Kyrgyzstan was 
committed to, appeared to be of discursive nature. Otunbayeva and her Interim 
Government found themselves in a situation of international abandonment. 
International actors and partners were both unprepared and unwilling to stop the 
ethnic bloodshed despite the threat of Kyrgyzstan’s failure as a state. Although the 
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violence itself lasted for four days, its repercussions will be imprinted for years to 
come. Ultimately, however, one of the lessons to learn for the new leadership of 
Kyrgyzstan should be whether to continue virtual politics of security cooperation or 
not. 
 
Internal Security Services 
Unlike the army, the internal security services are instrumental in supporting the 
ruling elites and governing arrangements in Kyrgyzstan. The fact that the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs of Kyrgyzstan is much stronger than the Kyrgyz military forces 
itself predicates the primacy of regime security in the republic. Yet, it is difficult to 
isolate the strengthening of the interior security troops as the sole variable 
responsible for the Kyrgyz foreign policy decision-making. Internal security services 
are part of the basic regime survival strategy, which is not the matter of foreign 
policy. Nonetheless, the physical survival of the ruling regime is important for the 
understanding of a larger constellation that takes into account systemic constraints, 
rent-seeking and virtual politics as the driving force of Kyrgyzstan’s international 
behaviour. 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, from the early 1990s the Kyrgyz leadership 
was least preoccupied with external threats, even after the invasion of Islamic 
extremists to Batken. Nevertheless, security from internal threats was constantly 
on the agenda of the then-presidents. After the dissolution of the USSR the 
leadership of Kyrgyzstan retained all security structures established during the 
Soviet Union. However, these institutions were relatively weak, underfunded and 
poorly equipped. Akayev, in turn, preferred to engrain internal security structures 
into the rent-seeking processes instead of reforming them (Lewis, 2011a: 16).  As 
a result, soon after the independence of the republic, internal security forces 
earned infamous reputation of being one of the most corrupt state institutions. The 
resonant corruption scandals involved all security divisions of the country, including 
the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the Office of the General Prosecutor, financial police, 
prison service and secret service. The corrupt and rent-seeking practices varied 
from the siphoning of the state budget funding and the extortion of bribes from the 
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businessmen, to involvement with the organised criminal grouping and the 
protection of illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking.  
 
Apart from those rent-seeking activities, internal security forces have often been 
used in Kyrgyzstan to strengthen governing regimes and suppress dissent and 
opposition. Both Akayev and Bakiyev exploited national security services to solidify 
their grip on power. Otunbayeva, in turn, had to rely on internal forces to stop the 
violence in the south of the country. As David Lewis (2011a: 16) asserts, Central 
Asian ruling elites have been routinely asserting control over society through 
interior and intelligence security services, highly politicised offices of the 
prosecutors and subordinated courts. In fact, the tradition of using internal security 
structures to subdue political opponents dates back to the early 1900s when the 
Bolsheviks came to power. The Bolsheviks recruited the peasants and working 
class into the new police service, whereas the tsarist gendarmerie has been 
dissolved. The newly established police or militia was instrumental in supporting 
communists and fighting counterrevolutionary forces (Ministry of Interior Defence, 
2013). The militia along with other interior structures then became the foundation of 
the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), which guarded the rule of 
the Communist party, especially during the era of the Stalinist political repressions. 
 
In a similar vein, the Kyrgyz subordinate security forces have often been used by 
Akayev to intimidate political rivals and pressure opposition. For instance, in 2001 
Kulov was sentenced to seven years imprisonment on power abuse charges after 
the decision to run against Akayev in the presidential elections. Likewise, Azimbek 
Beknazarov was arrested on charges of failing to open investigation of a murder in 
1995, when Beknazarov worked for the prosecutor’s office in Jalal-Abad district. 
These charges were brought up only in 2002, when Beknazarov began to call for 
the president’s impeachment, after the decision of the Akayev government to cede 
125 thousand hectares of the disputed land to China. After the arrest of 
Beknazarov, his supporters from the Aksy region began the march towards 
Bishkek, but were stopped by the police. After brief negotiations, the police opened 
fire at protesters, killing five demonstrators and wounding more than ninety. In fact, 
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the Aksy incident became ultimately one of those factors that led to the toppling of 
Akayev’s regime. 
 
Bakiyev’s views on national security forces have not drastically differed from those 
of his predecessor. In fact, security institutions have been significantly 
strengthened during the tenure of Bakiyev, especially in light of police impotence 
during the March events of 2005. Coming to power as a champion of democratic 
transformations, Bakiyev soon transformed himself into one of the most autocratic 
presidents in the region. In a short stint, Bakiyev managed to solidify his vertical of 
power by appointing loyal figures to key governmental and security positions whilst 
outplaying direct political rivals. Bakiyev’s tenure was marked by a widespread 
crackdown of opposition and a suppression of political freedoms along with 
resonant high-profile assassinations, and the State Committee on National Security 
(GKNB) was one of the most criticised agencies in this respect. For instance, in 
2006 opposition leader and member of the parliament Omurbek Tekebayev was 
arrested in the airport of Warsaw with a souvenir doll filled with heroin. The airport 
surveillance cameras revealed that Tekebayev’s luggage has been taken out of the 
VIP lounge to a different room prior to the departure (Wikileaks, 2006). The 
parliamentary investigation accused the GKNB of organising the frame-up, whilst 
Janysh Bakiyev, the then-deputy Chairman of the GKNB, and Busurmankul 
Tabaldiyev, the Chairman of the GKNB, had to resign (Freedom House, 2007). In 
2010, high-ranking GKNB officer Aldayar Ismankulov was arrested in Almaty and 
sentenced to seventeen years in jail by the Kazakh court for the assassination of 
Kyrgyz opposition journalist Gennady Pavlyuk in 2009 (Shishkin, 2013). Also, in 
2009 the GKNB began to illegally use the system for operative investigative 
activities (SORM), conducting surveillance of all communication channels (MK 
Aziya, 2013). At that time the GKNB was supervised by Bakiyev’s eldest son Marat 
who worked as an advisor to the Chairman of the GKNB (Anonymous, Investigator 
at the State Committee on National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 17 
December 2013). In addition, in 2008, two years later after the resignation from the 
GKNB, Bakiyev’s aforementioned younger brother Janysh was appointed the Chief 
of the powerful presidential State Security Service. This service was responsible 
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for the protection of strategic units in the country such as the White House and its 
residents. In other words, the tenure of Bakiyev was accentuated by his reliance on 
the internal security structures to sustain his regime. 
 
The early period of Otunbayeva’s rule was marked by different dynamics. The 
revolutionary leaders preferred to rely on their own supporters, sportsmen and 
bodyguards rather than on the established security structures as these institutions 
were deemed to be pro-Bakiyev (Anonymous, Investigator at the State Committee 
on National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 17 December 2013). 
However, when the violence broke out in the south of Kyrgyzstan, the Interim 
Government preferred to rely on its interior troops and security forces to stop the 
conflict. Nonetheless, the Kyrgyz security forces were not able to respond 
adequately to the ethnic clashes in the south of the republic. As aforesaid, the 
security structures of the country were already relatively weak, underfunded and 
poorly equipped. Furthermore, in addition to lacking necessary training and 
equipment, the Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies was significantly demoralised by 
the April events of 2010. During the April uprising of 2010 hundreds of security 
officers on the ground were severely beaten by the protesters. Moldomusa 
Kongantiyev, the Minister of Interior Affairs at that time, was also captured and 
mauled by the frenzied crowds in Talas. Moreover, when Bakiyev fled Kyrgyzstan 
and the Interim Government led by Otunbayeva seized the power in the country, 
nearly 28 members of the State Security Service along with the officers of the elite 
SWAT unit of the GKNB (Alfa) were brought to trial for the abuse of power and 
murder of the civilians during the April events of 2010. On April 7, when the 
protesters began to storm the White House, the officers of the State Security 
Service opened fire at the crowd as required by their oath, which led to 87 people 
being killed and many more wounded. Further, in another trial Janysh Bakiyev was 
sentenced to life in prison in absentia for the murder of former Head of the 
Presidential Administration Medet Sadyrkulov. At that trial, amongst the other 
defendants were also the former officers of the State Security Service, the GKNB 
and the Ministry of Interior Affairs (Asanov, 2012).  
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As a result, the trial of the elite security forces under the tacit approval of the 
Interim Government only contributed to the rising insecurities within the security 
structures. The looting and lawlessness that followed the overthrow of Bakiyev only 
demonstrated the unwillingness of the security forces to tackle post-revolutionary 
general crime and thus support the new regime. Another early indicator of the 
looming situation within the security structures was the inability of the police to stop 
a localised clash between the ethnic Turks and the land squatters in the Maevka 
village, which resulted in looting, arson and the deaths of several people. 
Furthermore, in the period from April to June of 2010, the Interim Government was 
frenetically substituting Bakiyev’s security cadres on their own, causing an internal 
division within the security block related to the political allegiance. Accordingly, in 
June 2010, Otunbayeva’s government found itself in a peculiar situation of needing 
to rely on the security forces that it had no trust in. 
 
Nonetheless, in sum, internal security structures were instrumental for the security 
of the ruling regimes during the tenures of Akayev, Bakiyev and Otunbayeva. Apart 
from being indispensable cogs of the rent-seeking ventures in the country,41 
security services were often used beyond their initial responsibilities of tackling 
general crime to pressure political opposition and maintain pro-ruling status quo in 
the country. Even in the case of Otunbayeva, once the conflict in the south had 
ended and the referendum on the new Constitution was conducted, the Interim 
Government returned to the practice of exploiting security structures to silence the 
revanchist forces in the country. This trend became more vivid during the tenure of 
Atambayev, when the General Prosecutor’s Office received a tacit political 
approval to detain opposition members of the parliaments such as Nariman Tuleev 
on charges of corruption and Kamchibek Tashiyev, Talant Mamytov and Sadyr 
Zhaparov for the attempted coup. 
 
Yet, the correlation between interior security forces and the foreign policy 
orientation of Kyrgyzstan is not as apparent as in the case of the military 
cooperation and the external dimensions of regime security. The maintenance and 
41 For instance, see Engvall, J. (2011) The state as investment market: An analytical framework for 
interpreting politics and bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan, Sweden: Uppsala University. 
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development of the internal security structures was always the prerogative of the 
national government, and most of the funding for these processes was channelled 
from the state budget. There were several attempts by international donors to 
enhance the security sector of the republic, but these projects were rather 
insignificant. The OSCE police reform project was the most comprehensive 
initiative undertaken in Kyrgyzstan. The ambitious OSCE project aimed at 
improving the operational capacity and professionalism of the Kyrgyz police, 
promoting community policing, enhancing forensics and criminal investigations, 
setting up emergency call centres, supporting Police Academy, training the 
policemen to deal with public disorder, and etc (OSCE, n.d.). The OSCE program 
began in 2003 with the initial funding of 3.6 million euro for the first stage (Lewis, 
2011a: 30). However, the project, which has been promoted as a success model 
for the entire Central Asian region, turned out to be quite controversial (Lewis, 
2011a; Lewis, 2011b).  
 
In particular, the criticisms this initiative has raised were related to the OSCE’s 
inability to develop self-evaluation mechanisms, the over-reliance on technical 
collaboration and the little attention paid to the political situation and context in the 
republic (Lewis, 2011a: 29). The latter aspect characterised not only the weakness 
of the OSCE programming in Kyrgyzstan, but also the general trends pertinent to 
regime security in the country, such as the intricacy of the relationships between 
domestic and international stakeholders. The OSCE project began against the 
political backdrop of Akayev expanding his powers and amending the Constitution 
via the referendum a year after the aforementioned events in the Aksy region 
(Lewis, 2011a: 29-30). As a result, the OSCE’s attempt to enhance the capacity of 
the Kyrgyz police to manage public disorder was predetermined to be marred by 
the autocratic inclinations of Akayev. As Lewis (2011a: 31) denotes, the NGO 
sector, excluded from the participation in the police reform, was galvanised by the 
rumours that the OSCE’s non-lethal support was enhancing the capacity of the 
Kyrgyz police to crackdown anti-government opposition protests. 
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Moreover, the public disorder management trainings became even more 
controversial during the tenure of Bakiyev. As the opposition began to rally against 
Bakiyev and take its supporters to the streets, Bakiyev was also prepared to resist 
the opposition initiatives. One of the vivid examples was the violent police 
crackdown of the anti-government protest in Bishkek in April 2007. The opposition 
member of the parliament Kubatbek Baibolov later lamented that the police SWAT 
team has brutally suppressed the meeting using the rubber bullets and the stun 
and riot control agent grenades (Komsomolsya Pravda, ‘Meeting oppozicii 
razognali pod boi barabanov i shum granat’, 2007). In turn, the OSCE’s police 
reform programming carried on without any significant amendments amidst the 
widespread reports of the police abuse and deteriorating political situation in the 
country (Lewis, 2011a; Lewis, 2011b). As a result, the OSCE’s training and 
equipment was used not to reform, but to modernize the suppressive mechanism 
of the ruling regime (Lewis, 2011a: 36). In addition, when Bakiyev came to power 
in the wake of the popular uprising against Akayev, the OSCE’s police assistance 
programme was short of funding, and it was the USA that covered nearly 70 
percent of the project’s financial needs (Lewis, 2011a: 32). The American financing 
can be explained through Washington’s support of the democratic reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan after 2005, and in a similar vein through Pentagon’s objective to keep 
the U.S. air base on the Kyrgyz soil, especially after Bakiyev’s call to evict the base 
at the SCO summit of 2005.42 
 
The OSCE’s initiative to send a police advisory group to Kyrgyzstan after the June 
bloodshed of 2010 turned out to be even more disastrous (Matveeva, Former Head 
of the Research Secretariat of the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, interview, 31 
May 2013). Initially, the Kyrgyz government requested hard technical support, 
whilst the majority of the OSCE member-states were more inclined towards the 
provision of soft and more ethical advisory assistance (Anonymous, Source from a 
Western Government, interview, 6 June 2013). After the period of ongoing 
discussions within and between “Eastern Vienna” and “Western Vienna”, the 
42 According to various sources, the GKNB’s SORM has been gifted or purchased by the Kyrgyz 
side in Russia in March 2009 (Loktionov, 2009). This timing coincides with the February 
announcement of Bakiyev in Moscow about the eviction of the American air base.  
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OSCE agreed to deploy a small police contingent of 52 people to the south of the 
republic (Anonymous, Source from a Western Government, interview, 6 June 
2013). Otunbayeva was originally supportive of the OSCE mission to Kyrgyzstan. 
However, the lengthy and drawn-out nature of the OSCE decision-making was 
exploited by some politicians, such as Melis Myrzakhmatov, as the nuisance factor 
to rally against the Interim Government (Lewis, 2011a: 38). As a result, 
Otunbayeva put on hold the decision to host the OSCE’s police mission in light of 
possible destabilisation of the situation in Osh that could have played against the 
Interim Government and its electorate in the upcoming elections of October 2010. 
 
In sum, the scrutiny of the physical survival strategy of the ruling regimes 
contributes to the better understanding of the Central Asian realpolitik, virtual state 
performance and rent-seeking. Empirical evidence demonstrates that regime 
security was constantly on the agenda of Akayev, Bakiyev and Otunbayeva. Whilst 
the Kyrgyz leadership perceived the army more as a symbolic attribute of 
statehood, internal security services were important for supporting the ruling 
regimes of Kyrgyzstan. Yet, it is still an open question whether interior security 
structures affected the foreign policy fluctuations of Kyrgyzstan, since there were 
no apparent dynamics that would causally link the strengthening of internal security 
forces to Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy priorities.  
 
Conclusion 
From the early 1990s the army was perceived more as a symbolic attribute of the 
statehood by the Kyrgyz leadership. Even after the incursion of the Islamic 
extremists the Kyrgyz ruling elites remained incredulous of the existence of 
external threats to the integrity of the republic. In turn, the Kyrgyz presidents 
exploited the army to perform the acts of virtual politics in order to convert the state 
dramaturgiia into financial and political currency and to accommodate the 
ambitions of regional hegemons and thus protect their regimes from any potential 
challenges. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the regional security 
structures such as the CSTO and the SCO suffered from institutional flaws and 
lacked political backing from the member-states to provide security guarantees to 
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the Kyrgyz leadership. In a similar vein, the NATO’s PfP programme was not 
equipped to address external and internal threats to the republic.  
 
Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan’s military state performance was not about achieving 
tangible benefits. The participation in regional security initiatives was the showcase 
conducted by the ruling regimes to display their bandwagoning attitudes towards 
greater players in order to reinforce domestic regime security and, as in the case of 
the USA, to widen financial channels to impoverished Kyrgyzstan. The task to 
ensure the physical survival of the Kyrgyz regimes was entrusted to interior 
security structures, which were engrained within the rent-seeking networks and 
were used to suppress dissent and opposition in the republic. In this respect, the 
June violence of 2010 is an excellent empirical referent to examine how all bilateral 
and multilateral security arrangements, which Kyrgyzstan has been virtually 
committed to, likewise brought virtual dividends only. Regional security 
organisations along with Russia, China and the USA remained reticent to 
Otunbayeva’s call for humanitarian intervention and international peacekeeping. As 
a result, against the backdrop of international abandonment the Kyrgyz leadership 
had to rely on internal security forces, which were corroded by the corrupt practices 
of rent-seeking and regime security. In sum, virtual politics of state security brought 
more questions than answers, which the ruling regimes of Kyrgyzstan failed to 
cope with. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Manas Air Base 
 
The experience of the American air base Manas in Kyrgyzstan serves as an 
excellent empirical referent to study the sources of Kyrgyz foreign policy. Chapter 
IV examined military cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Russia, China and the USA as 
the outcome of virtual politics exercised by the ruling regimes in order to display 
their bandwagoning attitudes towards more powerful players and thus to protect 
themselves from the systemic pressures. In turn, this chapter will examine the 
validity of the great power narratives vis-à-vis the rent-seeking variable. In 
particular, Chapter V will empirically demonstrate that the preponderance of regime 
security in Kyrgyz foreign policy was related not only to the systemic weaknesses 
of the country, but was also deeply rooted in the rent-seeking interests of the ruling 
regimes.  
 
Indeed, the developments around Manas since its establishment in 2001 shows 
that base politics in Central Asia extends beyond traditional international relations 
amongst states to connect local to global politics through offshore havens and 
supposedly legitimate financial mechanisms. The Manas Air Base became a 
source of rent for the ruling elites and the object of controversy between the 
government and the opposition in two successful uprisings, which toppled 
presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev.  
 
Accordingly, this chapter will expose how Akayev and Bakiyev and their 
entourages exploited shell companies and global financial mechanisms for their 
own benefits, merging the country’s economy with clandestine and informal 
offshore worlds. A special focus will be given to the rise of new Pentagon vendors - 
the mysterious Red Star and Mina Corp - and to their no less mysterious owners 
Erkin Bekbolotov and Douglas Edelman. This section will examine what kind of 
relationships these companies established with local elites and particularly with 
powerful sons of then-presidents and how as a result the Kyrgyz foreign policy 
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decisions pertinent to the Manas air base have rarely gone beyond the commercial 
preferences of the ruling elites. In other words, this part will attempt to trace a link 
between the Kyrgyz leadership and the very centre of political power in Kyrgyzstan 
through the offshore and transnational connections of the American vendors to 
locally registered fuel subcontractors. This is a constellation, which demonstrates 
that political power is not contained solely within national units, but flows from 
financial and economic connections from the transnational through the national and 
to the local. Whilst unveiling complex fuel arrangements between the American 
vendors and local subcontractors, this section will demonstrate that the geopolitical 
New Great Game is a seductive, but misleading concept. Particularly, it will be 
revealed that the Russian calls for a Manas eviction were political rhetoric, as the 
multifarious fuel cobweb had involved senior Kyrgyz officials, Russian Gazprom-
owned refineries, American DLA-Energy and Gibraltar-registered companies.  
 
Manas Air Base: From Famous to Infamous 
The Manas Air Base is an American military installation located 20 kilometers away 
from Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. The air base was opened on December 
16, 2001, at the civilian Manas International Airport under the status of forces 
agreements as part of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (Transit 
Center at Manas, n.d.).43 Initially, the 786th Security Forces Squadron of the 86th 
Contingency Response Group from the German Ramstein Air Base was deployed 
to Bishkek in order to ensure the security of coalition forces that were installing the 
new base (Global Security, n.d.). Thereafter, the base hosted the troops from 
several International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) countries; however its 
primary operating unit remained the American 376th Air Expeditionary Wing 
(Transit Center at Manas, n.d.). In the summer of 2009, the status of the Manas Air 
Base had been renegotiated in order to be renamed as the Transit Center at 
Manas International Airport, purportedly transforming the military nature of the 
installation.44 
43 The base was unofficially named in honor of an American firefighter Peter Ganci who was killed in 
the 9/11 terrorist attack. 
44 In this work, the terms “Manas Air Base” and “Transit Center at Manas” will be used 
interchangeably.  
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 The Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan represents a key logistic hub in the region and 
serves as a focal point in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. The ISAF command is 
responsible for ensuring a stable flow of supplies to one of the most hostile and 
remote parts of the world, where nearly 100,000 ISAF troops are stationed (U.S. 
House of Representatives45, 2010: 9). As a result, the Transit Center at Manas is 
one of the busiest American air force installations in the world (Viss, n.d.). Every 
American soldier who enters or leaves the Afghan battlefield must go through the 
Transit Center at Manas, which amounts for a transit average of 1,200-3,500 
coalition troops per day (Wasson, 2010; USHR, 2010: 9). In addition, from 6 to 13 
million pounds of cargo go through the Transit Center each month (Wasson, 2010; 
USHR, 2010: 9). The rates of fuel consumption for the Afghan war are higher than 
at any previous American fought war (Deloitte, 2009; USHR, 2010: 9). Nearly 30 
percent of all fuel comes from the KC-135 Stratotankers stationed at the Manas 
Transit Center (Wasson, 2010).46  
 
Nonetheless, locally the air base has a rather infamous reputation. Unlike the 
eponymous hero of the Kyrgyz epic Manas who united the Kyrgyz people, the 
American air base situated at Manas International Airport became a cause of 
fracture throughout Kyrgyz politics since its establishment in late 2001. On 
December 6, 2006, American soldier Zachary Hatfield shot dead Kyrgyz citizen 
Alexander Ivanov at a checkpoint at Manas Air Base. The U.S. officials stated that 
Ivanov, a 42-year-old truck driver, who was on his routine mission of delivering fuel 
to the air base, had threatened a U.S. serviceman with a knife and as a result was 
shot twice (Pannier, 2007). However, the statements of the U.S. spokesmen and 
Hatfield himself were unconvincing, whilst evidence of a knife found 20 meters 
away from the scene of shooting simply called for further investigation of the event 
(Marat, 2007; Horton, 2009; Baza, 2009). Although the Prosecutor General’s Office 
of Kyrgyzstan demanded a full homicide prosecution of the U.S. soldier, the 
American party denied access to Hatfield and transferred him out of the country 
45 Thereafter, the U.S. House of Representatives will be abbreviated as USHR. 
46 For example, the American forces operating out of the Manas Air Base consume up to 500,000-
600,000 gallons of TS-1 jet fuel per day (USHR, 2010: 9; Cooley, 2012: 142).  
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referring to the intergovernmental agreement of U.S. servicemen immunity at 
bases outside the USA (Pannier, 2007).  
 
The inability of the Kyrgyz government to put the American soldier on trial for the 
murder of the Kyrgyz citizen caused outrage in Kyrgyzstan, an event which was 
widely covered by both Kyrgyz and Russian media. The American compensation to 
Ivanov’s family was the sum total of 1,000 USD compared to the reparation of 
50,000 USD provided by Ivanov’s local company; a difference perceived as 
humiliating and insulting both by the wife of Ivanov and by the majority of Kyrgyz 
citizens (Baza, 2009).47 The Wikileaks cables dated July 2009 and purportedly 
issued to the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek by the Secretary of State reveal that the 
convening authority General Arthur Lichte dismissed the charges against 20-year-
old Zachary Hatfield and closed the case under no obligation to explain his 
rationale. This information, which was circulated in the Kyrgyz and Russia media, 
reignited further the public anger about the status and necessity of American 
troops on Kyrgyz soil.  
 
The base had always been under public scrutiny, and prior to this particular 
incident there were several complaints raised about the American installation. 
Some of the nuisances were related to the collision of an American stratotanker 
with the presidential airliner, the practice of dumping surplus jet fuel over Kyrgyz 
territory and the presence of armed U.S. military patrols in villages nearby the 
base. In addition, the location of the American base on the territory of Kyrgyzstan 
fostered debates amongst the local population on whether or not Kyrgyzstan will 
become a target for radical extremists, especially in light of possible American 
military actions against Iran.48  
 
47 After the news coverage, the amount of the American compensation has been substantially 
increased, whilst the initial compensation was presented as an interim payment to the Ivanov family 
by the U.S. officials (Arykbayev et al, 2011). 
48 Aleksandr Knyazev recalls at least five cases, when there was a leak of information that the 
Manas Air Base was a subject to an attempted terrorist attack (Bannikov, 2012). However, the 
controversial scholar points out that neither the American nor the Kyrgyz side is interested in 
making this information public (Bannikov, 2012). 
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Nevertheless, the greatest criticism of the Manas Air Base was attributed to the 
base’s hyper-secretive fuel contractors with unknown beneficiaries, off-shore 
registrations, opaque operations and close links to those in power. The lucrative 
and illicit contracts and subcontracts were purportedly used by both the first 
president of Kyrgyzstan Akayev and the second president Bakiyev and their 
entourages for personal enrichment and strengthening of their regimes. This 
phenomenon explains why the ruling elites were rather reluctant to question the 
presence of the air base on the territory of the republic despite growing dissent 
throughout society regarding the base. As for the abovementioned complaints, the 
ruling governments often exploited those grievances as a pretext to renegotiate the 
financial agreements for their own benefits. As a result, the air base became a 
source of rent for the ruling elites and the object of controversy between the 
government and the opposition in two successful uprisings, which removed 
presidents Akayev and Bakiyev from power.  
 
Manas International Services (MIS) and Aalam Services Ltd (Aalam) 
Rent-seeking emerges when a new source of assets is captured by a ruling 
regime. Basing payments are one source of such rents (Cooley, 2012; McGlinchey, 
2011). After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 Kyrgyzstan suddenly reappeared on 
Washington’s radar, as the Pentagon was searching for the footholds for Operation 
Enduring Freedom. For the USA, Kyrgyzstan emerged as a convenient location; 
not far from the operational zone, and with a functional airport, with a 14,000-foot 
runway initially designed for Soviet bombers (Daly, n.d.).  For Kyrgyzstan, the 
events of 9/11 provided a unique opportunity to host an American air base with 
subsequent financial benefits, and the government of Akayev seized this moment. 
As Borubek Ashirov (Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential 
Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 2012) stated, the 
decision to host an American air base turned out to be governmental conjuncture 
and an intersection of private interests, and not part of the republic’s clear foreign 
policy position.  
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Some policymakers believe that this decision was driven by the willingness of the 
Kyrgyz government to contribute to international efforts to fight terrorism and 
ensure stability in the region (Muktar Djumaliev, Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to the 
USA, interview, 15 November 2012). The government of Akayev had discussed 
this issue with all members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
and having received a verbal approval, agreed to host an American military 
installation on Kyrgyz territory (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic interview, 29 October 
2012).Accordingly, the Kyrgyz Parliament quickly ratified this decision, as 
President Akayev personally visited the Parliament to observe the voting. 
Washington was granted a right to build its military foothold at the civilian airport 
near Bishkek for the annual rent of 2 million USD, with an additional sum of four 
thousand USD per flight (Kudrina, 2007).  
 
The American side found the fuel suppliers to the air base just as quickly as their 
Kyrgyz counterparts ratified an agreement to host the base. The Defence Logistics 
Agency-Energy (DLA-Energy), the U.S. Department of Defence’s (DoD) agency for 
fuel solutions, chose a Maryland-based logistics firm, AvCard, to supply fuel to 
Manas (USHR, 2010). DLA-Energy awarded the vendor AvCard with two contracts 
and one extension without any tenders for the period from December 2001 to 
February 2003 for the total amount of 56,559,743.00 USD (USHR, 2010: 12). 
Kathryn Fantasia, the Executive Directive of the Defence Logistics Agency Energy 
and at that time the DLA-Energy contracting officer, stated that AvCard was 
selected for its promise to meet the needs of the military (Cloud, 2005). However, it 
is still unclear why this particular company had been chosen as the main fuel 
supplier to the air base and what the company’s previous fuel supply history was. It 
may be inferred, nonetheless, that the capitalization of the company was relatively 
small, as it was sold on November 8, 2007 to Miami-based World Fuel Services 
Corporation for approximately 55 million USD, which is close to what AvCard had 
received for the supply of fuel to Manas from DLA-Energy (InsideView, n.d.; 
Bloomberg, 2007; Mukhopadhyay, 2007). 
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Rent-seeking by state actors is often formally guaranteed and legal rather than 
informal and illicit. The first AvCard contract to supply 15 million gallons of jet fuel 
to Manas was announced on November 30, 2001, prior to the official Kyrgyz 
government statement confirming the allowance of the air base on its territory 
(USHR, 2010: 12). Aidar Akayev, son of the president, who coincidentally 
graduated from the University of Maryland, became one of the partners of 
Maryland-based AvCard. His company MIS had been chosen as one of AvCard’s 
two fuel subcontractors. The second subcontractor was Aalam owned by Adil 
Toigonbayev, the president’s son-in-law and a citizen of Kazakhstan. These two 
companies were responsible for all fuel delivery to the Manas Air Base, despite 
AvCard not even delegating a single full-time employee to Kyrgyzstan (Cloud, 
2005). MIS was initially founded by Aleksander Nastayev, a former Kyrgyz first 
class pilot and captain, who served as the CEO of the company for some time 
(Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). Allegedly, 
shortly after the establishment MIS was raided and expropriated by Aidar Akayev 
(Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). As for Aalam, 
the company was part of Toigonbayev’s holding. In summer 1999 the JSC Manas 
International Airport, which was a reorganized version of the JSC National Airlines 
“Kyrgyzstan Aba Joldoru”, illegally transferred the refueling complex of the Manas49 
airport to JSC Aalam Services Ltd (Kuzmin, 2005; Office of the General Prosecutor 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, quoted in RFE/RL, 2005). This transfer was presented as a 
30 percent contribution by Manas International Airport to the charter capital of JSC 
Aalam, with the entire refueling complex valuated at only 510,000 USD (Kuzmin, 
2005; Office of the General Prosecutor of the Kyrgyz Republic, quoted in RFE/RL, 
2005). The remaining 70 percent share or 1,190,000 USD, which was never 
transferred, became the liability of the offshore company Merleyside LLC, 
registered in Delaware (Kuzmin, 2005; Sotnik, 2013; Office of the General 
Prosecutor of the Kyrgyz Republic, quoted in RFE/RL, 2005). The Prosecutor 
General’s Office of Kyrgyzstan confirmed that both Aalam and Merleyside 
belonged to Adil Toigonbayev (Office of the General Prosecutor of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, quoted in RFE/RL, 2005; Kuzmin, 2005). 
49 The refueling complex Manas will be also referred as TZK Manas in this work. 
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 In this respect, the decision of the Kyrgyz leadership to host an American air base 
should be analysed through the prism of Akayev’s regime and its survival. The 
base could have served as a source of external legitimacy for unpopular Akayev, 
since domestically his sources of legitimacy were lacking. By the end of 2001 
Akayev was facing a crisis of legitimacy and had been widely criticized for 
corruption, nepotism, persecution of opposition, an usurpation of power and a 
crackdown on free speech. In 1998 the Constitutional Court of the Kyrgyz Republic 
had allowed Akayev to run for presidency for the third term, and on October 29, 
2000, Akayev was reelected as the President of Kyrgyzstan for the next five years. 
Felix Kulov, Akayev’s key opponent in the presidential race, was removed from the 
ballot and in 2001 was sentenced to seven years imprisonment with confiscation of 
property on power abuse charges. There is no formidable diagnostic evidence to 
prove Akayev’s self-legitimation motives, although the presence of the American 
contingent along with troops from the ISAF states on its own demonstrated that 
Kyrgyzstan or Akayev’s regime per se was an accepted and respected member of 
the international community. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a direct proof that Akayev had a vested interest in the 
presence of the American air base on the Kyrgyz soil. “Smoking-gun” evidence 
exposes that the lucrative and illicit fuel contracts and subcontracts were the real 
remuneration to Akayev for his services, in addition to the possible political 
currency. Although at first glance the official set fees appeared to be unreasonably 
low, the genuine agreement between Akayev and the Pentagon was rather 
camouflaged. The fact that the companies, directly affiliated with Akayev, were 
responsible for all fuel delivery to the American air base underlines the primacy of 
rent-seeking in Kyrgyz realpolitik and provides a sufficient criterion for 
acknowledging the causal relationship between the Kyrgyz foreign policy and the 
rent-seeking aspect of regime security. In the unlikely case of a weaker 
interpretation, subcontractors’ affiliation with Akayev may be regarded as a 
coincidental or somewhat unusual occurrence, but not as an exceptionally 
suspicious practice. Then our “smoking-gun” evidence turns into a “straw-in-the-
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wind”, which, however, still provides a certain degree of plausibility to our 
hypothesis. 
 
The AvCard executives have not disclosed how much they transferred to both MIS 
and Aalam for the fuel, but confirmed that the company was aware of the links 
between the subcontractors and the family of Akayev (Cloud, 2005; USHR, 2010). 
Linda Kropp, the President of AvCard, claimed that she learned about those ties 
soon after the fuel procurement and reported it to the responsible officials at the 
Defence Energy Support Center (Cloud, 2005; USHR, 2010). As it turned out, 
DLA-Energy also knew about the beneficiaries of the Kyrgyz fuel subcontractors. 
Kathryn Fantasia emphasized that the contracting and procurement laws of the 
DoD permitted companies affiliated with foreign leaders and their entourages to bid 
and win the DoD tenders (Cullison, Toktogulov and Dreazen, 2010). Lieutenant 
colonel Joe Carpenter from the Pentagon stated that the fuel procurement had 
been conducted in accordance with American laws and regulations, whilst any 
misappropriations of funds by the Kyrgyz leadership were solely the country’s 
internal affairs and thus respectively at the discretion of the Kyrgyz judicial system 
(Roston, 2006). Accordingly, the provision of rent-seeking opportunities to the 
regime members of allied governments appeared to be an effect of the American 
government contracting procedures.  
 
Furthermore, in late 2002 DLA-Energy invited new bidders to join the race for the 
lucrative fuel contracts at the Manas Air Base. The agency received five valid 
applications including AvCard, but DLA-Energy selected Gibraltar-registered Red 
Star Enterprises Ltd as the new fuel supplier to the base (USHR, 2010: 12). 
Although the initial contract was for one year beginning February 2003, the 
contract with Red Star was reconsidered five times and eventually prolonged until 
July 2007 without any further open tenders (USHR, 2010: 12). These procedures 
were justified by the “unusual and compelling urgency” to deliver fuel to one of the 
most hostile regions in the world (USHR, 2010: 12). Furthermore, although the 
supplier of fuel to the air base had changed, both MIS and Aalam remained the key 
and only subcontractors. Similar to AvCard’s complaint, the Representatives of 
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Red Star lamented the fact that the company had no choice but to work with MIS 
and Aalam, as Manas airport authority allowed only the abovementioned local 
fixed-base operators to supply fuel to the airport (USHR, 2010: 24). As a 
consequence, over the period from 2003 to 2005 MIS had received nearly 87 
million USD and Aalam Services nearly 32 million USD from Red Star (Cloud, 
2005). 
 
Whilst rent-seeking is an effect of the preponderance of regime security in foreign 
policy, in the Kyrgyz case rent-seeking has accompanied regime instability and 
chronic state weakness.  On March 24, 2005, Akayev and his family fled the 
country to find political asylum in Moscow as a result of the popular uprising across 
the country against his corrupt governance. Immediately after, the newly-appointed 
Prosecutor General Azimbek Beknazarov included the Manas International Airport, 
MIS and Aalam into the list of 42 Kyrgyz businesses affiliated with the Akayev’s 
regime. The privatization of the refueling complex Manas was denounced, and the 
facility was returned to Manas International Airport (Sorokina and Saakyan, 2011).  
 
The denunciation of the Akayev regime after the Tulip Revolution had created 
numerous allegations about Akayev’s offshore bank accounts and clandestine 
relationships with international criminal syndicates. Some allegations went beyond 
factual accusations to constitute the body of the conspiracy knowledge. 
Nonetheless, apart from the conspiracy theories and domestic inquiries, there was 
a serious investigation of Akayev’s business ventures conducted by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Prosecutor General’s Office of Kyrgyzstan 
requested assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice to trace the overseas 
assets of the ousted president, which Akayev could have acquired through illegal 
and corrupt practices (USHR, 2010: 25).  
 
The eight-page report produced by the FBI was provided to the new leadership of 
Kyrgyzstan, however shortly afterwards this document was classified by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (USHR, 2010: 63; Shishkin, 2013: 228). Prior to the 
classification, The New York Times and NBC News received a copy of this report 
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from the government of Kyrgyzstan (USHR, 2010: 25). Aram Roston (2006) of 
NBC News Investigative Unit revealed that international investigation had 
examined a “vast amount of potential criminal activities” with nearly 175 enterprises 
associated with the ousted president. In fact, the FBI found that the criminal traces 
of the Akayevs led to the USA, where the president’s family had connections with 
an American, “known to have formed over 6,000 U.S. shell companies for 
organized crime factions, weapons and drug traffickers and cyber criminals” 
(Roston, 2006).  
 
Moreover, the FBI report confirmed that both MIS and Aalam might have been 
engaged in money laundering via their accounts at Dutch bank ABN AMRO and 
Citibank in New York (Cloud, 2005). Both banks reported to the FBI that MIS and 
Aalam were “tied to transactions with arms traffickers, Politically Exposed Persons 
(PEPs) and a myriad of suspicious U.S. shell companies associated with the Akaev 
Organization” (Roston, 2006). Edward Lieberman, an American lawyer hired by the 
Kyrgyz government to assist with the investigation, stated that in the period from 
December 18, 2001, to November 12, 2003, nearly 40 million USD had been wired 
from MIS and other related companies to Citibank accounts in New York 
(Centrasia, 2005). In general, the FBI Eurasian Unit advised that Akayev and his 
entourage might have been engaged in “siphoning off at least $1 billion from the 
Kyrgyz state budget” (Roston, 2010).  
 
However, offshore jurisdictions turned out to be the major challenge for tracking 
down the owners and beneficiaries of Akayev-affiliated businesses. The case of 
MIS and Aalam was one of numerous high-profile cases that incriminated Akayev, 
as his family and entourage were engaged in nearly all lucrative business spheres 
in the country ranging from gold mining and gambling to banking and mobile 
communications. Although Prosecutor General Beknazarov, American lawyer 
Lieberman and Head of the State Inquiry Commission Daniyar Usenov promised to 
locate and return the overseas assets and accounts of Akayev and his family, their 
attempts appeared to be populist and unviable. The State Inquiry Commission 
even struggled to establish domestic criminal links between major local businesses 
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and the family of Akayev. The initial list of 42 ventures allegedly to have belonged 
to Akayev was soon expanded to 73 companies, with the process of initializing 
these assets resembling a witch-hunt. Offshore jurisdictions were the major 
challenge of tracking down the owners and beneficiaries of these businesses. The 
State Inquiry Commission confirmed that the registration of the companies under 
the investigation included the Isle of Man, the Seychelles, Liberia, Panama, 
Liechtenstein, Cyprus and the Cayman Islands among many others (Jumagulov, 
2005).  
 
Nonetheless, these cases and particularly the MIS and Aalam affairs demonstrated 
that since the start of Kyrgyzstan’s independence, the so-called “Switzerland of 
Central Asia” had not been detached from the global economy. Akayev and his 
entourage actively exploited the new opportunities that opened up after the 
breakup of the USSR. What was unthinkable during the Soviet era had become an 
indispensable part of regime security in Central Asia. By using offshore companies 
and global financial mechanisms, Akayev and his family guaranteed themselves a 
secure and comfortable living in exile, whereas the country had become infamously 
attached to hidden and informal offshore worlds. 
 
Rise of Red Star and Mina 
Rent-seeking theory rests on the assumption that the opportunities for personal 
enrichment can have a significant impact on public policy decisionmaking. 
Diagnostic evidence suggests that such a phenomenon was vividly present during 
the tenure of Bakiyev, whilst Bakiyev’s quest for personal gains has been 
camouflaged by the populist rhetoric of national interests and social developments.  
 
Bakiyev came to power in March 2005 as a result of the popular uprising against 
Akayev.  Serving as Acting President, Bakiyev immediately began to criticise the 
illicit and non-transparent base arrangements between Akayev and the Pentagon. 
In July 2005, Bakiyev signed a declaration to remove foreign military installations 
from the country at the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
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in Astana (Cooley, 2012: 120).50 As a result, in July 2005, Donald Rumsfeld, the 
Secretary of Defence, had to make a personal visit to Kyrgyzstan to discuss the 
future of the Manas Air Base with the new leadership.  
 
Nonetheless, sworn in officially as President of Kyrgyzstan on August 14, 2005, 
Bakiyev continued to denounce the fees paid by Washington to the Kyrgyz side 
and threatened to evict the base. In October 2005, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. 
Secretary of State, made a visit to Bishkek, where she held talks over the base 
with Bakiyev and his cabinet. Although both Rumsfeld and Rice were reassured 
that the base would remain in Kyrgyzstan, they were also hinted at that the price 
for the presence of the air base had to drastically increase. On February 14, 2006, 
Bakiyev stated in an interview to Russian newspaper Kommersant that the 
American side had to pay 207 million USD per year for the use of the facility 
(Pannier, 2006). Washington was reluctant to accommodate a new price tag, as 
the requested amount was perceived to be disproportionately high (Cooley, 2012: 
121).  
 
The rounds of negotiations continued, and effectively in 2006 Bishkek and 
Washington came to a mutual agreement. The annual rent for the air base had 
been increased from 2 million USD to 17 million USD as part of the larger aid 
package promised by the USA, totalling up to 150 million USD per year (Cooley, 
2010). Nonetheless, in its dispatch to the State Department in 2007, the U.S. 
Embassy in Bishkek acknowledged that the Manas Air Base would “continue to 
lurch from crisis to crisis”, as both the government of Kyrgyzstan and the 
opposition would continue to use the base “in their own domestic political 
arguments” (Wikileaks, 2007). 
 
Although there were ongoing political negotiations over the base after the Tulip 
Revolution, the fuel supplies to the Manas Air Base were never interrupted. As 
mentioned above, Red Star continued to supply fuel to the base up until July 2007 
receiving in total 509,217,358.00 USD (USHR, 2010: 12). From 2007 the fuel “relay 
50 The same month Uzbekistan delivered a diplomatic note to the USA to vacate the Karshi-
Khanabad “K2” air base from its territory within a 180-day period. 
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baton” was officially passed to new vendor Mina Corp, which turned out to be a re-
branded version of Red Star (USHR, 2010). There were rumours that Red Star and 
Mina with their opaque operations, unknown beneficiaries and offshore 
registrations were enriching both the Akayev and Bakiyev regimes. After the April 
Revolution of 2010 and the subsequent ousting of Bakiyev, the American base 
along with its secret vendors became the core of diplomatic scandal between both 
countries. As a result, in April 2010, the Subcommittee on National Security and 
Foreign Affairs of the USHR under the chairmanship of John Tierney started an 
official investigation of the fuel supplies to the Manas Air Base.51 In the end, the 
eight-month long investigation called for policy changes and greater oversight in 
fuel procurement (USHR, 2010).  
 
The Subcommittee revealed the perturbing details about the fuel supply at the 
Manas Air Base and its vendors Red Star and Mina Corp (USHR, 2010). The 
Subcommittee discovered that the company Red Star belonged to Erkin 
Bekbolotov52 and Delphine Le Dain who each owned a 50 percent stake (USHR, 
2010: 20). The USHR (2010: 20), however, was cautious to advise that “it is 
virtually impossible to determine the companies’ beneficial ownership through 
public records”. The Subcommittee also concluded that the real owner of Le Dain’s 
shares was her husband Douglas Edelman53, as Delphine Le Dain herself had 
51 In this work, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform of the USHR will be referred as the Subcommittee. 
52 The first owner of the company Erkin Bekbolotov is the Kyrgyz national52, son of Jenishbek 
Bekbolotov, the former Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources under Akayev (Anonymous, 
Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). Erkin has graduated from the Kyrgyz State 
University of Construction, Transport and Architecture named after N. Isanov majoring in finance 
and accounting (Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, interview, 12 November 2012). 
From 1994 to 1995 Bekbolotov studied at the Pace University in New York52, and after returning to 
Kyrgyzstan he was employed by two consulting companies for a short period of time, where 
Bekbolotov was responsible for the provision of educational services and market researches to the 
local fuel firms (USHR, 2010: 20). In late 1996 Bekbolotov joined the Kyrgyz Petroleum Company, a 
closed joint stock venture created by the government of Kyrgyzstan and a Canadian investor 
(Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, interview, 12 November 2012). Being responsible 
for the fuel supplies and logistics of the refinery Jalal-Abad, Bekbolotov soon rose to the position of 
general manager at the Kyrgyz Petroleum (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 
December 2012). In 1998 Bekbolotov negotiated the sale of the Jalal-Abad refinery and left the 
company to start his own business (USHR, 2010: 21; Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 
21 December 2012).  
53 Originally from Stockton, California, Edelman has been living and doing business in Kyrgyzstan 
from the mid 1990s, establishing several fuel trading firms and even owning expats-favorite 
American Pub in Bishkek (Hettena, 2010; USHR, 2010: 21). It is believed that Edelman still holds 
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never actively engaged with the companies (USHR, 2010: 20). The official website 
of their holding states that Mina Group is “an international group of companies – 
Mina Corp Limited, Red Star Enterprises Limited, and Mina Petroleum FZE – with 
trading operations” in Asia, Europe, the USA and the Middle East (Mina Group, 
n.d.). Bekbolotov himself stated that Mina was founded in 2004 “as an umbrella 
structure for a number of operations in Iraq”, including the petroleum trade and the 
production of a daily English newspaper Iraq Today, published in Baghdad54 
(USHR, 2010: 23; Hettena, 2010). Although the activities of Mina resembled a CIA 
set-up, both Bekbolotov and Leon Panetta, a former Director of the CIA, rejected 
the notion that Mina was an agency project (Shishkin, 2013: 232). Nonetheless, 
thereafter Mina evolved into a vast corporation that even owned an Internet 
company in Kabul and MTV Adria in the Balkans in addition to its mining and 
commodities trading interests across different continents (LeVine, 2010; Hettena, 
2010).55  
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that Bekbolotov and Edelman have established 
business relations with Akayev-affiliated companies even prior to the opening of 
the American air base in Kyrgyzstan. In a testimony to the USHR (2010) 
Bekbolotov stated that one of Edelman’s companies used to supply jet fuel to 
Kyrgyzstan’s national airline, which owned Manas International Airport. In 1998 
Bekbolotov met Douglas Edelman, and in 1999 they teamed up to supply jet fuel to 
the civilian aviation at the Manas International Airport (USHR, 2010: 21). As 
mentioned above, in the late 1990s the airport belonged to the JSC National 
Airlines “Kyrgyzstan Aba Joldoru”, which was later decentralized and privatized. In 
the course of this privatization, TZK Manas had been illegally transferred to Aalam. 
In addition, Bekbolotov confirmed that both he and Edelman had helped create 
an American passport, although he has lived abroad for more than 25 years (USHR, 2010: 22). 
Presumably, Edelman currently resides in Kensington, London (LeVine, 2010). 
54 Mina Media’s director Stephen MacSearraigh used to serve as the director of both Mina Corp and 
Iraq Today (Hettena, 2010). 
55 Edelman, who is also linked to Aspen Wind Corporation, a financial consultancy firm with 
executive offices in Cyprus, turned out to be an executive producer of the movie about evangelist 
Billy Graham Billy: The Early Years (2008). The film was financed by the firm Solex Productions, a 
sister company of Mina Media (Hettena, 2010). Hettena (2010) discovered that Mina Media is 
registered in Nicosia, Cyprus, and is a subsidiary of Mina Corp. The company owns and runs MTV 
Adria, which broadcasts in Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro (Hettena, 2010).  
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another fuel company MIS with a 40 percent ownership share in the name of 
Edelman’s French wife (USHR, 2010: 21). The remaining 60 percent was divided 
between three unidentified Kyrgyz businessmen who later in 2001, according to 
Bekbolotov, expropriated their 40 percent share (USHR, 2010: 21). Nonetheless, 
Bekbolotov and Edelman continued to supply jet fuel to MIS, which, in turn, was 
selling this fuel to Manas Jet Services, a firm-supplier of civil aviation fuel who 
supplied Manas International Airport (USHR, 2010: 21). In addition, the director of 
operations of Red Star and Mina Corp Charles Squires, who was a Defence 
Attaché at the American Embassy in Bishkek before 2001, confirmed that he was 
personally introduced to both Adil Toigonbayev and Aidar Akayev when he was 
taking over the fuel supplies from AvCard at Manas (Cloud, 2005). Consequently, it 
is evident that the business relationships of Bekbolotov and Edelman with the 
companies belonging to Aidar Akayev and Adil Toigonbayev had been developed 
even prior to the DoD fuel procurements. 
 
In 2001, Bekbolotov moved with his family to Toronto, where he established Red 
Star Enterprises (USHR, 2010: 21). Soon after, Bekbolotov and Edelman 
registered Red Star Enterprises Ltd in Gibraltar, the British tax haven known for its 
hyper-secretive jurisdiction and protection of corporate interests (Roston, 2010). In 
2002 Red Star Enterprises Ltd won the DLA-Energy contract to supply fuel to 
Manas Air Base, and in February 2003 the company began its deliveries to the 
base (USHR, 2010). Concurrently, in 2003 Red Star became the sole supplier of 
jet fuel to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan (USHR, 2010). Bagram base 
commander Colonel Jonathan Ives recalled that every day approximately thirty 
Red Star tractor-trailers were delivering nearly 250,000 gallons of fuel to Bagram, 
transporting it all the way from Uzbekistan through the Salang Pass and the 
mountains of Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul (Roston, 2010). Moreover, in 2007 the 
leadership of Red Star signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Air 
Forces to install a proprietary petroleum pipeline at the Bagram air base (Roston, 
2010). The Subcommittee of the USHR (2010: 15) admitted that this Memorandum 
had institutionalized Red Star’s control over fuel deliveries to the base in 
Afghanistan, as Red Star retained ownership of the petroleum pipeline, whilst other 
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bidders and fuel competitors were obliged to attain access to this pipeline. In 
addition, as my anonymous interlocutor mused, “Surprisingly, neither the Taliban 
nor the Northern Alliance has dared to attack the Red Star’s tractor-trailers or the 
pipeline” (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012).56 
 
Indeed, policy changes and a greater oversight of the American fuel procurement 
practices could have reduced rent-seeking opportunities in the countries like 
Kyrgyzstan. In 2007, DLA-Energy announced a new tender to supply fuel to the 
Manas Air Base (USHR, 2010: 12). The name of Red Star had often been 
associated with Akayev and his family, and the leadership of Red Star decided to 
rebrand the company whilst submitting the bid for a new contract (USHR, 2010: 
23). In an e-mail sent to Kari Archer of DLA-Energy, Bekbolotov stressed that Red 
Star and Mina are two different companies, which “share the same management 
team as far as fuel trading goes”; however Mina also “employs other management 
teams that are involved in a broader range of activities” (USHR, 2010: 23). As a 
result, although the incumbent bid was submitted by Red Star, the contract was 
awarded to Mina Corporation (USHR, 2010: 23). In fact, from the period of July 
2007 to December 2011, Mina had won the tenders for fuel supply to Manas Air 
Base three times, and similar to the cases of AvCard and Red Star its contracts 
have been extended five times without open and full competition (USHR, 2010: 
12). These decisions were justified by reasons of national security and were 
subsequently classified as secret (USHR, 2010: 13). During this stint, Mina 
received nearly 1 billion 292 million USD from the DoD for procurement, delivery 
and storage of fuel (USHR, 2010: 13). 
 
As a result, Red Star and Mina Corp emerged as the key fuel players in the region, 
winning the DoD’s most lucrative petroleum contracts. Although these companies 
56 Allegedly, prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, one of Bekbolotov’s companies was 
supplying fuel directly to the Taliban (Anonymous, Consultant, interview, 3 November 2013). After 
the invasion, Bekbolotov switched his allegiance and began working with the American side 
(Anonymous, Consultant, interview, 3 November 2013). According to Bekbolotov, the Americans 
were interested in cooperating with him, because Bekbolotov had established fuel delivery routes 
and his business was scalable to the American needs (Anonymous, Consultant, interview, 3 
November 2013). Unfortunately, although this is an original story, there is no available information 
with public access to cross-check these statements, 
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were successful in supplying fuel to the bases in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan, the 
USHR was astonished by the levels of secrecy and mystery that veiled both the 
vendors and the DoD procurement practices and questioned why such opaque 
proceedings were necessary. The new government, which came to power after the 
ousting of Bakiyev during the April Revolution of 2010, claimed that the non-
transparent and secretive nature of fuel supplies to the base was a bribe of sorts 
by the USA to the Bakiyev’s clan (Roston, 2010). Chief of Staff of the post-2010 
interim government Edil Baisalov accused Mina Corp of paying certain dividends to 
Maksim Bakiyev, the son of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, so that the Pentagon could have 
continued to use the Manas Air Base (Roston, 2010). Lawyer of Mina Dean Peroff 
from the law firm Amsterdam & Peroff stated that all accusations against the 
company were groundless, as the Subcommittee’s investigation found no financial 
evidence linking the fuel suppliers with the Bakiyev family (Mazykina, 2011). 
 
With access to public information only, it is unrealistic to track down the direct 
connection between the families of Akayev and Bakiyev and Red Star/Mina. The 
Gibraltar-registered companies, headquartered now in Dubai, continue to operate 
in a secretive manner. Denis Grigoriev (e-mail, 19 December 2012), the CEO of 
Mina Corp and Red Star, emphasized that “the company and its representatives 
have a policy not to grant interviews or comment directly on political events or 
situations outside of the most extraordinary circumstances”. The FBI report on 
Akayev and his businesses have been classified in 2005, and the date of its 
declassification is unknown. The report of the U.S. Congress has shed some light 
on the issues of fuel delivery to the Manas Air Base. However, the investigation 
could have been more critical and thorough with a wider engagement of the 
Department of Justice, FBI and CIA. For instance, the Subcommittee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs concluded that there is no credible evidence linking 
financially Mina and Bakiyev. It is uncertain how the Subcommittee came to this 
conclusion because the investigators had not conducted a forensic audit, which 
would have traced every dollar spent either by AvCard, Red Star or Mina. In 
addition, the Subcommittee had not disclosed or referred to the classified 
information provided by the State Department and the DoD. As Philip Shishkin 
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(2013: 229) wrote, to Mina’s accusers the findings of the USHR meant that the fuel 
corruption “was so well hidden and devious as to be beyond the reach of 
Washington investigators”.  
 
Rise of the Subcontractors 
Nevertheless, it is the relationship between the Pentagon’s vendors and their local 
subcontractors, through which we can establish the vested interests of the Kyrgyz 
then-presidents in the Manas air base.  Diagnostic evidence reveals that Bakiyev 
and his entourage continued the legacy of Akayev by recapturing the fuel supplies 
to the American air base through the use of subcontractors and fixed-based 
operators. Scott Horton (2010), in a testimony to the Subcommittee, stated that 
apart from the prosecutors, independently hired lawyers from a Washington-based 
legal firm investigated the Manas case and presented the findings to Bakiyev. 
Nonetheless, according to Horton’s (2010) interlocutor, Bakiyev decided to drop 
the criminal case on fuel deliveries simply in order “to step into the shoes” of 
Akayev. 
 
Since subcontractors operated locally, their ties with the ruling elites were more 
apparent than their links with either the DoD or the main vendors. As mentioned 
above, the founders of Red Star formed relationships with MIS and potentially with 
Aalam even prior to the events of 9/11. However, after the DoD procurements, 
these links were cemented, since Red Star became the base’s only vendor, whilst 
MIS and Aalam became exclusive subcontractors. After the Tulip Revolution of 
2005, the leadership of the country changed, as had changed the leadership of 
both MIS and Aalam. The Kazakh owners of Aalam immediately fled the country, 
whilst the company’s machinery, equipment and two storage facilities were 
nationalized (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). 
The refueling complex was also returned to Manas airport (RFE/RL, 2005). 
 
As for MIS, the company came fully under the control of Babanov who was already 
supplying fuel to MIS from 2003 (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 
December 2012; USHR, 2010: 24). Prior to MIS, Babanov was building his gas 
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station empire in Kyrgyzstan under the patronage of Aidar Akayev (Jeenbekov, 
2012). The total control of MIS, however, opened the door for Babanov to the jet 
fuel business, from which Babanov was previously excluded (Anonymous, Fuel 
Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). Babanov split up MIS into Aircraft 
Petrol Management (APM) and Aero Fuels Service (AFS) and continued to supply 
fuel to the base (Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, interview, 12 
November 2012). Bekbolotov confessed that after the ousting of Akayev, Red Star 
financed the creation of Kyrgyz Aviation Services (KAS), a proxy company, which 
leased the Aalam’s former storage facilities (USHR, 2010: 26). However, 
Bekbolotov lamented the fact that the plan to control the entire fuel delivery 
process was soon interrupted, when Babanov established exclusive rights to 
access the Manas airport and its storage facilities (USHR, 2010: 26). As a result, 
Red Star was again subcontracting the fuel delivery to APM, a restructured version 
of MIS (USHR, 2010: 26).  
 
 
Nonetheless, despite the involvement of the president’s family in fuel deliveries, the 
American vendors continued to supply fuel to the air base via Bakiyev-affiliated 
subcontractors. The incident with Hatfield and Ivanov, the driver of Babanov’s 
company, allowed Mina’s KAS to regain the subcontracting niche, phasing out 
Babanov’s stakes (USHR, 2010: 26). In May 2008, Mina created a new firm Manas 
Aero Fuels (MAF) with Gazprom subsidiaries.57 In addition, in that stint Mina 
founded two more firms: Central Asia Fuels (CAF) and Manas Fuel Service (MFS) 
(USHR, 2010: 28). Mina did not even attempt to disguise its relationships with 
MAF. Red Star, Mina and MAF shared the same office space at the Hyatt hotel in 
Bishkek, whilst Nurbek Tashibekov, the general director of MAF, had a Red Star-
affiliated email account (Tynan, 2010d). Nikolai Ushakov, Edelman’s former 
employee at the American Pub, registered seven websites on behalf of Mina, 
among which were manasaerofuels.net, cafuels.net, manasfuels.net and 
kaerofuels.com (Tynan, 2010d). In 2008 MAF managed to fully outbid Babanov’s 
57 The role of Gazprom will be discussed below. 
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APM and gain absolute access to the storage facilities of the airport Manas 
(USHR, 2010: 28). 
 
Although Mina representatives claimed that MAF, CAF and MFS were created to 
guarantee the company full control over fuel delivery, these new firms were 
believed to be Maksim Bakiyev’s shares in the lucrative fuel chain (Sorokina and 
Saakyan, 2011; Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, interview, 12 
November 2012). When Bakiyev came to power, his son Maksim soon became 
allegedly the richest person in Kyrgyzstan, taking over all Akayev’s assets from 
gold mining and hydro-energy to banking and mobile communications. He was 
accused of sharing business interests with disgraced Russian oligarchs and 
transnational criminals. The management of his assets and finances was 
conducted by MGN Group, an investment firm with offices in Moscow, New York 
and London (Smythe, 2012; Shishkin, 2013: 121). The company was led by 
American citizen Eugene Gourevitch who was accused of defrauding Telecom 
Italia and money laundering for international mafia (Smythe, 2012; Kucera, 2013). 
The public reputation of Maksim’s companies was ostensibly sustained by a PR 
firm Flexi Communications led by former London-based BBC producer Vugar 
Khalilov (Ferghana News, 2010). Maksim’s personal banker was his friend Mikhail 
Nadel, whose AsiaUniversalBank with two former US senators on its board, 
became the largest systemic bank in the country during Bakiyev’s tenure (Shishkin, 
2013). Maksim became so influential in the country that no serious political 
appointments were conducted without his approval (Anonymous, Security Adviser, 
interview, 14 January 2013). According to a confidential cable by the U.S. 
Embassy in Bishkek, British and Canadian businessmen complained to the Duke 
of York Prince Andrew that “only those willing to participate in local corrupt 
practices are able to make any money”, because nothing gets done in Kyrgyzstan 
without “a cut” to Maksim (Wikileaks, 2008).  
 
Accordingly, there is circumstantial evidence that Maksim Bakiyev had “a cut” in 
the air fuel business as well. Unlike in the Aidar Akayev’s case, it is more difficult to 
establish a direct connection between Maksim and MAF, CAF or MFS. Baisalov 
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wrote to Shishkin (2013: 229) ahead of his visit to Kyrgyzstan to study fuel 
supplies, “What do you guys want: some videotape where Maxim is seen taking 
cash from Mina? There is no such thing.” However, the USHR (2010: 37) 
confirmed that its investigation did establish that Maksim was informally engaged 
with the JSC Manas International Airport, the airport’s governing authority, which 
served as a gateway to lucrative fuel procurements.  
 
In particular, after the Tulip Revolution one of the first orders by Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev was to appoint Egemberdi Myrzabekov as the new president of the Manas 
airport, whilst Bakytbek Sydykov, the son of Bakiyev’s Chief of Staff, was 
appointed as Myrzabekov’s deputy (Pobedimov, 2005). In turn, after these 
appointments DLA-Energy received a few letters from Myrzabekov who clearly 
outlined the criteria for the American vendors to meet in order to supply fuel to the 
Manas airport (USHR, 2010). Taking into account these requirements, DLA-Energy 
announced on March 15, 2007, that all fuel solicitors had to possess a letter of 
authorization from the Kyrgyz airport authorities and a commitment letter from the 
fixed-based operators (USHR, 2010: 39). As a result, AvCard and AeroControl 
were unable to obtain permission from Myrzabekov, whilst International Oil Trading 
Company’s letter of permission was believed to be not genuine (USHR, 2010: 39). 
Mina again won the DLA-Energy solicitation, as the company secured all 
authorizations, suitable fuel storages and exclusive relationships with all local fuel 
subcontractors (USHR, 2010: 39-40). In turn, MAF became a key subcontractor for 
fuel storage (USHR, 2010: 27).   
 
Furthermore, in April 2009, Maksim’s confidant Eugene Gourevitch was introduced 
to the Board of Directors of Manas International Airport, whilst Sydykov was 
promoted to the position of the president of the Manas airport (Lenta.ru, 2011; 
Kucera, 2013). In few months Gourevitch orchestrated the sale of the airport’s 
refueling complex58 to MAF for approximately 7 million USD, whilst Mina financed 
MAF to purchase this facility (USHR, 2010: 28; Lenta.ru, 2011). After the April 
events of 2010, Gourevitch would be sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment in 
58 This is the refueling complex, which was illegally transferred to Aalam Services during Akayev 
and then nationalized. 
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absentia with confiscation of property on corruption charges (Akipress, 2011; 
Lenta.ru, 2011). The Prosecutor General’s Office would state that the facility itself 
used to bring 4-5 million USD per year in rent fees, yet was still sold cheaply to 
MAF (Tynan, 2009). Although MAF was in good standing at that time, such 
operations in favour of MAF raised serious questions about whether Mina cut a 
deal with Bakiyev’s younger son or bribed airport authorities (Shishkin, 2013: 229). 
 
Such a chain of events confirms the involvement of the Kyrgyz government in the 
American fuel procurement practices and affirms the interests of the Bakiyev family 
in the American fuel deliveries. Unlike in Akayev’s case, the engagement of 
Bakiyev and his entourage in this business is more clandestine. Nonetheless, there 
are diagnostic clues, which accentuate that nearly all key decisions pertinent to the 
presence of the American base in Kyrgyzstan should have been processed 
through the prism of the rent-seeking interests of the ruling regime. The recurring 
empirical pattern of fuel capture by Akayev and Bakiyev families only contributes to 
the hypothesis that mercantile interests of the ruling elites prevailed over the long-
term state-building objectives. 
 
Open Secrets and Closed Rules: The Political Economy of Base Closure 
The fusion of private interests and state politics is a central feature of political 
economy of weak states. Civil servants lured by the opportunities of rapid 
enrichment often manipulate public policy in order to enrich themselves and their 
entourage (Mbaku, 1998). Accordingly, foreign policy becomes a handy tool for the 
ruling regime to maintain legitimacy and further its rent-seeking interests. The case 
of the Manas air base is an excellent empirical referent to examine how rent-
seeking interests may affect high-level state decision-making.  
 
As circumstantial evidence affirmed, the Manas air base was a source of lucrative 
rent for Bakiyev and his entourage. Nonetheless, on February 3, 2009, Bakiyev 
announced his decision to close the American air base at Manas International 
Airport. A few weeks later members of the Kyrgyz Parliament unanimously voted 
for the eviction of the base, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a 
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diplomatic note to the American side to leave the base in 180 days. This decision 
had been conducted in light of the Kremlin’s promise to provide a 2 billion USD soft 
loan to Kyrgyzstan along with a 150 million USD grant. Although Bakiyev confirmed 
the irrevocability of his decision, on June 23, 2009, Bishkek and Washington 
signed a new deal, according to which the rental fees for the use of the airport 
would increase from 17 million USD to 60 million USD (Cooley, 2012). The 
installation, renamed to the Transit Center at Manas, ceased to be a military base 
and became a logistics and transportation hub. In the first instance, these 
developments may be perceived as the New Great Game struggle between 
Washington and Moscow over strategic influence in Central Asia. Nonetheless, 
through the prism of the process-tracing methodology it becomes evident that the 
political economy of rent-seeking was integral to Bakiyev’s political manoeuvres. 
 
Despite Bakiyev’s early rhetoric to evict the ISAF troops from the Kyrgyz soil, the 
announcement to close the American air base still came unexpectedly, especially 
after the rounds of high-level negotiations. In a similar vein, only few could have 
predicted the changes in basing agreement between Bishkek and Moscow after 
the Kremlin’s pledge to provide a 2 billion USD loan to Bakiyev’s government. Such 
a politics reinvigorated the popular tale of the New Great Game on the grand 
chessboard of Central Asia. Bakiyev explained his decisions regarding the air base 
through the prism of false expectations and high-level deception. In particular, 
immediately after the April revolution, at the Minsk press conference in 2010, 
Bakiyev asserted that he felt cheated by the Russian leadership in February 2009. 
The ousted president revealed that he had a lengthy conversation with both 
Medvedev and Putin prior to the announcement of his decision to terminate the 
U.S. access to the Manas air base (Centrasia, 2010). According to Bakiyev, the 
Russian leadership was irritated by the presence of the American forces in 
Kyrgyzstan and was willing to offset the costs of evicting the base.  
 
However, when Bakiyev agreed to this deal and publicly announced his decision, 
the very next day the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
expressed their willingness to host an American air base (Centrasia, 2010). In turn, 
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when the Kyrgyz government delivered a formal notification to the USA of its intent 
to evict the base, Hillary Clinton sent a cable to the American agencies to examine 
the receptivity of the governments of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman 
to the shift of ISAF operations to their facilities (Wikileaks, 2009a). The U.S. State 
Department also advised to deliberate whether to pursue the Azerbaijan facilities 
as an alternative option (Wikileaks, 2009a). Respectively, Bakiyev lamented, “It 
turned out that only Kyrgyzstan was against [the presence of the American troops 
in Central Asia], whilst everyone was for it. This was a slap in the face from the 
Russian leadership” (Centrasia, 2010). Thus, Bakiyev referred to these 
developments as the justification for his decision to keep the American air base in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Nonetheless, an array of “straw-in-the-wind” clues suggested that Maksim Bakiyev 
managed to capture fuel supplies to the Manas Air Base, as did Aidar Akayev and 
Adil Toigonbayev at one time. Therefore, taking into account the vested interests of 
Bakiyev’s entourage in the lucrative fuel business, it remains contentious whether 
Bakiyev was guided by the Russian “deceit” to keep the air base in the country. In 
turn, such a political move by Bakiyev substantially endangered security of his 
regime. Although the proximate causes of the April 2010 events were directly 
related to the grievances accumulated within the country during the reign of 
Bakiyev, Kremlin contributed to the overthrow of Bakiyev by heating up the anger 
generated within Kyrgyzstan via the federal TV channels and imposing taxes on 
the export of the Russian petroleum products to Kyrgyzstan.  
 
The Kremlin always reacted sensitively to any developments in the region related 
to the engagement of other players. After the events of 9/11 Vladimir Putin openly 
supported George W. Bush and the US-led war on terror, as Russia preferred to 
bandwagon the USA. Nonetheless, with the growing world prices on oil and gas, 
the rhetoric of senior Russian officials changed, as the political discourse in Russia 
was again focused on the geopolitical rivalry between Moscow and Washington. In 
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2003 Russia opened a military base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.59 The new air base, 
located 30 km away from the American air base, became the first military 
installations of Russia beyond its borders since its independence. The Russian 
leadership began to call for the eviction of all American military installations from its 
nearby territories and from Kyrgyzstan in particular, although the latter was 
installed under the approval of Moscow (Ashirov, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of 
the Presidential Administration of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 29 October 
2012).  
 
Accordingly, Bakiyev’s U-turn enraged Vladimir Putin personally, as Putin refused 
to meet the official Kyrgyz delegation led by Prime-Minister Daniyar Usenov in 
Moscow in 2010 (Mikhailov, 2010; Rasov, 2010; Anonymous, Political Adviser, 
interview, 6 May 2013). Kremlin was further ridiculed by Bakiyev’s misuse of the 
first instalment of the preferential loan in the amount of 300 million USD (Mikhailov, 
2010; Rasov, 2010; Abdygulov, Head of the Economy and Strategic Development 
Department of the Government of Kyrgyzstan, interview, 13 September 2012). 
Maksim Bakiyev preferred to gamble with this money on the Russian stock 
exchange through his financial companies (Abdygulov, Head of the Economy and 
Strategic Development Department of the Government of Kyrgyzstan, interview, 13 
September 2012).60 In addition, Maksim was setting up a scheme to appropriate 
the remaining 1.7 million USD designated to the construction of the hydro-energy 
stations in the republic (Anonymous, Political Adviser, interview, 6 May 2013).61  
In a similar vein, it remains contentious whether the Kremlin’s initial goal was to 
overthrow Bakiyev’s regime and evict the American base, although U.S. 
Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul confessed that in 2009 both Washington 
and Moscow offered bribes to Bakiyev to keep the base or shut it down 
respectively (Kucera, 2012). The Wikileaks (2009c) cables reveal that Russian 
59 During the Soviet times, the Kant air base was a military aviation school, where pilots from the 
communist satellite countries, among which were even two presidents Hosni Mubarak and Hafez al-
Assad, were undergoing aviation trainings (Mironov, n.d.). 
60 With access to public information, it is yet too difficult to cross-check this statement. Nonetheless, 
taking into account that Abdygulov worked with Maksim Bakiyev at his Central Agency for 
Development, Investment and Innovation and nowadays Abdygulov chairs the National Bank of 
Kyrgyzstan, I assume that Abdygulov could have indeed possessed insider knowledge. 
Nonetheless, this information should be still analysed with a certain degree of skepticism. 
61 In a similar vein, this information is also difficult to triangulate. 
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Ambassador Valentin Vlasov enjoyed an excellent rapport with the Kyrgyz political 
beau monde. For instance, at the opening of Maksim Bakiyev’s new resort on June 
20, 2009, the Russian Ambassador moved “like a trusted friend” through the 
nervous crowd of Kyrgyz political and business elite, which waited for “boss” 
Maksim to arrive and start the ceremony (Wikileaks, 2009c). U.S. Charge d'Affaires 
Lee Litzenberger reported that during this event a Member of the Kyrgyz 
Parliament ran up to the Russian Ambassador at some point to inform him that the 
American air base would stay in Kyrgyzstan because it was “all about the money” 
(Wikileaks, 2009c). To which Vlasov unsurprisingly replied, “I know it's about the 
money, but I want to see all the details of the money” (Wikileaks, 2009c). This 
“straw-in-the-wind” evidence demonstrates that Bakiyev’s ruling regime shaped 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy according to its rent-seeking interests and preferences. 
 
In general, such privy discussions demonstrate that rent-seeking schemes 
constituted an important part of political processes in Kyrgyzstan and were 
instrumental in the Manas basing politics. Moreover, there is “smoking-gun” 
evidence, which may explain why Bakiyev and his entourage decided to play the 
greater players off against one another. Behind-the-scene fuel arrangements 
reveal that the Russian call for the Manas eviction was rather a political discourse, 
since intricate fuel delivery chain had involved senior Kyrgyz officials, Russian 
Gazprom-owned refineries, American DLA-Energy and Gibraltar-registered 
companies. 
 
From the very inception, the fuel procured to the Manas Air Base was delivered 
predominantly from Russian refineries with the tacit approval of Kremlin. During 
Akayev’s tenure MIS and Aalam were procuring TS-1 jet fuel for the American air 
base from different locations, including Pavlodar and Atyrau, Kazakhstan, and the 
refineries of Turkmenistan (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 
December 2012). However, the main deliveries were from the Omsk refinery 
(Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). The Omsk 
refinery is the largest petroleum refinery in the world with the annual production 
capacity of approximately 21 million tons of crude oil and is a subsidiary of 
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Gazpromneft, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Gazprom (Gazpromneft, n.d.). The 
established fuel delivery schemes became jeopardized when Putin signed a 
decree No. 230 dated February 20, 2004, about the "Amendments to the list of 
equipment, materials and technologies that can be used to produce missile 
weapons and which are subjected to export control" (Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation, 2004). Referring to this decree, the 
Federal Agency for Technical and Export Control of the Russian Federation 
banned all exports of jet fuel for military purposes (Turdukulov, Chairman, 
Foundation of Progress, interview, 12 November 2012).62  
 
Regardless, the Manas air base has not experienced any fuel shortages. The U.S. 
Congress revealed that Red Star and Mina invented a scheme, which allowed 
companies to evade the ban and continue supplying jet fuel to the base. According 
to the USHR (2010), these American fuel vendors used their proxy companies to 
obtain false Kyrgyz certifications, which stated that the Russian fuel would be used 
by Kyrgyz civil aviation. However, this fuel was then re-procured to Red Star and 
Mina. All my interlocutors confirmed that it would be naïve to assume that the 
Kremlin was unaware of this illicit scheme. As Turdukulov (Chairman, Foundation 
of Progress, interview, 12 November 2012) stated, all top Gazprom officials, 
including Miller, understood where their fuel was really going, but in the end 
Gazprom was the recipient that was receiving most of the American money. 
Indeed, it was apparent and easily calculable that imported jet fuel was not used 
for Kyrgyz domestic purposes. The monthly needs of the Manas air base were 
several times higher than the annual needs of the “half-dead” Kyrgyz civil aviation 
(Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, interview, 12 November 2012). 
During some months the Manas Air Base was consuming more fuel than Moscow 
airport Sheremetyevo (Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, interview, 
12 November 2012). 
 
62 Both Bekbolotov and the DoD officials claimed that they have not seen this Decree, and they 
doubted whether it has existed per se. Yet, the document is freely available on the Russian internet 
for the download. 
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In light of these developments, the letter from the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Igor 
Chudinov to the Chief Executive of Gazprom Alexey Miller becomes especially 
controversial.63 This letter, which was presented by Bekbolotov to the USHR, 
reveals that Chudinov requested Miller’s assistance in the provision of jet fuel to 
Kyrgyz aviation. In particular, the head of Gazprom was asked to ensure Mina-
founded CAF would continue to receive 40,000 tons of jet fuel per month. 
Bekbolotov did not disclose how they managed to persuade a second person in the 
country to engage in such a sensitive issue and, moreover, falsely verify that 
Russian jet fuel would be used by Kyrgyz aviation. Nonetheless, this letter serves 
as a “smoking-gun” proof that the ruling regime exploited official communication 
channels in order to protect its personal interests. Otherwise, it remains unclear 
why the Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan officially requested Gazprom to support a 
private firm. 
 
Moreover, Bakiyev’s entourage also used unofficial “back-door” channels to 
promote its rent-seeking interests. Horton (2010: 5) revealed that Mina’s director of 
operations Squires enjoyed an exceptional rapport with Kyrgyz senior officials 
including Maksim Bakiyev whom he personally saw together at the Hyatt hotel in 
Bishkek. In addition, my anonymous interlocutor (interview, 14 January 2013) 
confirmed that the appointment of Chudinov as Prime Minister was directly 
orchestrated by Maksim, because Chudinov was a cadre of Maksim. In turn, the 
Subcommittee of the USHR (2010) also exposed that Erkin Bekbolotov, owner of 
Mina Group, personally served as a middleman between Maksim Bakiyev and the 
DoD during the negotiations over the base. Erkin, who was a contemporary of 
Maksim, admitted before the USHR that they were, indeed, “social acquaintances” 
and knew one another since they were teenagers (USHR, 2010: 32; Shishkin, 
2013: 230).64 Although Bekbolotov claimed that “personally” he did not do any 
business with Maksim, Bekbolotov confirmed that he has approached Maksim to 
save the base (USHR, 2010: 32). After a meeting with Maksim, Bekbolotov 
contacted DLA-Energy to outline a proposed solution to the Manas conundrum 
63 The original letter is published in the report Mystery at Manas of the USHR (2010). 
64 The fathers of Maksim and Erkin come from the same Jalal-Abad region and both served on high-
level positions in the governments of Akayev. 
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brokered with the son of the president, and until June 23, 2009, Bekbolotov 
continued to serve as a “back-door channels” intermediary (USHR, 2010: 30). In 
turn, the Wikileaks (2009e) reveal that Maksim Bakiyev praised himself for 
masterminding the new transit agreement via his “American friends in 
Washington”.  
 
If Bekbolotov’s rationale behind those negotiations was to save a source of his 
lucrative business, it is yet unknown what guided Maksim. Due to the lack of 
available public information and inaccessibility of Maksim Bakiyev for interview, we 
may only assume the genuine motives of Maksim in saving the base. Nonetheless, 
aforementioned diagnostic evidence indicated that Maksim Bakiyev had vested 
interests in the fuel deliveries to the Manas Air Base. After the April events of 2010, 
the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a statement that there was an ongoing 
investigation of the companies that belonged to Maksim, amongst which were 
CAF, MFS, KAS, Aircraft Petrol Ltd and Aviation Fuel Service (Tynan, 2010a). If 
those allegations are genuine, then the engagement of governmental officials and 
the rationale of Maksim in saving the base become apparent.  
 
In fact, the protectionism of the jet fuel business by high-standing officials was not 
exercised regarding CAF only. Prior to 2005, there was a draft law to impose a 
2000 KGS65-per-ton tax on all imported jet fuel; however, after 2005 the taxes on 
imported jet fuel were lifted by the Kyrgyz Parliament and the president (Tynan, 
2010a). Moreover, Red Star and Mina were exempt from paying any taxes on 
Kyrgyz soil by an intergovernmental agreement (Tynan, 2010a). Accordingly, it is 
highly unlikely that the tax haven for American fuel vendors was spearheaded by 
incentives to ease the tax burden of businessmen in the republic with a budget 
deficit. The rent-seeking nature of the Bakiyev regime presents rather a more 
realistic picture, with tax havens used for some secretive purposes. 
 
Furthermore, the Manas case not only demonstrates how the ruling elites capture 
the government and influence its distributional outcomes, but it also exposes how 
65 2000 KGS are approximately 45 USD. 
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political economy of rent-seeking emerges as a phenomenon not bound to the 
borders of weak states. “Smoking-gun” evidence showcased that complex fuel 
scheme engaged a variety of players. As Tolkunbek Abdygulov, (Head of the 
Economy and Strategic Development Department of the Government of 
Kyrgyzstan, interview, 13 September 2012) advised, this fuel chain was all about 
making money. The law of finance is to make money using other people’s money, 
and in our case there was a stable buyer – the U.S. Air Force, and there was a 
stable seller – the refineries in Russia (Abdygulov, interview, 13 September 2012). 
What was needed was to find a way how to join this chain between the seller and 
the buyer and make money (Abdygulov, interview, 13 September 2012). Maksim 
Bakiyev did not even have to invent anything, he simply outlined the new rules of 
the game, and everyone started playing to them accordingly, because all parties 
were interested in the Russian fuel to be delivered to the American air base 
(Abdygulov, interview, 13 September 2012).  
 
What was important for Gazprom and other Russian companies is that they have 
never been directly engaged with the American vendors or Kyrgyz subcontractors 
in these transactions (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 
2012). There were 2-3 intermediary companies, which bought fuel from Russia and 
then resold it in Kyrgyzstan; there was never a direct contact between the initial 
sellers and Mina (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 
2012). For instance, in Russia there are few documents available online for public 
access about legal dispute No. А40-85035/2005 between LLC NefteTrade and the 
Inspectorate of the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation at the Arbitrary 
Court of Moscow.66 According to this case, NefteTrade had purchased fuel from 
JSC RussNeft’s Syzran refinery and then sold it on to a third party LLC Albars. In 
turn, Albars sold this fuel to Red Star’s KAS. KAS would then sell this fuel to Red 
Star/Mina. Interestingly, the information about Albars (n.d.) available on its website 
displays that this Bishkek-registered company was created on August 29, 2002, to 
export Russian oil to the countries belonging to the Customs Union. The 
company’s main fuel suppliers are Russneft, Rosneft, Gazprom Oil and Lukoil 
66 For instance, there are some documents available on the legal portal Pravo.Ru.  
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(Albars, n.d.). Albars (n.d.) also has two foreign bank accounts at BNP Paribas and 
Bank Hapoalim in Switzerland, with the former also being a place where Red Star 
and Mina used to have accounts (USHR, 2010). 
 
As Bekbolotov confessed to the USHR (2010: 46), this scheme was a political 
cover for the Kremlin, because if the information about Gazprom and Mina became 
public, the Kremlin would have failed to deal with it politically and thus would have 
closed the fuel channel. There was also a pragmatic political explanation why the 
Kremlin permitted the sale of fuel to the base. Fuel was a hook for the Kremlin to 
have at least some control over the American base (Anonymous, Former Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). If 
Russia decided to close this particular fuel channel, the base would have found 
another source of fuel supply and would have become totally inaccessible to the 
Russians (Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). This situation was foreseen because Red 
Star and Mina were advised to examine alternative fuel routes, and were making 
contacts in Turkmenistan and Arab countries (Anonymous, Former Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, interview, 23 December 2013). 
 
In general, it is evident that the Kyrgyz fuel scheme was a multifarious mechanism 
that involved senior officials, shell and intermediary firms, the American DoD and 
Russian refineries. The cobweb of links between the companies was as complex 
as the logistics routes chosen for the delivery of jet fuel. Whilst ensuring that both 
Russian and American needs were satisfied, the regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev 
managed to turn the air base into the source of rent. The intricate linkages between 
the Kyrgyz ruling elites and international actors demonstrated that a small Central 
Asian republic was not a mere pawn of great powers, but a fully-fledged figure in 
the “tournament of shadows” for fuel, influence and power. In fact, much of the 
ostensible great power politics was mere acts of state dramaturgiia and a cover for 
the Kyrgyz ruling regimes to hide their goals of personal enrichment. The lucrative 
business opportunities brought together strange bedfellows, blurring the contours 
of the Central Asian geopolitical map and anachronizing traditional Cold War 
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thinking. Global financial mechanisms and offshore vehicles have become 
indispensable to modern Kyrgyzstan, whilst the country itself has fully immersed 
itself into the global informal economy. 
 
Rivalry from Within 
In one of its cables to the U.S. State Department, the American Embassy in 
Bishkek suggested that the Manas Air Base would continue “to lurch from crisis to 
crisis”, as both the Kyrgyz government and the opposition would use the base for 
their own domestic political purposes (Wikileaks, 2007). Although the American 
diplomatic cable suggested that the base would be exploited more rhetorically and 
as part of the political arguments, the Manas Air Base became the object of 
controversy between different elite groupings within the country, whilst the access 
to its fuel supplies contributed to political instability and to some extent to popular 
uprisings in Kyrgyzstan. As Eric McGlinchey (2011) asserted, the unwillingness of 
Akayev and Bakiyev to redistribute the wealth accumulated from the fuel contracts 
to the American air base was one of the factors in the downfall of their regimes.  
 
Indeed, in a country, where approximately 800 families own most of the profitable 
businesses, access to lucrative fuel contracts may become a cause of fracture 
between the elites and can lead to substantial power shifts within the republic.67 As 
Markowitz (2013) theorised, provincial and local elites become more dependent on 
the existing regime and open for cooptation, when rent-seeking opportunities are 
evenly distributed between them. However, when those elites lose their rent-
seeking avenues, they become more inclined to challenge political status quo in 
order to restore the opportunities to convert scarce resources into lucrative rents 
(Markowitz, 2013). In this respect, the rivalries over the sources of rent in 
Kyrgyzstan were noticeable not only between different clans, but also within each 
clan. For instance, initially during the tenure of Akayev Akayev’s son-in-law Adil 
Toigonbayev was controlling major assets in the country (Anonymous, Security 
Adviser, interview, 14 January 2013). However, after some time Akayev’s son 
Aidar began to drive out his close relative from the most lucrative businesses, and 
67 For instance, Beshimov (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, interview, 12 
November 2012) advised that approximately 500-600 people control all major assets in Kyrgyzstan. 
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as a result they had to split their spheres of interest (Cloud, 2005; Anonymous, 
Security Adviser, interview, 14 January 2013). The fuel supplies to Manas were 
splintered between Akayev’s son and son-in-law, which emphasises that none of 
the sides was interested in yielding control of this particular business.  
 
In the case of Bakiyev, the intra-clan rivalry was unfolding between the sons and 
the brothers of the president. During the first year after the March revolution of 
2005 Bakiyev’s brothers had significant influence over the president, but after 2006 
Maksim became in control of his father to usurp the power in the country 
(Anonymous, Security Adviser, interview, 14 January 2013; Anonymous, Political 
Adviser, interview, 6 May 2013; Wikileaks, 2008). Alikbek Dzhekshenkulov, the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Bakiyev, stated that he met Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev in 2006 to inform him that other families were also interested in the Manas 
jet fuel cake (Kramer, 2010). However, Bakiyev continued to threaten Washington 
to evict the base with the purpose of channelling the DoD’s fuel contracts to the 
companies controlled by his family (Kramer, 2010). Dzhekshenkulov claimed that 
this confrontation with Bakiyev has partly led to the Dzhekshenkulov’s dismissal 
from the office (Kramer, 2010).  
 
The emergence of a strong elitist class in Kyrgyzstan can be attributed to the early 
liberalisation reforms of Akayev (Radnitz, 2010b; Radnitz, 2010b). Those reforms 
helped create a thin layer of wealthy elites who had a large social support base 
and were capable of challenging the ruling regimes (Radnitz, 2010b). The rivalry 
between Babanov and Mina-affiliated intermediary companies is an indicative 
example of such a struggle between different power groups within Kyrgyzstan over 
access to the Manas fuel deliveries. When Aidar Akayev fled Kyrgyzstan, Babanov 
took over his jet fuel business, and from 2005 to 2007 Babanov became the sole 
supplier of fuel to the American air base (Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of 
Progress, interview, 12 November 2012). However, by 2008 the governing 
authorities of the airport began to favour the rivals of Babanov, and in a short stint 
Babanov’s companies were outbid by MAF, CAF and MFS (USHR, 2010). 
Allegedly, Maksim Bakiyev decided to get the full control over the jet fuel supplies 
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to Manas and used these companies and the airport authority to drive out Babanov 
from this business (Sorokina and Saakyan, 2011). Approximately the same period 
Babanov sold his gas station empire to Gazprom for 100 million USD and joined 
the opposition that demanded the resignation of Bakiyev (Bukasheva, 2010).68  
 
Furthermore, the competition between Babanov’s companies and Mina-affiliated 
entities was also evident in their attempts to capture the VOSST fuel storage. 
Valeriy Khon’s company VOSST owned a large fuel storage facility located in a 
close proximity to the Manas Air Base. Khon confirmed that Squires from Mina 
approached him in 2003, 2006 and 2008 seeking to buy or rent the facility (Tynan, 
2010b). According to Khon, after the third refusal the people of Maksim began to 
pressure Khon to sell the storage (Tynan, 2010b). Khon advised that he was 
pressured in a similar vein by Babanov and his affiliates (Tynan, 2010b). Squires of 
Mina acknowledged before the Subcommittee that Babanov turned out to be “a 
bitter and unpleasant rival” to Mina and Red Star (USHR, 2010: 40). Nonetheless, 
in a testimony to the USHR (2010) Khon asserted that Babanov was pressuring 
Khon to lease the storage facility not to Babanov, but to Red Star, and in 2008 
Khon agreed to sell the storage facility to LLC Atek Oil, which belonged to 
Sagadylda uuly Janybek, the niece of Babanov. However, Khon claimed that 5 
million USD promised for the storage has never been transferred to him. After an 
eight-month long lawsuit Atek Oil agreed to return the facility to Khon, but on 
onerous terms (Babakulov, 2011). Khon asserted that the people of Maksim 
Bakiyev forced him to sign this settlement agreement in December 2009 
(Babakulov, 2011). In 2009 Babanov was also appointed the Vice Prime Minister of 
Kyrgyzstan, which to some extent can be perceived as the compensation to him for 
the base, since by joining the opposition Babanov significantly increased the 
weight of the anti-Bakiyev block.  
 
In general, these examples demonstrate that there was a constant struggle 
between the local elites over access to the Manas fuel pipe. Although the fuel 
68 In turn, in 2008, Babanov’s close business partner Musa Bazhaev, the Russian oligarch of 
Chechen origin, lost his factories Koshoy and Kaiyndy-Kant in Kyrgyzstan purportedly to Maksim 
Bakiyev (Bukasheva, 2010). 
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supplies to the Manas Air Base were always controlled by the close relatives of the 
then-presidents, the remaining elitist groupings were keen to redistribute scare 
resources even at the expense of political stability in Kyrgyzstan. As a result, this 
struggle often shifted the power balance within the country.   
 
Life after the April Revolution of 2010 
The overthrow of Bakiyev exposed numerous problems related to the DoD 
procurement at the Manas airport, since the political economy of fuel supplies to 
the air base was part of the political conflict that led to the uprising against Bakiyev 
and then indirectly to the ethnic violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan. The new 
government openly criticised Washington for supporting Bakiyev’s corrupt regime 
by providing lucrative fuel contracts to Bakiyev-affiliated companies at the expense 
of political freedoms and human rights. The diplomatic scandal was escalated 
further, when Mina was awarded a new contract in 2010 by DLA-Energy 
notwithstanding the open objections of the Kyrgyz government. On December 2, 
2010, Interim President of Kyrgyzstan Roza Otunbayeva met with U.S. State 
Secretary Hillary Clinton in Bishkek, where both parties agreed to work on 
establishing a new Kyrgyz state venture that would supply fuel to the Transit 
Center at Manas.69 
 
Nonetheless, whilst DLA-Energy was preparing a new fuel solicitation for 2012 and 
whilst Kyrgyzstan was negotiating the creation of a joint venture with Gazpromneft, 
Mina continued to supply fuel to the Transit Center (Pellerin, 2010). In addition, to 
fix its reputation Mina hired reputable international and local law firms such as 
Amsterdam & Peroff70 and Kalikova & Associates71 and top-notch PR and lobbying 
firms such as Bush-Cheney affiliated Hamilton Place Strategies72 and BGR 
Gabara73. In the summer of 2011 Mina announced that it would provide 2.5 million 
USD to the American University of Central Asia to create a New Generation 
Academy, a preparatory school for 70 students from the regions (American 
69 To read the U.S. Embassy transcript go to http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/tr_12_03_10.html. 
70 See Mazykina, J. (2011). 
71See http://k-a.kg/eng/inga-mecke-attorney-amsterdam-peroff-llp. 
72 See Tynan (2010e). 
73 See http://www.bgrdc.com/bgr_gabara.html. 
211 
 
                                                          
University of Central Asia, 2011). Despite Mina’s public relations efforts it was 
apparent that the U.S. vendor was losing its business niche in Kyrgyzstan, since 
the new government was determined to oust Mina from fuel contracting to Manas. 
In the summer of 2010, Bekbolotov met with son of Otunbayeva Atai Sadybakasov 
in Istanbul (Kucera, 2010). After this meeting Otunbayeva posted a new entry in 
her video blog that the leadership of Mina was trying to establish contacts with her 
to renegotiate the terms, but Otunbayeva omitted that her son deliberately flew to 
Istanbul to meet Bekbolotov (Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of Progress, 
interview, 12 November 2012). Turdukulov (Chairman, Foundation of Progress, 
interview, 12 November 2012) speculates that probably Mina and Sadybakasov 
failed to come to a common agreement, and Mina decided to discredit 
Otunbayeva. By leaking the information about this meeting, the leadership of Mina 
was trying to demonstrate that the new government was also playing by the same 
rules of rent-seeking and self-profiting (Turdukulov, Chairman, Foundation of 
Progress, interview, 12 November 2012).  
 
In fact, the immediate post-Bakiyev fuel supply structure demonstrates that there 
was still a plethora of opaque operations and intermediary companies. In 2010 
Mina agreed to subcontract a fraction of its fuel requirements to the Kyrgyz state-
owned TZK Manas (Centrasia, 2011; Tynan, 2011b). Centrasia (2011) revealed 
that in 2010 Mina Corp was buying fuel from TZK Manas for 1030 USD per ton and 
was selling it to the U.S. government for 1263 USD, making a profit of 233 USD 
per ton. In turn, TZK Manas was buying fuel from a new player, mysterious Mega 
Oil, for 850-890 USD, making a profit of nearly 140-180 USD per ton (Centrasia, 
2011).  Mega Oil was buying fuel from the Gazprom-owned refineries in Russia for 
approximately 780 USD and earning 69-110 USD per ton (Centrasia, 2011).  
 
The appearance of these new intermediary companies immediately led to the 
allegations of old practices within the new government. TZK Manas has long been 
associated with Babanov, the favourite of Otunbayeva (Yalovkina, 2012). Mega Oil 
was an intermediary company created by the leadership of a Bishkek subsidiary of 
Gazpromneft, Gazpromneft Azia, led by former Minister of Finance under Akayev 
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Bolot Abildayev (Centrasia, 2011). Centrasia (2011) discovered that from its 
inception in 2007 Mega Oil has been several times re-registered, but all owners of 
the company were Gazprom-affiliates. For instance, amongst the founders of the 
company were the son, the wife and the daughter-in-law of Abildayev, whilst the 
legal address of the company matched one of the office addresses of the 
Gazpromneft Azia (Centrasia, 2011). Indeed, it is difficult to find a direct link 
between Otunbayeva, Babanov and Mega Oil. Nevertheless, Kyrgyz journalist 
Elena Avdeeva (2011) emphasised that in 2010 the director of TZK Manas was 
Marat Malatayev who knew Otunbayeva well from their shared diplomatic work 
history and who knew well Babanov. Purportedly, Malatayev orchestrated the 
purchase of Babanov’s gas station by Gazpromneft Azia, where Malatayev has 
served as the Deputy Director (Avdeeva, 2011). This information is, however, 
difficult to triangulate and thus it needs to be taken into account with a certain 
degree of scepticism. 
 
In turn, a Eurasianet source advised that TZK Manas was using Mega Oil, because 
at that time TZK Manas did not possess a license to export the Russian jet fuel to 
Kyrgyzstan (Tynan, 2011a). My anonymous interlocutor (Fuel Logistics Expert, 
interview, 21 December 2012) also stated that jet fuel is a very scarce product with 
extremely high demand in the world. Fuel vendors often have to negotiate the 
amounts of fuel they purchase one year ahead, because every petroleum refinery 
has its own storage limits (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 
December 2012). As a result, if fuel vendors fail to purchase the volumes of fuel 
indicated in their “wish lists” to the refineries, they often get fined for failing to 
comply with the obligations (Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 
December 2012). These practices are particularly widespread at the Russian 
refineries. Since no one in fuel business expected the April revolution of 2010, the 
fuel vendors found themselves in a situation when they could have procured fuel to 
Mina, but they had no signed memorandums with the Russian refineries 
(Anonymous, Fuel Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012). Thus, to some 
degree the introduction of Mega Oil was a way to continue fuel supplies to the 
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base, using the institutional capacities of Gazpromneft Azia (Anonymous, Fuel 
Logistics Expert, interview, 21 December 2012; Tynan, 2011a). 
 
Nonetheless, in February 2011, Gazpromneft Aero, the subsidiary of the Russian 
giant Gazpromneft, and TZK Manas signed an agreement on creating a joint 
venture Gazpromneft Aero-Kyrgyzstan (GAK), with a shared ratio of 51 percent to 
49 percent (K-News, 2012). On September 26, 2011, the DoD awarded GAK with 
the first contract to supply 20 to 50 percent of all required fuel to the Transit Center 
at Manas, with the possibility of increasing GAK’s shares up to 90 percent if GAK 
can fully meet those requirements (U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, 2011). On October 
26, 2011, the DoD announced that London-based World Fuel Services Europe 
(WFSE) was chosen as the second Manas fuel vendor with the requirement to 
supply a minimum of 10 percent of fuel needs of the base (Tynan, 2011b). World 
Fuel Services Europe is a branch of World Fuel Services, a Fortune 500 company, 
that purchased the first air base vendor AvCard (Tynan, 2011b). This news was 
perceived locally as a promising sign. Indeed, these were exciting times when the 
Americans, Russians and Kyrgyz sat together at the table to discuss the fuel 
arrangements to the Manas Air Base. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine a complex struggle over the fuel supplies to the 
American air base at the Manas International Airport. Whilst unveiling intricate 
linkages between different actors over access to the Manas Air Base, this section 
demonstrated that the American air base has become a source of rent for the 
ruling elites in Kyrgyzstan. Both Akayev and Bakiyev and their entourages 
exploited the DoD’s lucrative fuel contracts for the personal enrichment and for the 
strengthening of their regimes. The capture of fuel supplies to the Manas Air Base 
has been accomplished through the use of subcontractors and fixed-based 
operators. In the case of Akayev these companies were MIS and Aalam, and in the 
case of Bakiyev these companies were purportedly KAS, APM, AFS, CAF and 
MAF.  
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Although the fuel deliveries to the Manas Air Base were always controlled by the 
inner circles of the ruling presidents, the remaining elitist groupings were eager to 
alter these arrangements. As a result, lucrative fuel contracts became a cause of 
fracture between the Kyrgyz elites and led to substantial power shifts and political 
instability in the republic, which eventually turned into two successful uprisings 
against Akayev and Bakiyev. In addition, the empirical evidence demonstrated that 
even after the ousting of two presidents the new elites continued to play by the old 
rules. The case of Mega Oil displayed that there was still a progress to make in fuel 
procurement to make it a more transparent process.  
 
Moreover, Manas business arrangements revealed that the geopolitically motivated 
concept of the New Great Game lacked empirical evidence in Kyrgyzstan. 
Common business interests overshadowed potential geopolitical points of friction, 
whilst financial vehicles and offshore mechanisms ensured that these secret 
arrangements remained intact.  The regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev managed to 
play off Washington and Moscow for their own rent-seeking interests, as the 
complex fuel schemes involved not only Kyrgyz senior officials and shell and 
intermediary companies, but also the American DoD and the Russian refineries. 
Much of the great power politics turned out to be the state performances directed 
to hide the real rent-seeking rationales. As a result, Kyrgyz politics emerged as part 
of a complex constellation with transnational connections and global outreach. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis presented a comprehensive analysis of the Kyrgyz foreign policy from 
the early 1990s to 2011. The main research question was the following: how and to 
what extent does regime security affect Kyrgyz foreign policymaking? Accordingly, 
this work revealed that regime security was quintessential in shaping foreign policy 
of Kyrgyzstan. Such a situation was predetermined by the systemic weaknesses of 
the republic and personal interests of the ruling regimes. In particular, the Kyrgyz 
ruling elites managed to play off greater players for their own rent-seeking interests 
and performed the acts of virtual politics in order to accommodate the ambitions of 
regional hegemons and to sustain their own monopoly of violence within 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Regime Security and Foreign Policy 
Weak states like Kyrgyzstan pose a formidable challenge to the Westphalian view 
of security and international order. Security in such a context implies a wide range 
of preconditions vital for the existence of weak state and which have already been 
realised in developed countries. Weak states lack a strong physical base, effective 
public institutions, a monopoly on the instruments of violence and a consensus on 
the idea of the state and thus are distinguished by the nature of their insecurities 
(Buzan, 1991). The ruling elites in such states fail to escape the insecurity dilemma 
posed by both internal and external weaknesses of the state, and as a result the 
perennial challenge of those elites becomes the dilemma of achieving short-term 
regime security at the expense of the long-term state-building objectives (Migdal, 
1988; Ayoob, 1995; Mohamedou, 1998; Jackson, 2010).  
 
In this respect, the regime security variable may add an analytical breadth to the 
foreign policy analysis of weak states. Accordingly, this work attempted to 
demonstrate that regime security drove foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan. In turn, the 
preponderance of regime security in Kyrgyz foreign policy was explained by the 
systemic weaknesses of the country and the rent-seeking motives of the ruling 
elites. In this research, “regime” was defined as a certain group of people in power, 
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the ruling elites, who have a monopoly on the instruments of violence within the 
country. Such a conceptualisation focuses on a powerful minority of individuals, i.e. 
presidents and their entourages, who can significantly affect state policymaking 
and whose influence and might prevails over those of other players in the country. 
 
Traditionally, Central Asia has been studied through the interplay of greater players 
and particularly through the Russian decline and reassertion in the region. Such a 
conceptualisation is in line with the neorealist concept of the New Great Game, 
which imagines a covert rivalry between Russia, China and the USA over access 
to Central Asia. This model envisages that weak Central Asian states have no 
alternatives but to bandwagon the actors with stronger offensive potential. Indeed, 
the retrospective analysis of the Kyrgyz foreign policy demonstrated that the 
failures of economic reforms and rapid impoverishment of the republic under 
Akayev predetermined the weakest place of Kyrgyzstan in the regional geopolitical 
system of axes.  
 
As a result, the pattern of Kyrgyz foreign policy behaviour was often erratic and 
fragmentary. Instead of bridging the East and the West, Kyrgyzstan was rather 
fluctuating between the East and the West. Driven by certain momentums and 
political conjunctures the foreign policy orientation of Kyrgyzstan failed to translate 
into a consistent system that would reflect Kyrgyzstan’s national interests. The 
prevailing political discourses attributed bandwagoning behaviour of Kyrgyzstan to 
systemic constraints and were often justified by the idea that small and weak states 
are more prone to external influences.  
 
Indeed, the systemic weaknesses of Kyrgyzstan partially explain why the ruling 
regimes were preoccupied with the accommodation of the ambitions of regional 
hegemons, whilst their multivector foreign policy resembled opportunism and state-
level beggary. Kyrgyzstan’s weak infrastructural power, undiversified economy and 
a limited resource endowment transformed the republic into one of the poorest and 
weakest states in the world incapable of projecting power beyond its borders. As a 
result, the Kyrgyz leadership had to take into account the policies and priorities of 
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stronger partners, regional organisations and international institutions quite often in 
order to attract necessary funds to finance deficit budget. 
  
Nonetheless, the preponderance of regime security in Kyrgyz foreign policy was 
related not only to the systemic weaknesses of the country, but was also deeply 
rooted in the rent-seeking interests of the ruling regime. Characterised by corrupt, 
autocratic and family-based governance, the Kyrgyz ruling elites, in reality, lacked 
ideological commitments to any foreign policy poles and were rather interested in 
securing personal political and economic benefits by playing off greater players 
(Lewis, 2008). As diagnostic evidence revealed, rent-seeking schemes constituted 
an important part of political processes in the country and were instrumental in 
shaping foreign policy orientations of Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Since regime security was driven by the systemic constraints and the rent-seeking 
interests of the ruling elites, virtual politics emerged as a convenient strategy for 
the ruling regimes to both further their rent-seeking interests and to reinforce their 
security from the external pressures. In this respect, the Kyrgyz leadership excelled 
at theatricalising democratic reforms for the Western audience and at reinventing 
regionalism for the less democratic Eastern and Central Asian counterparts. The 
reflection of such a virtual politics was the erratic foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan. In 
fact, what some scholars (Abdurazakov, n.d.; Omarov, 2007; Otunbayeva, 2009; 
Baktygulov, 2012) framed as the non-existing Kyrgyz foreign policy can be 
interpreted as the virtual foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan, the goal of which was to 
guarantee domestic security and rent-seeking opportunities to the ruling regimes.  
 
This work revealed numerous cases of such a phenomenon. For instance, these 
tendencies were evident in the relationships of Kyrgyzstan with Russia, China and 
the USA within regional military structures. Diagnostic evidence exposed that both 
the CSTO and the SCO suffered from institutional flaws and lacked political 
backing from their member-states to provide security guarantees to the Kyrgyz 
leadership. In a similar vein, the NATO’s PfP programme was not equipped to 
address internal and external threats to the republic. Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan’s 
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military state performance was not about achieving tangible benefits. Akayev and 
Bakiyev exploited the army to perform the acts of virtual politics in order to convert 
the state dramaturgiia into political and financial currency and to accommodate the 
ambitions of regional hegemons. Participation in regional security initiatives was 
the showcase conducted by the Kyrgyz ruling regimes to display their 
bandwagoning attitudes towards greater players to reinforce domestic regime 
security. However, virtual politics of military cooperation brought quite often virtual 
dividends only. Regional security structures were as disinclined to fight the IMU 
islamists in the Batken region in 1999 and 2000, as they were unwilling to protect 
falling regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev in 2005 and 2010 respectively. 
Nevertheless, it was the government of Otunbayeva, which experienced the real 
non-committal nature of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. Regional 
security organisations along with Russia, China and the USA remained reticent to 
Otunbayeva’s call for humanitarian intervention and international peacekeeping, 
when the ethnic violence broke in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. As a 
result, against the backdrop of international abandonment the Kyrgyz leadership 
had to rely on internal security forces, which were corroded by the corrupt practices 
of rent-seeking and regime security, and on the Kyrgyz army, which was weak, 
poorly equipped and with low fighting capabilities.  
 
In a similar vein, the Kyrgyz ruling elites orchestrated the acts of state dramaturgiia 
to capture the state and create opportunities for personal gain. Crystallised by the 
clan and family bonds, rent-seeking in Kyrgyzstan has morphed into a symbiotic 
substance of parasitic nature to the state apparatus. Corruption and nepotism 
became the founding skeleton of the Kyrgyz political system, wherein every actor 
with access to illegal or semi-illegal profiting was interested in safeguarding the 
existing regime. Those excluded from the lucrative incomes and preferential 
benefits tended to challenge the ruling actors, but not the rules of the game. The 
experience of the American air base Manas in Kyrgyzstan serves as an excellent 
empirical referent to prove that Kyrgyz foreign policy decisions have rarely gone 
beyond the commercial preferences of the ruling elites. As this work showcased, 
both Akayev and Bakiyev and their entourages exploited the US Department of 
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Defence’s lucrative fuel contracts for the personal enrichment and for the 
strengthening of their regimes. In addition, the circumstantial evidence revealed 
that even after the ousting of two autocratic presidents the new elites continued to 
play by the old rules of rent-seeking. More importantly, clandestine business 
arrangements of the Manas Air Base challenged the geopolitically motivated 
concept of the New Great Game. The regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev managed to 
play off Washington and Moscow for their own rent-seeking interests, whilst much 
of the great power politics turned out to be mere state performances directed to 
hide the real rent-seeking rationales. Common business interests overshadowed 
potential geopolitical points of friction, as the complex behind-the-scene fuel 
arrangements involved not only senior Kyrgyz officials and shell and intermediary 
companies, but also the American Department of Defence and the Russian 
refineries.  
 
In turn, official and unofficial foreign policy discourses were used by the Kyrgyz 
leadership to justify opportunistic and mercantile deviations of the international 
behaviour of Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the concept of Kyrgyz multivector foreign 
policy assumed courting the protection of greater players and represented the form 
of political solidarity against the pressures and processes that could have 
challenged the Kyrgyz ruling regimes. Likewise, informal foreign policy discourses 
such as conspiracy theories reproduced the predominant state of affairs and 
legitimised patron-client relations as an established mode of governance. Thus, 
Kyrgyzstan continued its fluctuations between different power poles 
notwithstanding the proclamations by Akayev and Bakiyev to run a multivector 
foreign policy and to bridge the East and the West. Despite being a career 
diplomat, Roza Otunbayeva also had little opportunity and power to re-formulate 
foreign policy of the country. 
 
In sum, regime security played an instrumental role in shaping foreign policy 
choices of Kyrgyzstan. Although the majority of scholars and policymakers 
perceived Kyrgyz foreign policy of regime security as the reaction to external 
influences, systemic factors were not the only constitutive element that shaped 
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external relations of the republic. Rent-seeking was amongst the primary factors 
that influenced Kyrgyz decisionmaking. Akayev’s ineffective and corrupt 
governance led to the emergence of a rent-seeking regime, which was driven by 
the goal of maintaining its physical presence and safeguarding established rules of 
the game. These arrangements were further solidified by Bakiyev and remained 
unchallenged by Otunbayeva. As a result, the Kyrgyz foreign policymaking 
institutions became ingrained into the rent-seeking schemes of the ruling regimes, 
whilst the meritocratic expectations of foreign service were substituted by 
unprofessional, mercantile and deferential values that rarely went beyond the 
commercial preferences of the powerful elites. In other words, the inconsistent 
Kyrgyz foreign policy was the outcome of virtual politics exercised by the ruling 
regimes in order to protect themselves from the systemic pressures and to 
maintain their rent-seeking practices. 
 
Generalisation of Findings: Multilevel Framework of Analysis and Process-Tracing 
This dissertation examined international relations of Kyrgyzstan through an 
interpretive approach integrative of internal, external and transnational variables. 
Such an approach seeks to bridge the divide between FPA and IR and enhance 
their capacity to explain the input and output of state behaviour through a multi-
level and multi-causal framework of analysis. This framework challenges 
conventional approaches to the study of weak states and presents a new 
perspective for the causal analysis of complex political phenomenon. Indeed, an 
interpretivist approach with causal process-tracing methodology provides intriguing 
opportunities for hypothesis-building and hypothesis-testing. 
 
Accordingly, this work encouraged to start the quest for unpacking international 
behaviour of weak states not on domestic or systemic levels, but in between, 
incorporating external environment, internal insecurities and transnational links. 
This approach is based on Hay’s (2002) principles of critical political analysis. 
Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2008) proposed to apply the features of Hay’s analysis 
to the foreign policy sphere. This framework challenges the postulates of structural 
realism and actor-specific commitments of traditional FPA by incorporating both the 
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agency and the structure as potential independent variables and outlining 
necessary prerequisites for the effective causal analysis of political processes. The 
application of these principles to foreign policy of weak states offers a significant 
advantage over the limited perspectives of both FPA and wider IR, since there is a 
lack of conceptual frameworks that adequately explain foreign policy behaviour of 
weak states. Orthodox approaches to FPA are well-equipped to analyse foreign 
policies of stronger players such as the USA or Russia. Yet, when applied to 
smaller and weaker states such as Kyrgyzstan the universality of these 
approaches lacks sufficient explanatory punch. As a result, the studies of 
underdeveloped states remain underdeveloped and mostly centred around 
conventional idiosyncratic, reductionist and neorealist dogmas. 
 
In this respect, the framework used for this study can help understand and explain 
international behaviour of other weak states, in Central Asia and beyond, in 
broader and more genuine terms. In particular, an interpretive and inductive 
approach integrative of both internal and external variables may allow the scholars 
to examine the sources of foreign policies in the context, where a combination of 
different variables can lead to the same outcome. For instance, as previously 
discussed, through the analysis of war-torn Tajikistan Jonson (2006) provided 
constructivist insights on how a small and weak state formulates its foreign policy 
priorities under the vigilante focus of greater powers. Jonson (2006) demonstrated 
that the distinction between the internal and external variables, which shape 
foreign policy of weak states, is razor-thin. Thus, it is important to take into account 
both domestic and systemic context in order to understand how small Central 
Asian states develop and promote their national interests. 
 
Nonetheless, such an approach should not be limited to the Central Asian region 
exclusively. For example, Yasar Sari (2008) examined foreign policy 
decisionmaking of post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia through the 
interplay of domestic and systemic variables and regime security in particular. Sari 
(2008) sought to verify whether internal variables such as the type of threats, role 
of leadership and its orientation, strength of the newly independent states, and 
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external level of interference shape foreign policy choices of weak post-Soviet 
states. Thus, Sari (2008) denoted that the general foreign policy trends of those 
states towards their former imperial centre were characterised by balancing, 
bandwagoning and omnibalancing. However, when both internal and external 
security matters were on stake, the leadership of Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi gave 
higher priority to those issues, which were of vital importance to their own security. 
Accordingly, Sari (2008: 392) concluded that foreign policies of these Caucasian 
states were the product of the perceived threats to the ruling regimes than of the 
geopolitical estimations, although the ruling regimes have not separated domestic 
and foreign policies process, as they regarded foreign policy as “a tool for 
interaction between power struggles in domestic politics and position in the 
international system”. In a similar vein, Bassel Salloukh (2000) advocated for a 
move away from structural realism when examining the Arab alliance 
decisionmaking. Salloukh (2000) argued that foreign policies of Syria under Bashar 
al-Assad and Jordan under King Hussein were driven by the state-society variable, 
as the ruling regimes in these states were preoccupied with their own survival. In 
the case of Syria, the Ba’th party ensured regime control and obedience of the 
active societal group through strong internal corporatist institutions and specialized 
bureaus of the Regional Command, which in turn allowed Assad to engage more 
with the external threats and geopolitical balancing (Salloukh, 2000). In Jordan, the 
Hashemite regime was more engaged with the internal matters and its own 
security, whilst the domestic and external spheres overlapped to the extent of the 
merger (Salloukh, 2000). In other words, such an approach has the potential to 
contribute to the understanding of structural factors that shape international 
behaviour of weak states across the globe in general and in Central Asia in 
particular. 
 
Furthermore, the causal research design adopted for this work utilised the case 
study, process-tracing and triangulation research methods to ensure the validity 
and reliability of its generalisations. The inductive nature of the case study method 
provides an opportunity for the scholars to the test the hypothesis via the use of 
causal mechanisms, which produce observable implications for the evaluation. 
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Although external validity of case studies is relatively weak, transferability of 
findings is the challenge of qualitative research in general and not the problem 
inherent exclusively to a specific research design. Thus, case studies can still 
succeed at developing valid generalisations, especially in the context of the cases 
with equifinality. Moreover, interpretive process-tracing can be conducive for 
testing the hypothesis both against different evidence within and against different 
cases across the research topic, since process-tracing is superior at capturing 
causal mechanisms in action for comparison and possible transferability to other 
cases. 
 
There is a caveat, however, which needs to be taken into account by scholars who 
want to study complex political phenomena in the volatile and turbulent regions 
such as Central Asia through an interpretivist approach with causal process-tracing 
methodology. Due to an uneven access to the information it may be difficult to run 
a classical process-tracing research model. Scholars have to acknowledge the 
possibility of inferential leaps, missing variables and biased or false data, and thus 
they have to always cross-check or triangulate information. Moreover, scholars 
have to be aware that it may be problematic to locate undeniable evidence or 
evidence beyond reasonable doubt and run a “double decisive” process-tracing 
test in the context of a sensitive political research, especially if the researchers 
have access to public information only and are constrained by limited resources. 
 
Accordingly, to establish a causal relationship between the dependent, 
independent and intervening variables in such a research, scholars have to build a 
convincing case to test a hypothesis based on the available data. In this work I 
have attempted to evaluate my causal inferences through the prism of a “smoking-
gun” test. There were a number of “smoking-gun” clues, which helped me evaluate 
my hypothesis, although some of the evidence has fallen into the circumstantial 
“straw-in-the-wind” category. Nevertheless, multiple “straw-in-the-wind” clues also 
provide an important benchmark for the investigation of causal mechanisms and 
offer a certain degree of plausibility to the hypothesis. Thus, based on a 
preponderance of evidence I concluded that the inconsistent Kyrgyz foreign policy 
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was the effect of virtual politics exercised by the ruling regimes in order to protect 
themselves from the external interferences and to maintain their rent-seeking 
practices. Although the presence of undeniable proof would have enriched the 
argument beyond reasonable doubt, such evidence is yet unrealistic to obtain in 
the context of the Central Asian political landscape. 
 
In sum, an interpretivist approach integrative of internal, external and transnational 
variables can be conducive to the analysis of foreign policies of weak states on the 
post-Soviet space and well beyond. The inductive nature of the interpretivist 
methodology provides excellent possibilities to build and test the theories and 
compare the process and outcomes of the research within and across the case 
studies. Indeed, such a framework equips aspiring scholars with practical tools to 
study complex political phenomena in the volatile and turbulent regions. 
 
The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking and Political Instability 
In addition to the main findings, this research had an indirect discovery related to 
the political stability of weak states. The case study of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated 
that the Kyrgyz ruling elites failed miserably at a task of ensuring domestic regime 
security despite employing a variety of strategies to maintain physical presence 
and spearhead their personal interests. Accordingly, there is an ensuing question, 
which requires a further and more detailed academic inquiry: why does the foreign 
policy of regime security lead, on the contrary, to regime insecurity? In this respect, 
the political economy approach adds a fresh explanatory value to the 
understanding of post-Soviet political developments. 
 
Diagnostic evidence revealed that the political economy of rent-seeking has not 
only shaped foreign policy orientations of Kyrgyzstan, but also had a detrimental 
effect on the political stability of the country. The distribution of rents became a 
cause of fracture between different clans and thus contributed to political instability 
in the republic. Radnitz (2010a; 2010b) attempted to explain this phenomenon 
through the political economy of authoritarianism. By examining the presence of 
mass protests in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia and their absence in 
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Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Radnitz (2010a) related the wave of the 
colour revolutions in the post-Soviet states to the distribution of resources. In 
particular, Radnitz (2010a) believes that those post-Soviet states, which underwent 
liberalising economic reforms, were more prone to power struggle and political 
contestation, whilst the states, which did not undergo economic reforms and 
privatisation, were less vulnerable to mass protests. 
 
Radnitz linked this nexus of political economy and political influence in the region 
to the emergence of a wealthy layer of capitalist elites who were capable of 
challenging the status quo and unseating the autocratic rulers. For instance, 
Radnitz (2010a) argued that a thorough redistribution of resources in Kyrgyzstan, 
Georgia and Ukraine in the early 1990s created important preconditions for the 
revolutions, whilst command-type economic systems in Azerbaijan and Belarus 
minimised the number of regime defectors and starved the opposition of resources 
and financial channels. Indeed, Akayev’s economic reforms created a layer of 
oligarchs who amassed a fortune and established a large support base to protect 
and advance their own interests. These developments became the legacy of 
Akayev, which Bakiyev and Otunbayeva had to face. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that apart from the presence of the 
wealthy elites the mechanism of rent distribution and elite cooptation was also 
instrumental to political stability/instability in Kyrgyzstan. As McGlinchey (2011) 
asserted, the unwillingness of Akayev and Bakiyev to redistribute the rents led to 
their downfall. The case of the Manas Air Base demonstrated that that there was a 
constant struggle between the local elites over access to the Manas fuel pipe. 
Although the fuel deliveries to the Manas Air Base were always controlled by the 
inner circles of the ruling presidents, the excluded elitist groupings were keen to 
alter the fuel status quo. As a result, lucrative fuel contracts became a cause of 
fracture between the Kyrgyz elites and led to political instability in the republic, 
which eventually turned into two successful uprisings against the then-presidents.  
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Such a process may be related to the prevalence of distinct rent-seeking 
arrangements in Central Asia. In particular, Markowitz (2013) concluded that the 
ruling regimes become more resilient against popular uprisings, when rent-seeking 
opportunities are evenly distributed between provincial and local elites. On the 
contrary, in the resource-poor localities, elites, which are deprived of rent-seeking 
opportunities, are more inclined to challenge the ruling regimes in order to open up 
or restore the rent-seeking avenues (Markowitz, 2013). In this respect, Kyrgyzstan 
turns out to be an excellent empirical referent to examine the processes of power 
contestation through the lenses of the political economy of rent-seeking. 
 
In general, the correlation between the distribution of rents and political stability is 
an intriguing area to conduct further academic research. The analysis of this 
correlation can inform our understanding of state failures, regime changes, 
communal violence, protracted social conflicts and other challenges of weak states 
attempting to shift from the authoritarian to democratic form of governance. Thus, 
the answer to the question “Why does the foreign policy of regime security lead to 
the regime insecurity?” serves as an excellent starting point for independent 
academic research with strong normative implications. 
 
Global Anti-Corruption Regime as a Normative Aspiration 
This research has strong normative aspirations, since the author dreams of 
Kyrgyzstan to eventually become the Switzerland of Central Asia, as was promised 
by Akayev. Accordingly, the findings of this work may point at a variety of issues 
from a normative perspective such as the prevailing patron-client relations in 
Kyrgyzstan, inconsistent foreign policy orientations, weak rule of law or 
unprofessional security structures. Nonetheless, one of the aims of this work was 
to underscore the need for the re-development of current thinking about state 
weakness, organised crime and corruption within the discourse of global 
governance.  
 
Although the notion of corruption is probably as old as human civilization, the wave 
of global anti-corruption norms and strategies began only in the early 1990s as an 
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effect of accelerated globalization processes.74 In a famous speech, then-president 
of the World Bank James Wolfensohn placed “the cancer of corruption” on the 
agenda of development organizations and international institutions. The fight 
against corruption was launched under the aegis of good governance and the 
promotion of accountability and transparency. International actors such as the IMF 
and the World Bank began to identify corruption as one of the main obstacles to 
economic growth in the developing world. The initiatives these organizations 
proclaimed reinvigorated interest in the topic of corruption in the academy as well, 
leading scholars to study the impact and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. 
Nonetheless, Alexander Cooley and Jason Sharman (2013) point out that popular 
conceptualization reproduces the idea that corruption is contained only within 
states and in the practices of their officials. In those instances when corruption is 
examined in a transnational context, it is usually presented as an indispensible part 
of criminal networks that link illicit activities with officials of weak states and illicit 
non-state actors, including organized crime factions, terrorists, weapons traffickers, 
drug smugglers and money launderers (Andreas, 2011; Cooley and Sharman, 
2013). 
 
However, by focusing on illicit globalization, scholars and policymakers often omit 
the role of licit actors and financial mechanisms in the developed world that 
facilitate the expansion of illicit and corrupt practices in developing states. Building 
upon an empirical study of supplying jet fuel to the American air base Manas, this 
work revealed that illicit practices in Kyrgyzstan were linked to licit and semi-licit 
practices in developed countries. For instance, the Kyrgyz Inquiry Commission of 
2005 confirmed that many businesses purportedly owned by the family of Akayev 
had offshore jurisdictions at the Isle of Man, the Seychelles, Liechtenstein, Cyprus 
and the Cayman Islands amongst many others. In turn, the fuel subcontracting 
firms owned by the son and the son-in-law of Akayev used their bank accounts at 
ABN AMRO and Citibank in New York purportedly for money laundering. In a 
similar vein, the watchdog Global Witness (2012) conducted its own investigation 
in Kyrgyzstan, but in this case related to its largest bank AsiaUniversalBank (AUB). 
74 For instance, see the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention (1997), the Council of Europe’s Criminal 
Law Convention on Corruption (1999), or the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003). 
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AUB was nationalized after the April events of 2010 and was accused of 
involvement in large-scale money laundering by the new government, whilst an 
independent EBRD-funded audit supported this view. Global Witness (2012) found 
significant evidence of money laundering through AUB, as dozens of onshore and 
offshore companies moved millions of dollars through the bank with no clear 
business activity. Nearly 1.2 billion USD passed through the AUB accounts of three 
UK companies, which then dissolved without filing any account information (Global 
Witness, 2012: 66). The largest transfers went through the UK’s Standard 
Chartered, Austrian Raiffeisen Bank and Citibank in New York (Global Witness, 
2012). In the most flagrant example, a UK company, which moved 700 million USD 
through its AUB account without any business activity in the UK, was owned by a 
Russian who died two years before the company was actually registered (Global 
Witness, 2012).  
 
Such findings reveal not only the stark inadequacy of how some of the world’s 
major economies monitor the registration of companies and contribute to global 
money-laundering, but also expose the symbiosis of illicit practices in developing 
countries with licit and semi-licit practices in developed countries. Indeed, Central 
Asia in general and Kyrgyzstan in particular provides excellent opportunities for the 
most privileged to amass fortunes at the expense of ordinary people. At the same 
time, the unlawful enrichment of Central Asian rulers and their entourages could 
not have been accomplished without the support of local and international brokers, 
offshore companies and major financial institutions, which operate within the realm 
of licit and formal norms and practices. The global assemblages of different players 
only conform to the proposed dynamics of transnational corruption, which takes 
place with the complicity of reputable international institutions or even with their 
direct engagement. 
 
Thus, corruption in the developing states and in Central Asia per se should be 
examined within a transnational context. The fusion of the formal global economy 
with local informal economies poses a serious regulatory challenge to both 
scholars and policymakers who seek to establish sustaining policies and greater 
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oversight over these spheres in accordance with practices of good governance, 
transparency and accountability. In this respect, changing the conversation about 
corruption is the first step towards effective global anti-corruption regime, which 
can eventually lead to the strengthening of legal norms and to the appearance of 
effective programs such as the recovery of stolen public assets. Rather than 
speaking about problems of merely local, national and regional provenance, we 
need to recognize that we are dealing here with global challenges requiring global 
solutions. 
 
Epilogue 
With the arrival of Almazbek Atambayev to the White House, it appears that Kyrgyz 
foreign policy is no longer inconsistent and fragmentary. Portraying himself as an 
anti-corruption champion, Atambayev promised to fight corruption and turn 
Kyrgyzstan into a prosperous and developed state. The new President of 
Kyrgyzstan has been quite explicit in his foreign policy preferences. Kyrgyzstan is 
at the verge of joining the Russian-led Customs Union. The Americans shifted the 
air transit to Romania and finally left the Manas Air Base. Gazprom has purchased 
Kyrgyzstan’s largest gas company for a symbolic 1 USD. RusHydro has been 
selected to construct and develop hydroelectric power plants in the Kyrgyz region 
of Naryn. Rosneft expressed interest in purchasing the stakes of the Manas airport, 
whilst Moscow offered a military aid package to Bishkek in the amount of 1 billion 
USD. It is yet unknown whether these advances signal the formation of a strong 
Kyrgyz foreign policy vector or whether Kyrgyzstan is becoming a client state of 
Russia. However, the findings of my research suggest that the Kyrgyz elites tend to 
prioritise their own security and thus shape the foreign policies of the country in 
accordance to their own priorities. Consequently, these recent developments may 
turn out to be again the mere acts of virtual politics in order for the new ruling 
regime to ensure its survival and further its rent-seeking interests. 
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